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This volume is based on papers presented at the two-day international 
conference ―Towards an Asian Century: Future of Economic Cooperation 
in SAARC Countries‖ held on November 20-21, 2013 at Islamabad Hotel, 
Islamabad. The Conference was jointly organized by the Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute (IPRI) and the Hanns Seidel Foundation, (HSF) 
Islamabad. 
The organisers of the Conference are especially thankful to Mr. 
Kristof Duwaerts, Resident Representative, HSF, Islamabad, for his co-
operation and sharing the financial expense of the Conference. 
For the papers presented in this volume, we are grateful to all 
participants from Pakistan and abroad, as well as the chief guests and 
chairpersons of the different sessions. We are also thankful to the scholars, 
students and professionals, who accepted our invitation to participate in the 
Conference. 
The successful completion of the Conference owes much to the 
efforts and logistical support provided by the staff of the IPRI and the HSF.  
Finally, our thanks are due to all those whom it would not be possible 
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Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin 
Col. (R) Muhammad Hanif and Muhammad Nawaz Khan 
 
his volume is based on the papers and presentations made at the two-
day International Conference on ―Towards an Asian Century: Future 
of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries‖ jointly organised by 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and Hanns Seidel Foundation 
(HSF), Germany at the Islamabad Hotel, Islamabad on November 20-21, 
2013. Prominent scholars, academicians and policy-makers from 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and 
European Union (Germany) participated in the conference and shared their 
views on different aspects of future of economic cooperation in SAARC 
countries. The discussions focused on political and economic developments 
in the SAARC countries in the last 30 years and the future outlook with 
regard to peace and progress towards closer economic integration in South 
Asia. 
The emergence of China as a rising economic power and dynamism 
of the East Asian economies as engines of growth of the global economy 
together with the oil wealth of West Asian countries, the twenty-first 
century is being termed as the Asian century. This economic progress has 
helped millions of people of the Asian continent to come out of their abject 
poverty. Asia‘s economy is expected to expand at robust rates and it is 
likely to account for more than half of global output by the year 2050. A 
2011 study by the Asian Development Bank found that an additional three 
billion Asians could enjoy living standards similar to those in Europe today. 
If this projected position is realized by Asia, its average per capita income 
could rise above US$ 40,000 (in constant purchasing power parity terms). 
The Asian century will, however, be realized if the continent‘s growth is 
broad-based and its prosperity extends across the continent to South Asia, 
Central Asia and the Pacific Islands. 
South Asia‘s growth rate in the recent past makes the subcontinent 
currently the fastest growing region in the world. It has experienced six per 
cent average economic growth annually over the past twenty years which 
has resulted in impressive improvement in human development indicators. 
The present decline in growth rates in South Asia appears to be a temporary 
phase. Some analysts predict that South Asia‘s growth rate will rise again 
and progress at six to eight per cent until 2030. Comparing this to the 
T 
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declining growth of the global economy, analysts believe that South Asia 
will play a major role in future development of the continent. 
South Asian leaders are of the view that high and sustained growth 
rate can be speedily achieved by pooling regional resources through mutual 
economic cooperation. The Addu Declaration issued at the end of the 
SAARC Summit at Addu, Maldives in November 2011, firmly resolves to 
realize the objective of regional economic cooperation.  
So far South Asia has lagged behind other regions of the world, 
despite the fact that SAARC leaders have taken various concrete steps, such 
as signing of South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2004. The 
slow progress in achieving regional cooperation has been due to various 
reasons like underdeveloped infrastructure, poor connectivity, bureaucratic 
hurdles in decision making, preoccupation with security issues and political 
instability.  
Pakistan as a SAARC member is convinced that regional economic 
collaboration will benefit all South Asian countries in their economic 
development and in alleviating poverty in the region. To pave the way for 
this objective, Pakistan wants that mutual political differences and disputes 
impeding the process of economic cooperation should be resolved as a 
priority with sincerity and mutual accommodation through result oriented 
dialogue. This is the only way out unless South Asia wants to remain stuck 
with old disputes that have done no good to people of the subcontinent who 
certainly deserve better. Pakistan also considers that to achieve the 
objective of regional economic cooperation, SAARC countries can benefit 
from China‘s close and expanding economic relations with South Asian 
countries and also learn from EU‘s experience of achieving economic 
integration. This calls for pragmatism and taking practical measures. The 
international conference titled ―Towards an Asian Century: Future of 
Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries‖ organised by IPRI on 20-21 
November 2013 was an effort in that very direction. The proceedings of that 
conference are now being published in the form of a book. 
The book has two parts. The first includes the Welcome Address by 
Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin, President IPRI, Opening Remarks by Mr. 
Kristof W. Duwaerts, Resident Representative, Hanns Seidel Foundation, 
Islamabad, Inaugural Address by the Chief Guest, Ambassador Riaz 
Mohammad Khan, former Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Government of Pakistan and Concluding Address by Dr. Ishrat Husain, 
former Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, Dean and Director, Institute of 
Business Administration (IBA), Karachi. The second part of the book 
consists of 16 papers read and presentations made at the conference by 
scholars from Bangladesh, China, Nepal, Sir Lanka and EU (Germany),  
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Afghanistan and India in addition to local scholars.. The proceedings of the 
Conference are briefly described below: 
In his welcome address, Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin greeted the 
speakers, guests and audience and highlighted the significance of the theme 
of the conference. He said that one of the main objectives of the SAARC 
was to address issues of poverty and economic development in South Asia 
by accelerating economic growth through cooperation with emphasis on 
intra-regional trade in goods and services, energy, food security and water 
resource management. But despite the South Asia Free Trade Agreement 
having been signed in 2004 and the existence of institutional arrangements 
such as SAFTA Ministerial Council, SAFTA Committee of Experts and 
SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the volume of trade between 
SAARC member states had not exceeded three billion US dollars by 
September 2013 which was much below the region‘s potential. He stressed 
that SAARC countries needed to hasten the resolution of their bilateral 
issues and disputes which were the main hurdle in meeting this objective of 
the SAARC.  
In his opening remarks, Mr. Kristof Duwaerts wondered if like the 
20
th
 Century — which some had called the American century — the 21st 
Century might not eventually become the ―Asian century‖ or rather the 
―Chinese century‖. Despite the remarkable economic growth of several 
Asian countries, unlike the EU, the SAARC was still falling behind to a 
large extent. So, at the moment at least, the ―Chinese century‖ epithet 
looked more probable, he said. Integration was easier done in stages, topic 
and region wise i.e., compartmentally, as through integration of SAARC 
countries in south Asia. Yet despite the present difficulties, Asia was still 
the most significant Continent of the current century because of its 
important role in world politics economics and history. Mr. Kristof added 
that the Hanns Seidel Foundation had recognized that early which was 
reflected in its wide ranging activities across the continent through 31 
offices that were collaborating with Asian think tanks and other such 
organizations. He said the holding of the international conference on 
―Towards an Asian Century: Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC 
Countries‖ by IPRI and HSF was an important step towards that goal. Mr. 
Kristof thanked all participants of the conference. 
 In his inaugural address, Ambassador (R) Riaz Mohammad Khan 
said that the most distinctive feature of the twenty-first century was regional 
cooperation for accelerated trade and economic development as in the post-
cold war scenario the imperatives of geo-economics had attained primacy 
over geo-politics. He mentioned the impressive growth of many Asian 
countries in the last 30 years and of South Asian countries in the last 10 
years as the determining features of the ―Asian century‖ concept. 
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Discussing reasons why SAARC was lagging behind other regional groups 
he mentioned the meagre intra-regional trade which indicated the problems 
that needed to be overcome. He added that the challenges faced by South 
Asia were poverty alleviation, illiteracy, population control and 
employment of the world‘s largest youth bulge.  In addition there were 
issues of environmental degradation, climate change, water and food 
security. Ambassador Riaz said that all these challenges could be addressed 
through regional cooperation. He thought that SAARC‘s slow progress was 
due to the member nations‘ inability to fuse their domestic agendas with the 
SAARC agenda. There was little in terms of concrete SAARC projects and 
enterprises that could fire the imagination of South Asians. He emphasised 
on not letting political issues impede the progress of trade among the 
members. He advocated giving priority to cooperation in energy, 
connectivity, environment and water management. He said that the 
organizational structure of SAARC and its capabilities with respect to 
economic cooperation should be exploited by all SAARC member states to 
transform SAARC into a vibrant organization worthy of the shared history, 
heritage and culture.  
In his concluding address, Dr. Ishrat Husain remarked that  South 
Asia had not achieved one-third of the its potential in 60 years despite the 
fact that Asia was the prime mover of the global economic growth in 2013. 
The 2008 financial crisis proved the resilience of the Asian states. He said 
that global or regional cooperation was the derivative of what each nation 
wanted to do for itself. Looking at each regional grouping, there was a pivot 
and that pivot played an important role in either making the region work or 
destroying it completely. He said that India was the pivot in South Asia, so 
whatever happened in India had its repercussion on the whole region. He 
blamed India for not playing its due role in the region. India had to be more 
magnanimous and more generous in its approach as far as economic activity 
was concerned. It was in the interest of India to act as a pivot for South 
Asian economies which in fact was a win-win and not a zero-sum game. He 
pointed out that every time Pakistan agreed to phase out the negative list, 
some non-economic factor cropped up and derailed the entire process of 
normalization. He was of the view that political normalization should not be 
made a precondition and Pakistan should try to normalize its economic 
relations which would lead to political normalization also. And in this 
context he cited the example of India and China in improving their bilateral 
relations despite their political disputes over Laddakh and Arunchal 
Pradesh. As a result their bilateral trade had gone up to US$ 75 billion. Dr. 
Ishrat Hussain emphasised that SAARC states, particularly India, should 
urgently remove nontariff barriers to trade. 
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In his paper on “Regional Trade: Driver for Economic Growth”, 
Dr. Kamal Monnoo analyses the South Asian economies that are now 
increasingly exploiting the benefits of greater market openness, although 
their performance still lags behind other regions and SAARC is one of the 
least integrated regions in the world. He says that regions that failed to offer 
space for joint production and common productivity development, tended to 
lose in the long run. The fact is that bilateral trade on equitable terms can be 
very beneficial for both Pakistan and India and increased trade, investment 
and joint ventures within the SAARC countries can be the main driver of 
growth for the entire South Asian region. In fact the dynamics of smooth 
intra-regional trade if brought into play can be pivotal in strengthening the 
economies of all South Asian countries by unleashing a soft process that 
might create a helpful environment for resolving long standing political 
issues between SAARC countries which would further boost mutual 
economic cooperation.   
In his paper, Dr. Janak Lal Karmacharya on “Meeting Energy 
Requirements Potential for Intra-regional Energy Trade”, highlights 
that SAARC states have diverse sources of energy yet the energy situation 
is acute in the region. The energy sector must grow on an average rate of 
2‐3 per cent over the GDP growth rate just to sustain the prevailing SAARC 
economy. He notes that there is huge potential for intra‐state electricity 
trade among the SAARC countries which is reflected in the formation of 
SAARC Working Group on Energy. Besides, the creation of a Power Pool 
would enable the region to utilize its sources of electricity optimally by 
balancing the demand and supply. This could make electricity cheap and 
reliable. Moreover, this would create interdependence among SAARC 
nations. Dr. Janak says that this was the way to a win‐win solution. 
Ms. Arshi Saleem Hashmi, in her paper on “Building Regional 
Transport and Communication Infrastructure”, emphasises the 
importance of transport as the backbone of economic activity and social 
development. For improving connectivity, each mode of transport — roads, 
railways, maritime shipping and aviation, has its own physical and 
operational characteristics. She explains that connectivity challenges in 
South Asia include both hard (structural issues) and soft (agreements, legal 
framework) issues that require better understanding and adequate support. 
She discusses numerous challenges to regional connectivity in South Asia 
such as restrictive policy regimes and institutional issues. She says that 
South Asian countries are racing more towards globalization than 
regionalization. Ms. Arshi believes that the region, with its geographical 
contiguity, has a great potential for cooperation in the connectivity sector. 
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Prof. Savita Pande, in her paper on “Developing Energy Corridor 
from Central and West Asia to South Asia”, explains that cross-border 
trade in energy is a strategic issue. It has a great potential for creating 
cooperation among the states. Energy trade is a win-win situation for every 
state as it is an economic gain for importer and exporter alike as well as for 
the transit country. The afore-mentioned dividends may be classified as 
―relative gains‖ — a theory that governs international relations. She further 
highlights that Pakistan is facing energy crisis because it lacks infrastructure 
to import natural gas. Besides, she elaborates that Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) 
pipeline could only be economical for Pakistan if India enters in the deal. 
She terms IPI as the mother of all CBMs between Pakistan and India if it 
ever materializes. Since India has not officially withdrawn from IPI so it is 
expected that sooner or later India will join it. But there are challenges like 
the security situation in Balochistan. She admits that geo-strategically the 
IPI project gave leverage to Pakistan over India as far as energy corridor 
politics is concerned. She also points out that China will not join IPI as 
there is a dispute over costs and also because of the US factor. On 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline she is of the 
opinion that although it will boost economic cooperation in the region yet 
there are some issues as well. The quantity of gas available in Turkmenistan 
is not known, the issue of pricing is not settled, and above all the security 
situation in Afghanistan is a big challenge 
In their joint paper, “The New Silk Road Initiative: Economic 
Dividends”, Mr. Mohammad Yousuf Saber and Mr. Nabi Sarooh call 
the ―New Silk Road‖ strategy as the best option for economic and regional 
cooperation. This economic initiative will open business markets for the 
Central and South Asian countries to interact with each other and integrate 
their economies. Pakistan has a great role in that as the second land-bridge 
between Central Asia and India, and further with the rest of the South Asian 
countries. The ―Modern Silk Road‖ strategy was proposed by many 
European, Asian and Afghan economists‘ decades ago, but the vision could 
not materialize. This ―New Silk Road Initiative‖ has been proposed by the 
US to ensure economic growth and poverty reduction in Afghanistan. The 
integration of Afghanistan with neighbouring states is being postulated as 
the foremost task within the framework of the ―New Silk Road‖ strategy. 
Both the speakers note that the strategy might open India to Afghanistan 
and Central Asia through Pakistan. 
Dr. Liu Zongyi, in his paper on “China‟s Growing Economic 
Relations with South Asia: A Positive Development”, explains that 
although the economic relations between China and SAARC have 
developed at a very fast pace  in the past ten years, economic integration 
between China and SAARC is  the slowest compared to other regional 
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economic organizations around China. China‘s prosperous economy is the 
best driving force for South Asian countries‘ development and SAARC 
integration. Chinese leaders have put forward plans for the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, BCIM economic corridor, and China-Pakistan economic 
corridor (CPEC) to enhance Sino-SAARC cooperation. China‘s trade 
volumes with SAARC countries grew very fast between 2001 and 2012. 
The bilateral trade volume expanded from 6.5 billion US$ in 2001 to 73.9 
billion US$ in 2012, with an average growth rate of 26 per cent. Despite 
this healthy development Mr. Liu sees some problems in China-SAARC 
bilateral trade such as the imbalanced trade structure in which most South 
Asian countries have trade deficit with China which is increasing gradually. 
The Chinese scholar explains various large-scale economic projects which 
China is undertaking in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal and 
Pakistan. He also describes the significance of the Chinese long term plan 
of constructing Pakistan-China Economic Corridor costing approximately 
US$18 billion. About China-India economic relations,  Mr. Liu notes that 
Sino-Indian relations are becoming better and mutual trade volumes are 
increasing but the  relations are still fragile due to lack of  strategic trust. 
The Indian strategic and security community remains concerned about 
China‘s activities in South Asian countries and the Indian Ocean. Mr. Liu 
explains that this distrust is mainly due to the Western countries‘ 
propaganda manoeuvres to create differences between the two countries. 
One such example is the ―string of pearls‖ theory which many India 
scholars have also started believing in. 
In his paper on “Fast Tracking Economic Collaboration in 
SAARC Countries”, Dr. Pervez Tahir elaborates that trade, the 
characteristic feature of regional economic blocs, is missing as an area of 
cooperation in the SAARC Charter. It took six years to mandate economic 
cooperation in 1991. A number of stumbling blocks had slow-tracked the 
expansion of regional trade. One of the major hurdle has been the political 
issues and disputes between India and all other SAARC countries due to 
which mutual economic cooperation and implementation of various trade 
agreements have remained impeded. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) have been 
another stumbling block and India has the longest list of NTBs. Pakistan 
has its own set of NTBs for reasons of national security, health, 
environment and religion. Dr. Pervez points out that South Asia is an 
energy deficient region, and no member is endowed with surpluses of fossil 
fuels. Fast tracking any regional initiative in the energy sector is a difficult 
proposition. Two extra-regional initiatives have a promise, but in this 
context any breakthrough in near future is unlikely. The first is Iran-
Pakistan-India gas pipeline from which India has already pulled out and 
Pakistan has neither the money nor the hope that the United States would 
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exempt it from sanctions. Similarly, the fate of the other project, 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline is linked 
with peace and stability in Afghanistan. Mutual trade also remains 
hampered due to poor regional connectivity. In this regard, he suggested 
that the road, rail, air and communication links needed to be improved. 
In his presentation on “Future of Economic Cooperation in 
SAARC Countries: A View from FPCCI” Mr. Muhammad Ali 
identifies the most common Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) which are 
holding back progress. These NTMs are: a strong focus on food security 
and self-sufficiency; complexities and variations in licensing; permits and 
tariffs; anti-dumping duties and quantitative restrictions; duties and charges 
over and above tariffs; import of specific products through specified ports 
only; transportation restrictions; import only by state trading agencies; and 
stringent visa regimes etc. He suggests that to enhance intra-regional trade 
SAARC countries should minimize these NTMS on priority basis.   
Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan, in his paper on “Economic Cooperation 
among SAARC Countries: Political Constraints”, discusses the political 
constraints in respect of trade and economic cooperation among the 
SAARC countries at the bilateral as well as multi-lateral levels. He 
elaborates that although bilateral connectivity shows signs of growth in the 
last decade, SAARC members are still hostage to political constraints; and 
unless efforts are made to mitigate them, the goal of regional integration 
would remain elusive. He identifies four types of political constraints in the 
economic field namely strategic discord emanating from divergent 
perceptions of India and its neighbours on issues of peace and security in 
the region; lingering bilateral disputes, especially between Pakistan and 
India; domestic political compulsions; and the influence of extra-regional 
powers pursuing their economic and strategic interests in the region. Dr. 
Rashid Ahmad recommends that for building sustainable regional economic 
cooperation, it is necessary for the SAARC member states to display 
flexibility and the spirit of give and take to resolve their long standing 
bilateral disputes 
In his presentation on “Implications of Bilateral and Sub-regional 
trade Agreements on Economic Cooperation: A Case Study of  SAARC 
in South Asia”, Dr. Syed Akhtar Hussain Shah said that regional or 
bilateral trade agreements have now become the dominant mode of 
international commerce and their significance continues to grow. Among 
SAARC countries, various trade and economic agreements exist at regional, 
sub-regional, multilateral and bilateral levels. He highlights the fact that 
multilateral agreements relating to economic development contribute 
towards socio-economic development of individual states leading to 
regional cooperation. While bilateral agreements in the short run could be 
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worse being less competitive, less informed with weak marketing networks 
etc. in the long run these agreements would contribute more to regional 
cooperation. 
Dr. Barkat-e-Khuda, in his paper on “Implementation of SAFTA: 
Bottlenecks”, holds that regional trade is being hampered by a number of 
issues that are in the way of SAFTA implementation. These are: sensitive 
lists; poor connectivity and transit crisis; insufficient transit; poor logistics 
affecting cost of export and import; institutional constraints; bi-lateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs); non-tariff and para-tariff barriers; exclusive focus 
on ―trade in goods‖; identical comparative advantage; fear of loss of 
revenue; lack of trust; and trading blocs with countries outside the region. 
To implement SAFTA on priority basis he recommends that these issues 
should be addressed by the SAARC member states mutually and through 
negotiations at SAARC level. 
In his paper Dr. Wolfgang-Peter Zingel on “Economic 
Cooperation among SAARC Countries: An EU Perspective”, says that 
the initiative to form SAARC was welcomed in Europe. It is actively 
supported by European governments and especially by the European 
Commission. Since SAARC opened itself to other regional organizations 
and countries in 1995 to join it as observers and the European Union (EU) 
became an observer in 2006 its relations with SAARC have not been very 
active. EU‘s trade ties have been with SAARC nations but not with it on a 
regional basis. He cites EU trade deals with member countries only, none 
with SAARC. EU is not a blueprint for SAARC necessarily but there is lot 
to learn from each other‘s experiences. Mr. Wolfgang suggests that SAARC 
can hasten the process of economic cooperation by resolving their long 
standing political issues and disputes following the example of EU which 
addressed the old disputes that had caused among its members two world 
wars. 
Dr. Salman Shah, in his paper on “Implementing SAFTA and 
Joint Economic Ventures as CBMs”, highlights the importance of 
understanding the 2011 report of the Asian Development Bank on Asian 
Century which says that the projected average per capita income in Asia 
will likely cross US$ 42000 by 2050 with Pakistan crossing US$ 7900 and 
India $42000. He suggests that it is in the interest of the region that all 
countries of South Asia put their own houses in order to be winners in the 
Asian Century by following the recommendations of the report and 
achieving mutual economic cooperation. Furthermore, the future of this 
cooperation is particularly affected by the overwhelming footprint of 
Pakistan-India relationship on the region. While in Pakistan there is a 
general consensus among the political parties of the need to achieve a 
breakthrough on trade issues with India and the current political leadership 
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in Pakistan could claim to be champions for trade and peace, but no such 
trends are visible in India. In South Asia the main dilemma is that each 
country feels satisfied if it runs a trade surplus in its bilateral trade but feels 
cheated if it runs a big deficit in its trade balance. The bigger the deficit, the 
weaker is the political position of the proponents of free trade. Thus 
progress in implementing SAFTA and liberalized trade fall victim to the 
fear factor prevalent in each country that freer trade will strengthen the 
opposing country and swamp their domestic production. A clear joint 
venture that needs to be initiated in the SAARC region is to establish a 
competitiveness research hub that evaluates the relative competitiveness of 
SAARC countries and how they will fare in a free trade environment. In 
this regard, the establishment of a SAARC University could be a follow up 
activity. Secondly there is a need to promote travel and tourism within the 
SAARC region to build confidence amongst the people of the region for 
greater economic cooperation. There is a need to establish joint 
infrastructure funds to facilitate connectivity in the region. At some point in 
the future a joint investment company can be established to facilitate cross 
border investments. This could lead to establishment of a SAARC Bank to 
facilitate trade and investment. 
In his paper “Replacing Conflict with Peace in South Asia”, 
Ambassador (R) Nihal Rodrigo asserts that Sri Lanka has replaced a 
violent conflict with productive peace in the Island following decades 
during which its people had to confront the separatist mono-ethnic terrorism 
of the so-called Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Tamil area 
has now successfully concluded elections to its Provincial Council in 
September 2013. He notes that virtually all SAARC countries are now 
committed to democratic norms. None of the SAARC countries are 
monolithic in their ethnic, religious or social composition. This has its 
impact, internally on governance, on bilateral relations and on conflicts with 
neighbours, as well as in respect of relations with other member states of 
SAARC. He suggests that genuine engagement of the people is essential to 
replace conflict with peace. He holds China as the major player in the 
current century as with the trumpets of the Asian Century blowing, a series 
of bilateral and multilateral engagements are being developed in 
considerable harmony by the world‘s two largest economies, the US and 
China. 
Prof. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, in his paper on “Sustainable and 
Result-oriented Dispute Resolution Mechanism between Pakistan and 
India”, elaborates that no dispute resolution mechanism can effectively 
work without demonstrated political will to resolve the disputes by the 
involved parties. It becomes even more difficult if there is a pronounced 
asymmetry between powers and the stronger party is not willing to 
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renounce the use of force. Dr. Cheema discusses different approaches to 
conflict resolution i.e., negotiations, third party involvement (mediation), 
UN special representative‘s good offices, arbitration, and adjudication. 
Almost all of the above mentioned approaches have been employed in one 
form or the other with a view to resolving disputes in South Asia and more 
specifically between India and Pakistan. Among the relatively more 
prominent cases in which the mediation efforts successfully resolved the 
crises and in some cases reduced tension there is the Indus Water Treaty, 
Tashkent Declaration, Rann of Kutch Award and the four years of peace 
process (2004-2008). He points out that compared to ASEAN, SAARC has 
not been able to develop a conflict resolution mechanism. The SAARC does 
not have a forum like ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) where the states of 
South Asia could discuss their political disputes with honesty of purpose. 
The annual summit and periodic ministerial meetings at SAARC level do 
provide an opportunity to member states to exchange views on controversial 
issues but that is all they do. Dr. Cheema further explains that no regional 
dispute resolving mechanism is likely to work if there does not exist the 
political will. In fact the future of all regional organizations is heavily 
dependent upon the goodwill of member countries, especially India, being a 
major country, in the case of SAARC. 
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Welcome Address 
Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin 
 
Former Foreign Secretary Ambassador Riaz Mohammad Khan, 
Resident Representative Hanns Seidel Foundation Mr. Kristof Duwaerts, 
 
Honourable Parliamentarians,  
Excellencies,  
Distinguished Scholars,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,  
Good Morning!  
 
 welcome former Foreign Secretary Ambassador Riaz Mohammad Khan 
who has kindly accepted our invitation to be the Chief Guest at this 
conference. I welcome distinguished scholars from SAARC member 
states including Pakistan and all others who have found time to enrich this 
conference with their valuable input. It is a matter of pride for the 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute and Hans Seidel Foundation for having 
been able to arrange such a distinguished gathering of able scholars, 
economists and researchers from the entire South Asian region. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen,  
This is the time when Islamabad is embracing the winter season after the 
monsoon rains. I am sure the distinguished guests from abroad will enjoy 
the beauty of our capital city.  
 
Ladies and gentlemen,  
Today and tomorrow, researchers and scholars from SAARC member states 
will be exploring the future of economic cooperation among SAARC 
countries.  
One of the main objectives of SAARC is to accelerate economic 
growth among member states. Important drivers of growth that have already 
been identified by South Asian countries are trade in goods and services, 
greater cooperation in the energy sector, food security and water resource 
management.  
We all know that the South Asia Free Trade Agreement was signed in 
January 2004 during the 12th SAARC Summit held in Pakistan. The 
Agreement entered into force two years later, and the trade liberalization 
programme commenced from 1st July 2006. Following the Agreement, the 
I 
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SAFTA Ministerial Council comprising the Commerce Ministers of the 
member States was established which meets regularly. To assist the 
Ministers of Commerce, a SAFTA Committee of Experts (SCOE) also 
meets regularly and submits its report to SAFTA Ministerial Council every 
six months. Cooperation in the field of finance and related areas is 
discussed during the meeting of Finance Ministers, also held regularly. The  
SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services came into force last year 
but adequate data on this is not yet available. 
The SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry has also been also 
in place since 1992. It is comprised of the national federations of Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry of all the member states. It is meant to 
encourage development of business linkages "amongst entrepreneurs of 
South Asian region in the fields of trade, service, industry, small and 
medium enterprises, and agriculture. Developing global linkages is also a 
part of its outreach strategy.  
 
Ladies and gentlemen,  
As of Sept 2013, the volume of trade between SAARC member states has 
not exceeded 3 billion US dollars. This is still far below the desired level 
and the true potential of the region.  
With all these institutional arrangements in place, SAARC should 
have been an important platform to acts as a facilitator in speeding up 
regional economic cooperation. Some believe that one of the impediments 
in regional cooperation is the variance in degree of economic development 
of member states which brings in the factor of incompatibility. Member 
states do not have the capacity to provide necessary support to economies of 
the less developed partners. Competition within South Asia is, therefore, the 
common practice. It does not, therefore, seem unusual that instead of 
benefitting from SAFT A, preference is given by member states to bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen,  
There is a common consensus amongst analysts that bilateral problems have 
dwarfed the capacity of an otherwise vibrant organisation. The spirit to 
benefit from key SAARC economic processes is, therefore, lacking.  
Today and tomorrow eminent scholars from South Asian countries 
and renowned economists from Pakistan will be discussing the future of 
economic cooperation among SAARC countries. Presentations will focus 
on intra and extra regional incentives for economic cooperation and also the 
impediments that need to be overcome through collective efforts of member 
states. Policy makers in SAARC countries will surely benefit from the 
recommendations made at this conference.  
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Ladies and gentlemen,  
I take this opportunity to thank the Chairpersons who will be presiding over 
the four sessions of the Conference spread over two days. I am sure that all 
the participants will benefit from the expert views of the distinguished 
scholars who will be presenting their papers at this conference. Papers read 
here will later be compiled in the form of a book which Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute together with Hans Seidel Foundation will publish soon 
after the Conference.  
Thank you. 




Kristof W. Duwaerts,  




 would like to welcome you all very much to this conference on the 
―Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries‖. I am grateful 
and feel humbled for the presence of so many renowned scholars and 
practitioners in the field of regional South Asian integration.  I am hopeful 
that your voices will be heard, this not only in Pakistan, but also beyond. 
Whereas the 20
th
 Century has been termed the American Century, 
many observers are wondering whether the 21
st
 Century might eventually 
become the ―Asian Century‖ or – alternatively - rather the ―Chinese 
Century‖. Regional integration still falling behind to a large extent, at the 
moment the ―Chinese Century‖ in my eyes is a much more likely option. 
Whereas Europe has made the big leap forward by integrating a whole 
continent into the European Union, today there is not yet one Asia, but 
rather several ―Asias‖. 
Kishore Mahbubani, a notable Sindhi-Singaporean proponent of 
―Asian values‖, and the future of the ―Asian hemisphere‖ in this context 
talks about ―the Chinese, Indians, Muslims, and others‖. I would go further 
and say that we observe in Asia today, at best, six different sub-regions, 
being Southeast Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and West Asia, the latter being 
a catch-phrase for many states, and not so much a political entity 
whatsoever. Then there is the former Soviet Republic with many relatively 
young nation states diversifying into new realms, and the Arab Peninsula. 
All in all we are talking about 49 countries or a population of roughly four 
billion people, or two thirds of mankind.  
No wonder, the integration, or rather the integrations, take an 
enormous amount of time. We observe a huge span of economic, political, 
cultural differences, going far beyond Mahbubani‘s characterization. 
Integration in Europe was or rather is ―only‖ about 28 states and the 
comparatively small number of half a billion people, with more or less the 
same cultural roots, and just look at how many shortcomings can be 
observed still today. In short, it is easier, i.e., much less time-intensive to 
describe what ―Asian‖ states have in common, than to try to come up with 
the differences, which would fill libraries. 
I 
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This common denominator in Asia is the remarkable economic rise 
those states have observed in recent years. A common denominator, which 
goes far beyond cultural, political or other barriers; a denominator which 
includes the whole population of Asia, and not only certain layers; a 
denominator which even can transcend political barriers, as observed in 
East Asia. The Peoples‘ Republic of China is — by far — the most 
important trade partner of Japan, but just take a look at the political 
standoffs, which have arisen between the two countries in recent years, in 
fact ever since the end of the Second World War.  
The success of integration is much more likely when done 
compartmentally, both in terms of topics and regions. Again, let me quote 
the past: the European Union started off as a mere economic cooperation 
between six western European states, which can be traced back to the 
rapprochement between what was considered to be two hereditary enemies 
for more than six decades: France and Germany. And look at where we 
stand today: No borders, same currency, a European identity in the making. 
But, one caveat: It took us sixty years. Advancements cannot be made 
quickly, they need to be realized sustainably. 
One thing is for sure, Asia plays an ever more important role in world 
politics, in world economics, in world history. Asia for the time being is 
important because its parts are important, not so much because the continent 
as such would evolve certain dynamics. The United States dominated the 
20
th
 century both politically and economically as one unit. 
Let‘s look at how to make a unit out of the Asian mosaic. Taking into 
account the compartmental argument, Asia as a continent with its 49 states 
cannot be integrated at once. So what about starting in South Asia, what 
about a regional forum, which has been in existence ever since 1985. What 
about SAARC, consisting of currently eight member states, most of who 
representatives are with us in this room? And what better topic could there 
be than economic cooperation? Economic cooperation between SAARC 
countries, which to a certain degree, share the same historical and economic 
past. 
The Hanns Seidel Foundation had recognized the importance of Asia 
many years ago. All over the continent we currently run 31 offices and 
numerous projects in many fields pertinent to the current needs of the 
respective countries. We support projects which are conceptualized by 
people of the respective countries for people of the respective countries. 
What we don‘t run yet is any kind of regional office in Asia. The closest we 
can get to this is run in Indonesia, where we closely interrelate with the 
ASEAN secretariat. I would personally be very much thankful, if there were 
some good reasons for me to put before my headquarters in Munich to show 
the need for opening a SAARC regional office. I am really much looking 
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forward to the results of this conference and the findings with regard to the 
means of economic cooperation between South Asian nations. I hope, this 
conference will be contributing towards the goal of regional integration in 
the field of economic cooperation, small as this contribution might be. 
Let me thank our dear partner institute, the Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute for once again organizing an international conference on 
a very timely issue. Let me thank you, dear speakers from all over the 
SAARC region (and beyond) for making such an international conference 
possible and meaningful. Let me, last but not least, thank you, dear 
audience, dear ladies and gentlemen, for showing this conference, and 
thereby the topics discussed here, the interest which they certainly deserve. 
Thank you for showing us that you value the conferences which IPRI and 









Riaz Mohammad Khan  
Former Foreign Secretary 
 
hanks for giving me the opportunity to share my views on a matter 
important to all of us in South Asia. I also welcome the many 
eminent scholars and personalities who have travelled to Islamabad 
to participate in this conference.  
The topic "Towards an Asian Century: Future of Economic 
Cooperation in SAARC Countries" readily brings to mind two issues: What 
is shaping an Asian Century, and in that perspective where do west and as 
South Asia and as members of SAARC, our regional organization. 
 
The Asian Century  
The Twenty-First Century which is sometimes described as the Asian 
Century is being shaped by 'the post-Cold War dynamics with ascendency 
of geo-economics and the phenomenon of Globalization spurred by 
information and technological revolutions and manifest in unprecedented 
global interaction. A most distinctive feature is regional cooperation for 
accelerated trade and economic development. As a consequence, 
imperatives of geo-economics appear to override geo-political tensions.  
With the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world, confrontational 
politics at the global level had subsided giving way to competition and 
cooperation among great powers in today's steadily emerging multi-polar 
world.  
Surely, conflicts have not disappeared. Afghanistan, Iraq, many other 
parts of the world and recently of the Middle East have suffered conflict 
and turmoil while old disputes such as Palestine and Kashmir continue to 
defy resolution. The promise of peace associated with the end of the Cold 
War has proved to be elusive. There are ominous tensions surfacing around 
the Asia-Pacific sea board. In addition there is the menace of terrorism and 
extremism.  
Yet, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have witnessed the limitation of use 
of military power and the need for diplomacy and dialogue. Terrorism and 
extremism continue to ravage countries especially where they breed, but at 
the same time there is increasing international cooperation to counter this 
threat. In East China Sea and the South China Sea regions, recent tension 
has also given rise to concerns favouring circumspection and restraint and a 
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deep and shared appreciation that tensions must not be allowed to 
compromise the momentous transformation and historic gains in East Asia 
especially during the past three decades.  
On the whole, these developments are unlikely to reverse the trends 
for trade and economic cooperation set over the past three decades that have 
transformed many regions in the world, especially East Asia and South East 
Asia, into engines of global economic growth. Geo-economics has a 
powerful and inexorable logic. This coupled with the inspiration of building 
knowledge-based societies augurs well for Asia.  
The Asian development has altered the political landscape of the 
world. If we compare with the world situation on the eve of the Twentieth 
Century, what we witness today was unthinkable then. The change is not 
just spectacular it has by any measure brought about a better world order 
which is more equitable, more prosperous and more participatory. Thus 
describing the current century as the Asian century is justified.  
 
South Asia 
Turning to South Asia, there is little doubt that the region has made 
progress. Economic growth rates have been considerable, in particular of 
India which has become a leading economy in the world. Despite problems, 
Pakistan also showed consistent growth for many years in the last decade. 
However, regional cooperation especially within the framework of SAARC 
leaves much to be desired. This is more poignant when we compare 
progress made by other regional organizations such as the ASEAN, GCC or 
MERCOSUR. Figures for inter-regional trade are tell-tale.  
According to an estimate the intraregional trade within SAARC 
region is less than 5 per cent of its total trade. Compare this figure with20 
per cent among members of ASEAN and 15 per cent among MERCOSUR 
members and 50 per cent among countries of East Asia including South 
East Asia and 20 per cent among countries of Latin America.  
The figures point to both the potential and the problems that need to 
be overcome.  
South Asia faces serious challenges that depend on regional 
cooperation for their alleviation and redress. Social indicators in the region 
are among the lowest in the world, despite the resources and 
resourcefulness of the South Asian people.  
The examples of major challenges include:  
 
 poverty alleviation, South Asia is home to the largest 
population in numbers living below the poverty line;  
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 addressing illiteracy, again South Asia has the largest 
population that remains deprived of basic education;  
 population control, the population density in each of the South 
Asian countries underscores the magnitude of the problem;  
 employment for the largest youth bulge in the world;  
 the new challenges of environmental degradation, climate 
change, water issues, and food security.  
 
On most issues related to these challenges, there are summit level 
declarations and decisions for forging and promoting cooperation. There is 
also institutional frame work with numerous technical committees, 
subgroups and designated centres to study and develop blue print for 
cooperation. However, progress is anything but substantive. There can be 
many views on the reasons for this predicament.  
In my view, first and perhaps fundamentally, as member countries we 
have been unable to fuse SAARC agenda and priorities with domestic 
agenda which remains the primary vehicle in each country for socio-
economic development as well as for identifying and addressing problems. 
Among ASEAN members, ASEAN affairs are treated as core policy 
matters even on domestic agenda.  
Secondly, while there are agreements and recommendations and 
studies, there is relatively little in terms of concrete SAARC projects and 
enterprises that can fire the imagination of South Asians.  
Thirdly, political problems among member states are seen as 
impediments but have been rightly kept outside the purview of the SAARC 
mandate and activities. Even though there exists a Convention for 
suppression of terrorism along with a 2004 Additional Protocol, cooperation 
in this arena, in whatever degree it is maintained, is mostly through bilateral 
channels. There is a pervasive view that bilateral problems especially those 
besetting Pakistan-India relations have stifled SAARC from realizing its 
potential. Conceding that this matter is outside the framework of SAARC, I 
will venture two observations:  
First: problems among any two members should not weigh down on 
progress in cooperative endeavours among other members or programmes 
in other sub-regions of SAARC. Indeed, progress and success stories in one 
area could serve as an inducement for other areas. So in my view progress 
and levels of cooperation need not be symmetrical. By suggesting this 
modality I am stepping beyond the parameters of SAARC to a more flexible 
model for regional cooperation. But, I believe that such an approach can 
help expand the least common denominator which binds agreements and 
working within SAARC.  
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Second: In my experience of dealing with Pakistan-India issues, I 
have come to believe that resolution of political disputes and issues is not 
just the most effective confidence building essential for wide ranging 
cooperation. In the changed global environment of today, unlike in the past, 
territorial concerns need not necessarily be placed in the straitjacket of 
sovereignty. Innovative solutions are possible based on joint management 
that can become game changers and sound underpinnings for regional peace 
and development; thus problems can be turned into opportunities. What is 
needed is not generosity of spirit on the part of any of the protagonists, but 
openness to ideas and reasonableness.  
Success in this direction and in areas that have been identified by 
SAARC and are unexceptionable such as environmental protection, water 
security, food security and poverty alleviation can place South Asia on the 
cusp of a promising new age setting a lead example on how to address 
seemingly intractable problems and manage affairs for mutual benefit.  
 
Trade and Economic Cooperation  
As for the economic future and potential for trade and economic 
cooperation in the SAARC region, the comparison with intra-regional trade 
within ASEAN and MERCOSUR alone gives an idea.  
There is no dearth of agreements and technical committees and sub-
groups. Free trade agreement SAFTA was enforced in 2006. It was 
followed by yet another agreement on trade in services (SATIS) as well as 
agreements for customs matters. There is a functioning SAARC Chambers 
of Commerce. All these arrangements aim at integrating the regional 
economy. There have been seven SAFTA meetings at ministerial level and 
nine meetings of SAFTA Committee of Experts between 2006 and 2013. A 
number of products on the sensitive list have been reduced by almost every 
member state (Pakistan brought these down from 1169 to 936 in 2012). Yet 
the regional trade under SAFTA remained under three billion dollars 
according to 2012 figures.  
To be realistic, trade and economic cooperation develops if all 
participants profit and have a clear stake in the arrangements for facilitation. 
Theoretical models, however convincing, may not find traction if 
partnership yields one way advantage. Often the devil lies in the detail and 
much depends on rationalization of procedures and accommodation. Lack 
of political will is sometimes bureaucratic inertia, not uncommon in the 
South Asian administrative culture. While the case of Pakistan and India 
may have political baggage and therefore peculiar, the overall low SAFTA 
trade figures cannot be explained without reference to bureaucratic hurdles 
and absence of trade facilitation among other SAARC members. Causes for 
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this sluggish state of affairs have to be looked into and bottlenecks 
removed.  
Only recently, Pakistan and Afghanistan simplified procedures for 
overland transit trade removing encumbrances and providing better 
facilitation. As for Pakistan and India, trade has often mixed with political 
considerations. India faults Pakistan's ambivalence over MFN treatment. 
Pakistan on the other hand finds Indian tariff structures and procedures no 
less than non-tariff barrier to its trade. At a bilateral level, but in pursuance 
of the SAARC decision to enforce SAFTA, Pakistan and India have had 
discussions and reached framework agreements for rationalizing custom 
procedure, harmonizing standards and establishing banking facilities. Again 
progress on follow up is just typically slow. Pakistan‘s proposal for 
reducing peak tariff to zero to 5 per cent by 2020, excluding about 100 tariff 
lines on sensitive list, deserves serious consideration.  
 
Other Recommended Priority Sectors  
In addition to promotion of trade and cooperation in numerous sectors 
identified over the years by SAARC including poverty alleviation and food 




 Connectivity  
 Environment  
 Water management  
 
These sectors represent huge challenges where issues simply cannot 
be addressed within domestic framework; these have a vital intra-regional 
dimension.  
Energy sector opens new and exciting prospects of cooperation that 
can benefit the entire region. It would require an infrastructure of not only 
transmission lines but public and private sector arrangements between 
buyers and sellers. The resulting interdependence and positive dividends for 
better confidence and understanding are obvious. 
Since the establishment of a Technical Committee on Energy in 
January 2000, there have been technical and high level meetings to consider 
broad ranging intra-regional cooperation from promoting energy trade 
within SAARC to developing renewable energy resources. A SAARC 
Energy Centre has been established in Islamabad to act as a catalyst for 
collective activities on energy. It has developed a comprehensive ambitious 
plan for programme activities. However, traction in this sector will depend 
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on implementation of concrete projects and private public sector 
involvement with active official facilitation.  
Connectivity encompassing road and rail links, telecommunications 
and travel is a much discussed subject. It is without doubt an essential 
feature of regional economic growth. In the light of a SAARC Regional 
Multimodal Transport Study prepared with ADB funding, an inter-
governmental group recommended the SAARC Secretariat to develop draft 
regional agreements on transport and transit, railways, and framework for 
multimodal transport operations. Two draft agreements respectively for 
railways and for motor vehicle transportation were offered by India and 
have been under consideration since 2007. I will limit myself by suggesting 
that in this area if necessary a staggered or sub-regional approach could 
work to set the ball rolling instead of permitting the overall enterprise be 
stalled because of peculiar conditions in anyone sub-region or the state of 
bilateral relations among any of the member states.  
Environment is one area where we collectively have a heavy 
responsibility towards future generations. It is not just the issue of the fate 
of Maldives or of forests or clean air and clean water. From Afghanistan to 
Bangladesh, South Asia depends on the largesse of glaciers of the Hindu 
Kush, the Karakorams and the Himalayas. What the countries along these 
magnificent mountain ranges do today will secure the welfare and 
prosperity of succeeding generations tomorrow. The challenge of 
monitoring and protecting these glaciers cannot be overemphasized. 
Environment recognizes no boundaries nor inter-state conflicts and 
shenanigans; it has to be taken seriously.  
Water management is linked but essentially a separate issue that 
demands intelligent and integrated domestic and intra-regional measures. 
The issues of upper and lower riparian countries are acute and portend 
danger. In addition there are problems relating to depleting aquifers. 
Increasing usage and demand have stressed availability of fresh water and 
point to the urgency of inter-state cooperation and adoption of best 
practices,  
It will be naive to overlook impediments, but if we remain daunted by 
them, we risk losing opportunities that states have seized in other regions. 
Over three decades, SAARC has built a body of thought and institutional 
network. It provides a most valuable forum for its leadership to discuss both 
SAARC related and other vital political, bilateral and international issues. 
There is awareness of benefits of cooperation and willingness to move 
forward. We need to operationalize these ideas to transform SAARC into a 
vibrant organization worthy of the shared history, heritage and culture in 
our region. 




Dr. Ishrat Hussain 
Former Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, Dean and Director, 
Institute of Business Admiration (IBA), Karachi 
 
ddressing the concluding session as the Chief Guest Dr. Ishrat 
Hussain, former Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, Dean and 
Director, Institute of Business Admiration (IBA), Karachi, said that 
unfortunately South Asia had not achieved 1/3 of the its potential in 60 
years despite the fact that Asia was the prime mover of the global economic 
growth in 2013. The 2008 financial crisis proved the resilience of the Asian 
states. Today among the top ten banks of the world, five were Chinese and 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China was on top. Even Africa was 
growing at five per cent per annum which was a remarkable change. The 
time had come to put our own house in order and remove the impediments 
and constraints to growth. He said that global or regional cooperation was 
the derivative of what each nation wanted to do for itself. Looking at each 
regional grouping, there was a pivot and that pivot played an important role 
in either making the regional cooperation work or destroying it completely. 
China was the pivot of East and Far East Asia; in Southern part of Africa, 
South Africa was the pivot; in West Africa, Nigeria was the pivot; in EU, 
Germany was the pivot; and India was the pivot in South Asia. India was 
the eight per cent of South Asia, so whatever happened in India had its 
repercussion in South Asia. He blamed India for not playing its role of 
leadership properly in the region. India had to be more magnanimous and 
more generous in its approach as far as economic activity was concerned. It 
was in the interest of India to act as a pivot for South Asian economic 
cooperation. It was a win-win game and not a zero-sum game, he said. 
Dr. Ishrat Hussain noted that every time Pakistan agreed to phase out 
the negative list, some non-economic factor cropped in and completely 
derailed the process of normalization. Instead of putting pre-requisites of 
political normalization, Pakistan should try to normalize its economic 
relations first which, he hoped, would lead to political normalization. He 
cited the example of China and India having political issues relating to 
Laddakh and Arunachal Pardesh but the bilateral trade had moved up from 
almost nothing to US$ 75 billion. Bilateral surpluses were not always to be 
expected and if they were, that was economic nonsense, because there 
would be bilateral surpluses as well as bilateral deficits. Pakistan had huge 
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bilateral deficits with China and that would remain so. Similarly, with India 
it would benefit Pakistan because trade expands the economy and this opens 
up new opportunities for the people. He also mentioned that the bogey of 
non-tariff barriers had been created by those who wanted to keep 
protectionism on. 




Mr. Kristof W. Duwaerts  
 
r. Kristof W. Duwaerts appreciated the high standard of the 
discourse at the conference, the input of all speakers and the useful 
discussions that took place.. He said that the conference had 
provided very workable recommendations in favour of regional economic 
cooperation among the SAARC member states.  
Mr. Kristof mentioned that there was no need to get rid of political 
problems first. First, we needed to cooperate in the economic field, because 
it was good for all; political problems would take time to be solved and the 
process of resolution of disputes would be helped by economic relations 
which would soften up attitudes creating a spirit of give and take.  
He thanked IPRI for organizing the conference and inviting 16 renowned 
speakers from ten countries. He favoured holding such conferences more 
frequently in the future and hoped scholars of regional countries would 
participate in such events with enthusiasm. 
M 
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Vote of Thanks 
Ambassador Sohail Amin 
 
Dr. Ishrat Husain, Former Governor State Bank of Pakistan and Director 
Institute of Business Administration 
Resident Representative Hanns Siedel Foundation,  
Mr. Kristof Duwaerts 
Honourable Parliamentarians  
Excellencies,  
Distinguished Scholars, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Good Afternoon  
 
t the conclusion of this conference, I wish to state that these two days 
were full of sharing knowledge. The objective was to develop 
recommendations that could help in integrating the political, 
economic and social synergies of the region for collective growth and 
economic development. The Conference has come out with productive and 
useful recommendations based on the aims and objectives of the SAARC 
Charter whose goal is to achieve economic growth and social progress. The 
conference has presented a new vision for the region's progress and 
prosperity. Policy makers of the member states need to think afresh 
practicable means and strategies to quicken the achievement of mutual 
goals. 
Holding this conference was a source of great joy and pride for the 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute.  
I am grateful to Dr. Ishrat Husain for enlightening us with his 
sagacious thoughts on economic policy in the context of achieving SAARC 
objectives. 
I take this opportunity to extend our sincere thanks to all our guest 
scholars who travelled from different countries to participate in the 
conference and make it a success with their valuable contribution. I wish 
them a safe return journey.  I hope they enjoyed their stay in Islamabad.  
I also wish to thank all the participants of the Conference and the 
eminent audience for enlivening the discussion with their thoughtful 
remarks and queries. 
I thank the Hanns Seidel Foundation for making the conference 
possible. The Chief Guests at the inaugural and the concluding sessions, the 
Chairpersons of various sessions and the scholars who presented their 
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papers are the real contributors to all that has been achieved at the 
Conference. 
Before concluding, I wish to inform that the proceedings of this 
Conference will be compiled and published in the form of a book by the 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute very soon.  








n the light of the views expressed by the conference participants, Ms. 




There was consensus among the participants that it was not resource 
shortfall that constrained the evolution of SAARC as a meaningful 
economic entity but the regional leadership‘s lack of political will to move 
forward by resolving their political disputes. During the deliberations, 
approaches were cited that other regions adopted to achieve mutual 
economic cooperation despite the existence of disputes such as increased 
trade between China and Japan, China and Philippines and China and India. 
The second model fitted the case of SAARC where inter-state conflicts 
have taken the centre stage and trade and economic activity has been held 
hostage to their resolution. It was suggested that SAARC countries could 
also pursue mutual trade and investment-based economic cooperation 
without waiting for the resolution of inter-state disputes. 
With adequate institutional arrangements in place, SAARC should 
have been a facilitator and enabler in speeding up regional economic 
cooperation but the volume of trade between member states is far below the 
desired level and the true potential of the region. The eight SAARC 
countries account for around a quarter of humanity, with a population of 
nearly 1.7 billion. However, SAARC only has a combined share of three 
per cent of world GDP, roughly two per cent of world exports and imports 
and around 1.7 per cent of world‘s inward FDI flow. It is dominated by 
India with 75 per cent of the population of the region, 63 per cent of land 
area and 81 per cent of the combined SAARC GDP. One of the 
impediments in regional cooperation is the variance in the degree of 
economic development of member states which leads to economic 
inequalities and even the developed member states do not have the capacity 
to restructure the economies of less developed partners. That is why, instead 
of benefitting from SAFTA, preference is given by member states to 
bilateral free trade agreements. Such a trend needs to be discouraged. South 
Asian economies still choose to trade with extra-regional economic partners 
like the US and EU. Pakistan and India need to set the tone right and lead 
the way by correcting their respective trading priorities and preferring to 
trade with each other and within the region. 
I 
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 Within the region, resolving financial problems pertaining to 
intra-regional trade and investments should not be left to the 
central banks of a single country. To do that all member 
countries should co-opt their central banks to evolve 
compatible structures and regulatory mechanism. 
 SAARC member states need to keep in view that economic 
dynamism through mutual economic reliance creates its own 
peace dynamics and generates growth. There is a need for 
carefully thought-out processes of negotiations and a 
comprehensive package of agreements followed by a sound 
monitoring & management mechanism that is practical, and 
efficient, capable of comprehensively addressing political 
disputes and existing impediments to economic cooperation. 
 Micro economic fundamentals of the region reveal that these 
regional countries need to integrate production-investment-
value-chain to boost overall growth. For this both 
government and private sectors need to be involved in setting 
the investment agenda for regional investment framework. 
 SAFTA came into force on January 1, 2006.There are various 
elements and components which are supposed to be fully 
implemented by December 31, 2015. Therefore, it is 
important that all SAFTA agreements are implemented 
within the stipulated time. To implement SAFTA, every 
country should shorten its negative list as soon as possible 
and as far as feasible, especially regarding those products 
which are more economical to trade within South Asia. There 
is no mechanism in SAFTA for progressively reducing the 
negative lists. Such mechanism is needed. 
 Despite numerous incentives, FDI is quite low in South Asia 
due to less than expected economic returns, infrastructural 
deficiencies, law and order situation, political instability etc. 
Therefore, SAARC governments should attach high priority 
to addressing the impediments. 
 At present, all types of trade negotiations are taking place at 
the government level, both in the case of WTO and SAFTA. 
Business communities, the actual actors, have, by and large, 
been left out. To be able to identify the problems more clearly 
and to solve them efficiently, business communities and 
private sector representatives should be included in all trade 
negotiations to materialize the true spirit and benefits of 
SAFTA.  
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 Economic cooperation was the main driver behind European 
integration and it took sixty years for the EU to evolve into its 
present form, it would be difficult to have an Asian Union on 
the pattern of the European Union. It would be more feasible 
to strengthen SAARC by focusing on regional commonalities 
and economic cooperation. 
 Afghanistan is a natural land-bridge and the new Silk Route 
initiative would help to integrate the regional economies with 
Afghanistan, helping it to stabilize its economy in the post 
2014 situation. 
 Liberalization of trade amongst SAARC countries would help 
in reducing smuggling and other forms of informal trade. 
Hence, gradual formalization of informal trade would benefit 
the mainstream national economies of SAARC states. 
  SAARC must jointly establish a competitive research Hub to 
evaluate the relative competitiveness of SAARC countries 
and facilitate a free trade environment. 
 Member states must develop complementarities in their 
economies so that they can move forward in a relatively 
smooth manner.  
 SAARC should establish a joint investment company to 
facilitate cross border investments and this could ultimately 
lead to the establishment of a SAARC Bank to facilitate trade 
and investment. 
Energy 
 There are pockets of energy surplus and energy scarce areas 
within SAARC. Trade in energy sector can open new and 
exciting prospects of economic cooperation that can benefit 
the entire region. However, it would require extensive grid 
and transmission infrastructure upgradation.  
 Energy trade would also give rise to interesting patterns of 
interdependence and yield positive dividends in the form of 
sustainable and robust CBMs. 
 The SAARC Energy working Group should be more 
proactive to create infrastructure and regulatory mechanisms 
in SAARC. 
 The creation of SAARC ―Power Pool‖ will enable the region 
to utilize their collective resources of electricity/energy in an 
optimal way by balancing the demand and supply through 
various sources of electricity generation. 
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 To enhance inter‐state trade in energy the practical hurdles 
need to be removed to encourage investment in the required 
infrastructure and upgradation of transmission grid systems. 
 A dispute resolution mechanism should also be in place 
before cross‐border energy transmission plan is developed. 
 Energy pipelines would be a major CBM to create goodwill 
and mutual trust among member states. 
 
Communication and Infrastructure 
 Due to lack of connectivity, logistic costs in South Asia are 
very high ranging between 13-14% per cent of the 
commodity value, as compared to eight per cent in US. 
Connectivity encompassing road and rail links, 
telecommunications and travel is an essential prerequisite of 
regional economic growth. 
 Improved infrastructure and growth through improved 
connectivity would allow South Asia to share its benefits 
more widely. The state of physical infrastructure in South 
Asia needs to be improved. 
 To tackle the funding issue, cross-border projects need 
broader integration strategy, as demonstrated in projects like: 
the Almaty-Bishkek Regional Road Rehabilitation project 
funded by ADB under the Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation (CAREC) programme or the Northern Economic 
Corridor of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). Stronger 
cooperation with both developing and developed countries is 
needed for technology sharing and financing to remove the 
missing links in creating regional networks such as Trans-
Asian Railways (TAR). 
 All South Asian countries should sign ―Motor Vehicles 
Agreement‖ and ―Regional Transport and Transit 
Agreement‖ and work to revive a  regional overland road link 
from Istanbul to Yangon via Delhi. This can be revived for 
regional trade with little effort. A major part of this corridor 
is domestically operational, comprising a dual carriageway, 
and an integral part of the old Sher Shah Road, or Grand 
Trunk (GT) Road. The opening of the route will mark the 
revival of the old linkages which existed between South and 
South West Asia dating back to the British Period.  
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 Afghanistan-Pakistan-India-Bangladesh–Myanmar Transport 
Corridor (APIBM), aimed at making each and every country 
in South Asia as a transport hub for trade in broader Asian 
region deserves attention. Indeed APIBM corridor could be 
South Asia‘s new silk route bridging Central and West Asia 
to East Asia. 
 Apart from transit revenues, there are huge gains associated 
with energy conservation due to transit through shortest and 
efficient routes.  
 Opening border points such as Wagah-border and Ganda 
Singh border as well as revitalizing the old railway and road 
infrastructure can fast track mutual trade in South Asia. Trade 
between the two Punjabs and two Bengals can connect the 
whole region. 
 There is a need to establish joint Infrastructure funds to 
facilitate connectivity in the region. 
 
Trade 
 A large segment of the Pakistani businessmen maintain that 
there are strong non-tariff barriers (NTB) on the Indian side, 
which do not allow fair opportunity for the Pakistani products 
to enter the Indian markets. They fear that with such a 
significant trade imbalance between the two countries 
granting MFN status to India may cause a huge negative 
impact. 
 In theory, opening up of an economy is mostly considered to 
be beneficial as it promotes growth. However, as 
markets/economies open, competition stiffens and fresh 
challenges emerge. Hence, the regional trade boosting 
endeavour needs to be in sync with SAARC nations‘ 
aspirations. Trade should be conducted on terms that provide 
a level playing field to all stakeholders. 
 SAARC should go beyond the mere Agreement on ‗trade in 
goods‘; and include regional co-operation mechanism in the 
areas of investment, finance, services‘ trade, trade facilitation 
and technology transfer.  
 A substantial part of international trade involves trade in 
intermediate goods. Trade in intermediate goods is based on 
both comparative and absolute advantage. The South Asian 
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countries can engage in vertical specialization through 
production sharing arrangements. 
 SAFTA has come into force on January 1, 2006; there are 
various elements and components which are supposed to be 
fully implemented by December 31, 2015. Therefore, it is 
important that all SAFTA agreements are implemented 




 There is a view that implementation of SAFTA has been 
hindered by political disputes among SAARC countries 
especially between Pakistan and India; though other factors 
such as bureaucratic hurdles and absence of trade facilitation 
among SAARC members are also important, yet large scale 
economic cooperation and integration will only happen when 
these disputes have been resolved particularly between the 
two major states of South Asia. 
 The nations of South Asia need to make concerted efforts to 
build mutual trust so that the process of regional cooperation 
can move forward. For this purpose especially Pakistan and 
India should display their resolve to tackle their major 
political disputes like Jammu and Kashmir through a 
sustainable dialogue framework within a given time frame. 
Such a comprehensive agreement will greatly help in creating 
trustworthy environment in South Asia and assist in 
achieving early economic cooperation among SAARC 
countries.  
 There is also a need to enhance people-centric regional 
cooperation to create social harmony in South Asia. In this 
regard the establishment of a SAARC University would be an 
important step. There is a requirement to promote travel and 
tourism within the SAARC region as well to build confidence 
amongst the people of the region for greater economic 
cooperation. If tourism can take off, trade, investment and 
economic cooperation can follow. A joint Tourism 
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Best Practices 
 
 There are lessons to be learnt from successful examples of 
regional trade, Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and common 
currency zones in other regions of the world. As a result of 
regional linkage/integration, benefits ooze out in the form of 
tremendous synergies that unleash diverse strengths in 
manufacturing, resource development, trading and related 
services.  
 SAARC as a region needs financial capital to meet its 
investment requirements. Of late, we have noticed that other 
regions (Far East, South East Asia, Asia Pacific, even EU and 
China (and now China and UK) are resorting to currency 
swap arrangements and agreements on mutually utilizing 
bilateral cum internal trade deficits. SAARC can benefit 
collectively through such innovations. 
 Strong institutions and organizational structures are the main 
drivers and enablers of economic growth, regional integration 
and collective prosperity. The South Asian countries need to 
build such institutions for which examples of regional 
organizations such as the EU and the ASEAN may be taken 
as a guide. 
 In addition to promotion of trade and cooperation in 
numerous sectors, collective efforts can be made towards 
poverty alleviation, food and water security. Disaster 
management is another area of cooperation that needs 
collective effort by SAARC member countries. These 
countries could also work together to mitigate the effects of 




 Like the ASEAN Regional Forum which fosters constructive 
dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of 
common interest and concern, SAARC should also establish 
its Regional Forum where the states of South Asia could 
discuss their political disputes with honesty of purpose. Of 
course such a regional dispute resolving mechanism can 
only come into existence and operate with the political will 
of the disputing parties. Political will implies that they are 
ready to make concessions and work for a compromise 
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formula in order to settle the issues or resolve the disputes. 
SAARC leaders should display such political will to create a 
dispute resolving mechanism and in this context, being a 
bigger state, India should lead by showing greater 
accommodation. 




Regional Trade — Driver for Economic Growth 
 




he eight member countries of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) account for around a quarter of 
humanity, with a population of nearly 1.7 billion. However, SAARC 
only has a combined share of three per cent of world GDP, roughly two per 
cent of world exports and imports and around 1.7 per cent of world inward 
FDI. It is dominated by India with 75 per cent of the population of the 
region, 63 per cent of land area and 81 per cent of the combined GDP. 
Although, the South Asian economies are now increasingly looking to 
exploit the benefits of greater market openness, their performance lags 
behind other regions. While trade as a percentage of GDP has risen from 19 
per cent to 30 per cent between 1994 and 2010, it is still well below other 
regions like East Asia (58%) and Europe (66%). They exhibit a similar 
tepid performance when it comes to trade and investment integration within 
the region and with the rest of the world — Intraregional trade for the 
SAARC region stands at a low 2 per cent of GDP compared to 40 per cent 
for the South East Asian region. SAARC is one of the least integrated 
regions in the world. It is also amongst the poorest. Almost 30 per cent of 
SAARC population lives on less than $ 1 per day — representing 40 per 
cent of the world‘s poor in general. Despite the advantages of physical 
proximity, South Asian economies still choose to trade with the more 
distant economies of the United States and European Union. And it is here 
where Pakistan and India need to set the tone right and lead the way by 
correcting their respective trading priorities and preferring to trade with 
each other and within the region over others. 
Countries these days are being seen to be moving back towards 
protectionism, opting increasingly for bilateral trade agreements (like 
preferential trade agreements, free trade agreements, mutual tariff 
arrangements, etc.) instead of pushing to conclude the larger pending Doha 
Agreement on overall global trade. These mushrooming FTAs (Free Trade 
Agreements) and PTAs (Preferential Trade Agreements), often referred to 
as the ‗Noodle Bowl‘ effect, are eating away at the very spirit of WTO. 
T 
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Large developed economies which are already considered as Knowledge- 
based economies are endeavouring to go back several ‗stages of growth‘ in 
arguing that a certain level of manufacturing base should always be 
maintained in an economy to hedge against unemployment, inflation and 
restricting undesirable imports.  
However, on a positive note, of late, apart from the international 
pressure and WTO compulsions for freeing up bilateral trade between 
Pakistan and India, what we are seeing is a commitment and will by the two 
neighbours themselves to seriously work on a sustainable process of Indo-
Pak trade liberalization. A realization by both Pakistan and India that in 
enhancement of economic cooperation not only lies the key to resolving 
their long standing issues, but also the opportunity for realizing their true 
economic potential. Only developed Pakistan and India can provide the 
future for their citizens that they deserve but have been deprived of thus far. 
It is heartening to note that three key agreements were signed on September 
21, 2012 in order to embark upon the course of removing three main 
irritants or NTBs. 1) The Customs Cooperation Agreement, to avoid 
arbitrary stoppages of goods at each other‘s ports and facilitate bilateral 
trade, 2) Mutual Recognition Agreement, for acceptance of certificates of 
internationally accredited laboratories, and seek harmonization in each 
other‘s standards and certifications and 3) Redressal of Grievances 
Agreement, for resolving matters in case of any disagreements. Another 
agreement between the Export Inspection Council of India and Pakistan 
Standard and Quality Control Authority is also likely to be signed soon. If 
the logjam in the trade relations between Pakistan and India can somehow 
be resolved, it will automatically pave the way for enhanced trade within 
the SAARC region per se. 
Protectionism according to a study by the famous Lawrence and 
Edwards (Harvard professors) is a high-cost option in an interdependent 
environment and the socialist countries of the post-World War II era learnt 
this the hard way. They basically argue on how increased but prudent 
imports induce indigenous industries to be more competitive. Ultimately 
this enhanced competitiveness leads to increase in exports of the country 
shunning protectionism. In the 18
th
 century, a French social critic and 
political philosopher, Montesquieu, thought that commerce improves 
manners and cures most destructive prejudices. The concept is now gaining 
currency that intra-regional as well as inter-regional trade will lead to peace 
among nations that have conflicts and have seen many wars. Not only does 
trade promote peace, but the enhanced trading relations also multiply 
collective benefits for all stakeholders. There is no denying the fact that 
bilateral trade on equitable terms will surely be very beneficial to both 
Pakistan and India and increased trade within SAARC can be the main 
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driver of growth for the entire South Asian region. The dynamics of smooth 
intra-regional trade can not only play a pivotal role in strengthening the 
economies of all South Asian countries, but also unleash a soft process, 
which over time can be the key to resolving long standing sticky issues 
between countries. However, when it comes to taking bold initiatives 
between Pakistan and India, a careful cum proper homework needs to be 
done before embarking on the same. Too often have such endeavours failed 
simply because the key drivers in such attempts failed to adequately grapple 
with the elements of reciprocity and fair play to provide a level playing 
field to all parties. Only a carefully thought out process of negotiations and 
a comprehensive package of agreements followed by a sound monitoring & 
management mechanism that is practical, efficient and comprehensively 
addresses long standing concerns amongst the SAARC nations (especially 
between Pakistan and India) can bring about sustainable progress and a 
win-win for both countries. History tells us that the window of opportunity 
in Pakistan-India affairs is generally very small!  
There is increasing historical evidence that classical geopolitical 
threats get influenced and mitigated by forms of economic collaboration 
and mutual dependence through trade. Countries that get connected through 
trade and resultant supply-chains across the border tend to then understand 
the risk premiums they have if they were to indulge in anything 
adventurous. If one follows the evolution of supply chains, one sees the 
prosperity and stability they promoted first in Japan, and then in South 
Korea and Taiwan, and now in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, 
Indonesia and China. Once countries get embedded in these regional and 
global supply chains, they feel part of something much bigger than their 
own limited markets. In broader terms one can distinguish three types of 
connection between economic development and security of a region: a) The 
immediate impact of security/insecurity on wellbeing and consequently on 
development achievements or the ways in which security forms part of the 
definition of overall economic development; b) The way that insecurity 
(non-security) affects elements of developments and economic growth or 
the way development affects security; and c) Most importantly, how 
economic linkages and trade bring together both security and 
development/growth.  
Recent economic history is full of examples where countries have 
achieved higher growth through enhanced economic and trade linkages; in 
fact the world economy itself over the last decade has mostly grown on the 
back of enhanced global trade. Perhaps the most notable recent work in this 
respect comes from the Nobel Laureate economist, Paul Krugman. What 
Krugman really explained in his Nobel winning work was that in reality 
when trade barriers fall and trade increases, firms gain access to bigger 
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markets, allowing them to expand production and reap economies of scale, 
but at the same time, openness also exposes them to competition from rival 
foreign firms, paring their margins. Some firms may go out of business, 
however, between the domestic survivors and the foreign entrants, 
consumers (meaning people) still have more to choose from. Thus the gains 
from trade arise not from specialization, but from ‗scale economies‘, fiercer 
competition and cornucopia of choice that globalization provides. This 
concept of scale economies for the first time gives economics a sense of 
space. For example, he himself argues that, night-time satellite photos of 
Europe reveal the distinctive contours of economic activity: bright lights 
cluster around metropolitan centres, shinning particularly more brightly 
around the triangle of Brussels, Amsterdam and Dortmund. Earlier, 
economists struggled to explain these images as they didn‘t fall in line with 
the crux of the theory itself. They were accustomed to assuming that firms 
face constant returns to scale and yet if this was to be true then every person 
could essentially create his own little backhouse production chain and there 
would be no need for an economy to divide into a farm belt and an 
industrial belt?  
As we all know that big factories benefit from lower costs of 
production. Manufacturing firms might therefore cluster near to a large 
market, leaving behind a sparsely populated hinterland, in order to make the 
most of scale economies and minimize the cost of transporting goods to 
their customers. Earlier theorists reasoned that firms herd together to benefit 
from some kind of ―spillover‖, i.e. perhaps firms pick up tricks of the trade 
and other know-how from their neighbours. But this argument appeared 
somewhat unsatisfying, because largely spillover could neither be measured 
nor could their scope be delimited. However, what in essence we have 
learned today from Mr. Krugman‘s work is that regional focus, proximity 
and neighbourhood cooperation instead yield new yet tangible kinds of 
benefits and strengths. The opportunity for firms to locate in respective 
regional strong areas is a gift to other firms in the area, because in attracting 
new workers it also brings new customers. Unlike a technological spillover, 
the real physical proximity of firms and real production work taking place 
in common areas of interest leave a paper trail, showing up in firms‘ growth 
in general, thus benefiting the entire region by making it more competitive 
in a global environment. 
Finally, to put all this simply, by contrast, the gross importance of 
regional cooperation for the first time has come to the global fore front. We 
have a leading Economist who is advocating with concrete and tangible 
empirical evidence the following three focus points: 
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1) Regions, which fail to offer space for joint production and common 
productivity development, tend to lose out in the long run. 
2) Negative spillovers cannot be avoided. Meaning, a neighbour‘s loss 
cannot be your gain and a regional partner‘s problem cannot be 
bottled up within the geographical boundaries of that country. 
3) And the most important: Poverty alleviation is a geographical 
challenge and therefore needs to be tackled at a regional level. 
 
Regrettably, the short history of Pakistan and India stands mired in an 
unhealthy rivalry, mistrust, needless animosity and frivolous point scoring, 
which is not only adversely affecting their economic progress, but is also 
holding hostage the economic potential of the entire South Asian region. 
Instead of some honest soul searching, the will to find solutions, and to 
evolve strategies to further open up trade for the sake of mutual 
development and growth, what we see is a culture of blame game – One 
step forward and two backwards. And it is this barrier we have to cross in 
order to bring about prosperity to the South Asian region as a whole. 
 
Free Trade is God’s diplomacy. There is no other certain way of uniting 
people in the bonds of peace and prosperity. ~ British politician Richard 
Cobden, 1857.    
 
Regional Trade — Driver for Economic Growth 
It is both interesting and at the same time heartening to note that we are 
talking about regional trade (and not protectionism) as a driver of growth. 
Post 2008 financial crisis (the ‗Great Recession‘ as it is being called by 
many economists) the debates, once considered ‗closed and shut‘, 
pertaining to: unbridled free trade cum modern day globalization versus 
controlled imports, minimum footprint of the state versus finding the right 
mix between private sector and state capitalism in an economy, and 
pursuing a complete laissez-faire cum a minimally monitored markets 
model versus the comparatively controlled and monitored markets model, 
have all been recently brought back to life and earlier conclusions are being 
questioned and challenged vociferously by a number of well-known 
economists, Joseph Stiglitz included. Countries these days are being seen to 
be moving back towards protectionism, opting increasingly for bilateral 
trade agreements (like preferential trade agreements, free trade agreements, 
mutual tariff arrangements, etc.) instead of pushing to conclude the larger 
pending Doha Agreement on overall global trade. These mushrooming 
FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) and PTAs (Preferential Trade Agreements), 
often referred to as the ‗Noodle Bowl‘ effect, are eating away at the very 
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spirit of WTO. Large Developed economies which are already considered 
as Knowledge-based economies are endeavouring to go back several ‗stages 
of growth‘ in arguing that a certain level of manufacturing base should 
always be maintained in an economy to hedge against unemployment, 
inflation and restricting undesirable imports. The United States of America 
(USA) as we know after a long time has renewed its focus on shoring up 
American manufacturing in order to replace some of its imports and boost 
its exports and in the European Union (EU) we see a lot of anger and 
criticism on Germany running a large surplus at the expense of deficits in 
the other Euro-Zone economies. A case seems to be building in the EU 
against a pattern of trade that unfairly favours a single country and it is 
threatening the very unity of the region as a whole. Given this changed 
global environment where countries these days are more focused on 
protecting their own backyard rather than undertaking international 
engagement, a move by SAARC (and especially Pakistan and India) to 
instead opt for opening their respective markets to each other will surely be 
termed as rather brave. More so for the countries that run a regional trading 
account deficit, which virtually means all members except India. As an 
example, Pakistan being the second largest member, to date its products 
have struggled to find a significant place in the Indian markets, whereas, the 
Indian products have done rather well in the Pakistani markets. 
The eight member countries of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) account for around a quarter of humanity, 
with a population of nearly 1.7 billion. However, SAARC only has a 
combined share of 3 per cent of world GDP, roughly 2 per cent of world 
exports and imports and around 1.7 per cent of world inward FDI. It is 
dominated by India with 75 per cent of the population of the region, 63 per 
cent of land area and 81 per cent of the combined GDP. 
Although, the South Asian economies are now increasingly looking to 
exploit the benefits of greater market openness, their performance lags 
behind other regions. While trade as a percentage of GDP has risen from 
19per cent to 30 per cent between 1994 and 2010, it is still well below other 
regions like East Asia (58%) and Europe (66%). They exhibit a similar 
tepid performance when it comes to trade and investment integration within 
the region and with the rest of the world — Intraregional trade for the 
SAARC region stands at a low 2 per cent of GDP compared to 40 per cent 
for the South East Asian region. SAARC is one of the least integrated 
regions in the world. It is also amongst the poorest. Almost 30 per cent of 
SAARC population lives on less than $ 1 per day — representing 40 per 
cent of the world‘s poor in general. Despite the advantages of physical 
proximity, South Asian economies still choose to trade with the more 
distant economies of the United States and European Union. And it is here 
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where Pakistan and India need to set the tone right and lead the way by 
correcting their respective trading priorities and preferring to trade with 
each other and within the region over others. 
On a positive note, of late, apart from the international pressure and 
WTO compulsions for freeing up bilateral trade between Pakistan and 
India, what we are seeing is a commitment and will by the two neighbours 
themselves to seriously work on a sustainable process of Indo-Pak trade 
liberalization. A realization by both Pakistan and India that in enhancement 
of economic cooperation not only lies the key to resolving their long 
standing issues, but also the opportunity for realizing their true economic 
potential. Only developed Pakistan and India can provide the future for their 
citizens that they deserve but have been deprived of thus far.  
It is heartening to note that three key agreements were signed on 
September 21, 2012, in order to embark on the course of removing three 
main irritants or NTBs.  
 
1) The Customs Cooperation Agreement, to avoid arbitrary 
stoppages of goods at each other‘s ports and facilitate bilateral 
trade, 2) Mutual Recognition Agreement, for acceptance of 
certificates of internationally accredited laboratories, and seek 
harmonization in each other‘s standards and certifications and 3) 
Redressal of Grievances Agreement, for resolving matters in case 
of any disagreements. Another agreement between the Export 
Inspection Council of India and Pakistan Standard and Quality 
Control Authority is also likely to be signed soon. If the logjam in 
the trade relations between Pakistan and India can somehow be 
resolved, it will automatically pave the way for enhanced trade 
within the SAARC region per se. 
 
However, the timing, pace and the endeavour itself of freeing trade 
with India draw a mixed reaction from all quarters, Industrialists, Business 
Community at large, Agriculturists and Security Analysts. While on the one 
hand there is this lobby, which argues that by doing so not only do we get 
access to a robust market of more than a billion people, but more 
importantly the free trade dynamics will unleash a future of mutual 
dependence, in turn minimizing cross border security concerns; on the other 
hand is a large cross section of nervous manufacturers, struggling farmers 
and skeptical security personnel who all  remain equally fearful of Indian 
regional designs in particular and India‘s poor track record on bilateral trade 
in general.   
Amidst these conflicting views and confusing international trends the 
average Pakistanis stand quite confused that if their government doing the 
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right thing by wanting to liberalize with its arch rival and if not, then given 
Pakistan‘s commitment to backing the global free trade dynamics under the 
WTO what policy options are available to our government vis-à-vis the 
MFN status and trade with India. To answer this properly, perhaps the right 
approach would be to first analyse the existing realities in each area of 
relevance or concern and then try to discuss the pros and cons of the MFN 
reality from 2013 onwards. 
 
Things as they Stand Today  
 
The total trade volume between Pakistan and India in 2009-10 was around $ 
1.45 billion, out of which Pakistan‘s exports to India accounted for only $ 
275 million (19% of the total bilateral trade), whereas, the Indian exports to 
Pakistan stood at more than $ 1.20 billion (81%). In the current year, the 
trade is said to have crossed the $ 2 billion mark, but the balance of trade 
has tilted further in favour of India. In addition, experts believe that 
Pakistan absorbs about $ 3 to 4 billion of Indian imports through unofficial 
channels like smuggling and indirect routing through countries like Dubai, 
Singapore, Thailand, etc.  
The pro MFN lobby argues that not only can the government of 
Pakistan earn crucial revenue by bringing the illegal trade into the official 
fold, but also reduce its import burden by sourcing (closer to home) cheaper 
Indian products and by tapping into the huge trade potential (estimates by 
various trade bodies on potential of mutual trade range from $ 10 to $ 20 
billion) that exists between our two neighbouring countries. On the other 
hand the reality is that although India granted the MFN status to Pakistan 
way back in 1996 the gesture has not helped Pakistan much in increasing its 
exports to India. A large segment of the Pakistani businessmen maintain 
that there exist strong non-tariff barriers (NTB) on the Indian side, which do 
not allow fair opportunity for the Pakistani products to enter the Indian 
markets. They fear that with such a significant existing imbalance of trade 
between the two countries despite not having granted India the MFN status, 
no rocket science is required to gauge the gravity of the impact once the 
MFN status is bestowed! 
As for the NTB, according to the WTO, there exists no agreed or 
definitive definition. In principle, NTB include all measures, besides tariffs, 
which are used to protect a domestic activity (industry). They normally 
refer to ‗government imposed‘ or ‗government sponsored‘ measures. The 
panel of Eminent Persons as set up by the United Nations Central Product 
Classification proposed a comprehensive and detailed classification of NTB 
in 2005. Fifteen types of NTBs have been identified by them including 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), other 
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technical measures, price control measures, quantity control measures, para-
tariff measures, finance measures, anti-competitive measures, export-related 
investment measures, distribution restrictions, restriction on post sales 
services, subsidies, government procurement restrictions, intellectual 
property and rules of origin. A similar classification has been developed by 
UNCTAD of procedural obstacles to trade and include the following 
categories: arbitrary or inconsistent behaviour, discriminatory behaviour 
favouring specific producers or suppliers, inefficiency or cases of outright 
obstruction, non-transparent practices, legal obstacles and unusually high 
fees or charges.  
 
Some Non-Tariff Barriers of India: 
i) Sanitary and phytosanitary measures: Applied through a number 
of laws and mostly covering food items. 
ii)   India‘s strong focus on internal food security and self-sufficiency. 
iii) The licensing, permit and tariff regimes are complex, varying 
according to product or user. 
iv) India is one of the most active users of anti-dumping measures. A 
number of safeguard measures have also been imposed, including 
quantitative restrictions. 
v) India applies a number of duties and charges, over and above 
tariffs. 
vi) Reference prices have been established for some products, which 
are revised every two weeks to align with international market 
prices. 
vii) Some goods can only be imported through specified ports. 
 
Agricultural products and textiles are of special interest to actual and 
potential Pakistani exporters to India. The former face the largest number of 
NTB on imports from all sources, including import licensing, quota or 
prohibition, transportation restrictions, import only by state trading 
agencies, application of SPS and TBT measures and quarantine 
requirements.  
Textile exports generally to India also face a number of NTB 
including pre-shipment inspection, high para-tariff, SPS measures along 
with relatively high tariffs. Note: Quite a number of these are currently 
under review. 
The question is: Are these barriers applied in a discriminatory manner 
or in a trade restrictive manner on imports mainly from Pakistan? Overall, 
Pakistan exporters face special restrictions in trade with India including 
problems in transportation, financial transactions and stringent visa 
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requirements. Also, there are apprehensions that India applies NTB more 
strictly on Pakistani imports, motivated partly by security considerations. 
India also appears to be heavily subsidizing inputs into agricultural 
production, including fertilizers, electricity, irrigation, etc. According to 
WTO (2011) the total subsidies in 2008-09 aggregated to US$53 billion, 
over five per cent of the GDP and have probably continued to show rapid 
growth up to 2010-11. The subsidy per hectare was almost US$300. The 
comparable figures for Pakistan for 2010-11 are agricultural subsidies of 
US$2.70 billion, equivalent to 1.20 per cent of GDP and per hectare $118. 
Meaning, going by these figures the agricultural subsidies are almost three 
times higher in India in comparison to Pakistan. 
 
Some Non-Tariff Barriers of Pakistan 
i) Pakistan‘s main trade policy instrument is the tariff regime. 
Industrial policy is influenced by a large number of SRO 
(Statutory Rules and Orders), which specify 
concessions/exemptions in tariffs by end use and products. 
ii) Import prohibitions and licensing are applied for health, safety, 
security, religious and environmental reasons. 
iii) Some imports under SRO require approval by relevant 
ministries/agencies, like the EDB (Engineering Development 
Board) for the import of components and parts for the automotive 
sector, finished pharmaceuticals by the Ministry of Health and 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture for import of wheat flour. 
iv) The NTC (National Tariff Commission) conducts anti-dumping, 
countervailing and safeguard investigations. 
v) Pakistan has 27,000 national standards, covering mainly 
agriculture, food stuffs, chemicals, civil and mechanical 
engineering and textiles. 
vi) There are 25 notifications covering mainly sampling and testing 
procedures as well as labelling, package, storage and transport of 
a number of food products, pharmaceuticals, etc. 
vii) Pakistan‘s SPS-related legislation is relatively outdated. 
 
NTB in Pakistan tend to be somewhat more focused on 
manufacturing goods, especially with regards to customs valuation, pre-
shipment inspection, import licensing by a number of ministries/agencies, 
quantitative restrictions, indigenization, anti-dumping and quality 
certification. Transportation links between the two countries are weak. 
There are several bottlenecks on the road and rail route, too.  
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The road route is open to exports for a limited number of 
commodities from India. Currently, Indian banks are not allowed to have 
branches in Pakistan and Pakistan also like India follows a restrictive visa 
regime for the Indians. 
Prior to the agreements signed last month in September 2012, the 
number of importable products, which India allows from Pakistan, consists 
of 850 items, while Pakistan already allows non-MFN India 1,945 items. 
According to a World Bank report, by allowing India the MFN status, 
Pakistan must then restrict to the following three options: gradually 
expanding the positive list, replacing a positive list with a short 
negative/sensitive list, or completely eliminating the positive list.  
 
Note: the position on this has already changed with both countries for the time 
being resorting to reach only a shortened negative list and doing away with 
respective positive lists. 
 
The fear or concerns on the Pakistani side are that whereas, India 
talks about freeing regional trade within SAARC, in reality it is the 
hegemonic policies and designs of India that is holding back free, fair and 
open trade within the South Asian region. Simply (further) freeing up of 
trade between Pakistan and India, without first entering comprehensive 
agreements on regional (SAARC) trade as a whole, the cause of promoting 
intra-region trade will not be promoted. In fact, this may be counter- 
productive since India already enjoys favourable trading accounts with all 
SAARC countries and after also gaining complete access to Pakistani 
markets there will be very little or no interest left for India to adjust the 
regional trade equation in a way that makes trade within SAARC more 
‗equitable‘.    
 
Pakistanis are Further Concerned that, 
 
 Liberalization of imports couldn‘t have come at a worst possible 
time: Pakistan‘s repayments to IMF have already started kicking in, 
The current account balance has become a serious concern in recent 
months, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) reduced to a mere $ 359 
million (6 months ending November 2011) from $ 7 billion in 
2006-07 and exports, which only a few months back were nearly 75 
per cent of imports have been reduced to virtually half that of 
today‘s total import bill. Under the circumstances the measures 
policy makers should be contemplating should be on somehow 
restricting the import regime and not expanding it!  
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 Pakistan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PPMA) has 
expressed serious concern on granting the MFN to India. According 
to them the move will significantly affect the home industry, 
possibly forcing it to close down altogether. It strongly feels that 
that all medicines should be on the negative list as the industry 
forms the second line of defence in case of war, natural disasters, or 
epidemics — PPMA meets around 90 per cent of the country‘s 
demand of finished medicine. According to them the Indians 
already have very solid non-tariff barriers in place to protect their 
home industry and the size of the Indian pharmaceutical market is 
ten times larger than the Pakistani market, which has allowed 
Indian industries to become global players, and therefore the 
Pakistani pharmaceutical industry will stand no chance unless it can 
either compete on a level playing field or get similar state support 
& protection.  
 A comparative analysis on the agriculture sectors of both countries 
has already been presented above, which shows a huge difference 
between the competitiveness of both sides due to the asymmetry of 
subsidies extended to the respective farmers and the unequal 
availability of water resources. Further, Pakistan is far behind India 
when it comes to supporting its farmers by way of comparative 
prices of fertilizers, availability of modern machinery, energy 
resources for electric tube wells and the sheer allocation of 
respective governmental budgetary funds for the agriculture sector. 
The existing scarcity of water and an alarming pace at which its 
availability continues to shrink further compounds the disadvantage 
for the Pakistanis who believe that India continues to play games on 
this vital issue of concern to Pakistan by blaming environmental 
developments for the reduction of water flows in the Indus Basin, 
whereas, the reality points to new water diversions created by India 
through construction of dams on the rivers in Pakistan‘s share.  
 Finally, there is significant segment of Pakistani experts on 
security, defence and foreign affairs who genuinely believe that 
unless the MFN and a resultant liberalized trading regime is 
managed very closely and prudently the negatives will far outweigh 
the positives. In their opinion, aside from the concerns on an 
absence of or a rather compromised Pakistan‘s internal defence 
mechanism in the spheres of health, seed development, yields and 
export competitiveness, there prevails a sense of scepticism over 
the Indian double game. We hear about the underlying potential of 
the flow of goods across the borders, but not a word is said about 
Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries  49 
the necessity of creating long term important linkages such as 
technology transfer, joint resource management mechanism, cross 
border investments, financial connectivity, regional anti-trust 
treaties, equal opportunity amongst SAARC nations, and devising 
joint regional legislations on rules of doing business. Also, on one 
side India talks about cementing mutual ties through the instrument 
of trade, while on the other side their political moves tend to 
exacerbate the long standing security issues between the two 
countries. Bilateral issues continue to be viewed by them under a 
unilateral light and recently, the Indo-Afghan Agreement, which 
covers a wide ambit from humanitarian assistance ranging from 
education to capacity development to development of natural 
resources to security, can easily be interpreted to portray an India 
that still remains more focused on isolating or encircling Pakistan 
than to become its vibrant economic partner. They maintain that as 
always, we see an India eager to gain direct access to Central Asia 
and Europe, but not willing to offer any such reciprocal 
accessibility to Pakistan on its Eastern and Northern sides. 
 
WTO Corner — Latest 
While we contemplate our economic moves and trade relationship within 
our region, it is also important to keep a close eye on what is happening to 
the trading patterns in general around the world, as this will in-turn help us 
in making the right bilateral and regional choices. Economic fear and 
insecurity seems to be the order of the day not just in South Asia, but also in 
the most developed economies of the world. The high moral ground that 
once drove the richer nations towards a commitment to make this world a 
better living place for all inhabitants, by providing equal opportunities 
through a WTO rule-based framework of free and fair trading practices, 
seems to have taken a serious dent since the financial crisis of 2008. As the 
focus shifts more and more on internal economic challenges the tune of 
‗inclusiveness‘ moves further into the background. Self-focused statements 
like, ―Without a solution to the Euro Zone crisis the world economy will be 
swept into a downward spiral of collapsing confidence, weaker growth, and 
fewer jobs. We all have to help them resolve their problems as we have a 
stake in their crisis‖ — Christine Lagarde & ―We cannot let our industry 
down at a time when we need to create jobs at home. Inward before 
Outward‖ — Banners at the last Republican Party primaries, raise alarm 
bells about the future of free trading practices in general and a visibly 
weakening foundation of WTO in particular. Ironically, the trouble is 
brewing in the very quarters that once championed the cause of turning the 
50 Seminar Book 
world into a large ‗global village‘ and romanticized about eradication of 
poverty through enhanced trade and equal opportunity! 
What we see today is an atmosphere where the larger WTO 
membership appears reconciled to the fact that the Doha Round will remain 
inconclusive for some time or at least till such time that a) the world 
economy is less turbulent, b) some significant members like the USA and 
EU are out of their present financial predicaments, c) previous priorities are 
reinforced, d) global issues and concerns are realigned and e) a global 
political climate is recreated that once again instils the spirit of enhanced 
trade and inter-dependence within the world economies instead of the 
prevailing tilt towards protectionism. So, at a time when the Doha Round of 
the WTO has run into a virtual stalemate and there are already murmurs 
about modifying the very basis of the Doha Talks and replacing it with the 
Bali round of talks featuring a more toned down version of free trade, one 
wonders what the future of the world trade will be like in the years to come. 
Moreover, criticism that is often hurled at the WTO relates to the menace of 
prevalent global inflation, which is at present particularly hurting the poor 
nations. The argument states, that firstly under the garb of free trade and 
enhanced market access the rich nations go on to capture the developing 
markets by granting disguised subsidies to home corporations, which then 
later on increase their selling prices to maximize internal profits and 
secondly, the economically emerging countries also play their part in aiding 
global inflation by raising stakes in their over-zealous pursuit of growth and 
enhanced market access. Examples being, the present surge in global food 
and agricultural prices and the spiralling price of oil, respectively. 
 
Contradictions cum Confusions 
a) In theory, opening up of an economy is mostly considered to be 
beneficial as it promotes growth. In this context the most frequently 
quoted example is that of Singapore, which successfully resurrected 
its faltering growth by undertaking a new set of revolutionary 
economic reforms back in 2005 that further liberalized the 
Singaporean economy. However, as we know that as 
markets/economies open, competition stiffens and a fresh challenge 
emerges on successfully managing the evolving situation through 
good governance cum sound economic management — all SAARC 
nations need to feel confident within themselves that they are 
capable of managing healthy and fair competition and are willing to 
accept the challenges of trade liberalization.  
b) Theoretically, there exists some confusion about clear linkages 
between trade and growth and then between growth and poverty 
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reduction or with growth‘s correlation to the real life benefits for 
the poor. Ironically, the new person nominated by the US to head 
the World Bank, Mr. Jim Yong Kim, also belongs to this school of 
thought, which believes growth does little to help the poor and Mr. 
Kim has also published a book in 2000, arguing his case. 
C) Will the focus on regional trade come at the expense of losing 
out from certain global markets? After all, like most developed and 
emerging economies (India & China included), shouldn‘t our 
emphasis also be on FTA and PTA that suit our product base and 
can help us grow our total trade and not just our regional trade? As 
discussed above, the ‗noodle bowl‘ effect (mushrooming of 
bilateral and regional agreements while the overall global trade 
agreement takes a back seat), is already in play amongst leading 
world economies.  
 
Trade in Finance 
One of the principal growth constraints facing South Asia is lack of 
financial capital. Post 2008 financial crisis it has become difficult to raise 
finance from the international markets and given an existing scarcity of 
resources at home, but a dire need to improve infrastructure, SAARC as a 
region needs financial capital to meet its investment requirements. Of late, 
we have noticed that other regions (Far East, South East Asia, Asia Pacific, 
even EU and China and now China and UK) are resorting to currency swap 
arrangements and agreements on mutually utilizing bilateral cum internal 
trade deficits. Currency swaps in essence provide an additional pool of 
resources, which is stabilizing in its effect for the currencies of both the 
countries involved. According to a research paper released in 2012 by the 
People‘s Bank of China, for all countries enjoying a sizeable trade relation 
with China and aspiring to significantly build-up on this bilateral trade 
relationship (Pakistan certainly being the case), it will be very important  
that these countries also maintain RMB (Rinminbi, Chinese internationally 
trade able currency) based liquidity just as they keep US Dollar based 
liquidity in order to keep up with the desired increase in trade with China. 
As we know, China initiated its first bilateral ‗local‘ currency swap with the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) back in 2008 and has never looked back since. 
The move was a win-win for both countries, especially for the junior 
partner ROK, as the arrangement provided ROK much support during the 
global financial crisis in 2008. Ironically, ROK never practically utilized 
this facility, but it provided ROK with a sense of liquidity and confidence 
amidst some very testing times. In 2009, China signed similar agreements 
with Malaysia, Indonesia and Hong Kong. To date China has signed about 
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18 bilateral swap agreements for a total amount exceeding RMB 1.6 trillion 
by June 2012. 
The point is that solving an economy‘s financial problems should not 
be left to the central banks of a single country. Regional blocs should work 
in partnership with central banks in finding pathways for solving financial 
problems in evolving economies. As a current example of this model, an out 
of box solution on these lines is at present being worked out between China 
and India. Indo-China trade, which was virtually zero about 10 years back 
has today increased to nearly US$ 100 billion. However, the pattern of this 
trade is asymmetric, since India in this relationship undergoes an annual $ 
30-40 billion trade deficit putting a heavy burden on its already large 
current account deficit. At the same time India has large infrastructure 
requirements and against this backdrop, it has been signing several 
agreements with China on high speed rail, power and other infrastructure 
needs. In such a scenario it is only logical that China should be investing in 
Indian infrastructure in local currency.  
Keeping to this an agreement is being put in place where China will 
initiate a long-term debt fund that will invest in India and hence for India 
local currency lost through the current account can be invested back in India 
through the capital account transactions. Such a bond will carry a pre-
negotiated interest rate, hence also benefiting China, as it will ensure steady 
returns, whereas, India would get access to long-term infrastructure funds 
that are not denominated in US Dollars. Similar arrangements of 
cooperation should also be worked out within the ambit of SAARC. There 
have been some efforts under the auspices of SAARC to draft and conclude 
an agreement on promotion and protection of investment across the region. 
This draft still awaits approval since 2007 despite the 17
th
 SAARC Summit 
calling for fast-tracking of regional investment cooperation and creation of 
regional production chains.  
Further, there is increasing historical evidence that classical 
geopolitical threats get influenced and mitigated by forms of economic 
collaboration and mutual dependence through trade. Countries that get 
connected through trade and resultant supply-chains across the border tend 
to then understand the risk premiums they have if they were to indulge in 
anything adventurous. If one follows the evolution of supply chains, one 
sees the prosperity and stability they promoted first in Japan, and then in 
South Korea and Taiwan, and now in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, 
Thailand, Indonesia and China. Once countries get embedded in these 
regional and global supply chains, they feel part of something much bigger 
than their own limited markets. In broader terms one can distinguish three 
types of connection between economic development and security of a 
region: a) The immediate impact of security/insecurity on well-being and 
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consequently on development achievements or the ways in which security 
forms part of the definition of overall economic development; b) The way 
that insecurity (non-security) affects elements of developments and 
economic growth or the way development affects security; and c) Most 
importantly, how economic linkages and trade bring together both security 
and development/growth.  
While surely every country needs to manage its imports very 
carefully and ensure that it is not undertaking trade that hurts national 
interests and job creation at home, however when working out the 
modalities of its trade, what it also needs to keep in mind is that 
protectionism can almost never be a sustainable solution for a country‘s 
economic growth and prosperity. A recent study by international trade 
experts, Robert Z. Lawrence and Lawrence Edwards, shows that there 
exists a good correlation between import and employment growth. The 
study argues that if imports can be managed successfully, they can in fact 
increase productivity and in cases also make domestic manufacturing more 
competitive. The prime example these experts use to define this logic is by 
applying the model to the field of Services in the US. They argue that the 
export of another country to the US or the import of the US in IT & ITES 
helps American corporations improve their cost competitiveness.  
For example, Indian IT majors, generally considered to move jobs 
away from the US, have in fact created direct and indirect employment 
opportunities for the Americans. According to a recent CII survey, in the 
last five years, Indian companies in the US have invested US$ 26 billion, 
and created 100,000 jobs. A healthy percentage of employees of Indian 
software companies like TCS, Wipro or Infosys in the US are non-Indians. 
Protectionism according to the study is a high-cost option in an 
interdependent environment and the socialist countries of the post-World 
War II era learnt this the hard way. The Lawrence and Edwards lesson 
basically argues on how increased but prudent imports induce indigenous 
industries to be more competitive. Ultimately this enhanced 
competitiveness leads to increase in exports and again they quote the 
example of India. Post liberalization, India‘s exports have increased from 
US$ 18.50 billion in 1990-91 to US$ 251.1 billion in 2010-11. Further, 
protectionism especially for high debt countries carries higher dangers. 
Unsustainable debt situation invariably forces reduction in domestic 
consumption, which in-turn increases reliance on the export markets for 
growth. And if the economic managers choose to resort to protectionism in 
such a scenario, it not only leaves the economy with a compromised growth 
outlook but also with serious social and economic issues arising from high 
unemployment. Nowhere more can one see a better example of such a 
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realization than in the recent policy decisions of the new leadership of 
China.  
Today, the Chinese policymakers, after a long gap, are again feeling 
the need to bolster China‘s exports competitiveness. And for this rather than 
resorting to protectionism they have instead opted to go back to the basics: 
Establish more Free Trade Zones and this time also provide them with 
enhanced financial liberalization, both for domestic and foreign investors. 
The world‘s largest Shanghai free trade zone has already been announced 
and global investors are comparing it with the Chinese reform measures of 
the mid 70s and likening this step to the establishment of the Shenzhen 
special zone in 1979 that ultimately saw China‘s accession to WTO in 
2001.  
The regional trade boosting endeavour needs to be in sync with 
SAARC nations‘ aspirations of trade in the global arena. This will help 
them avoid any possible disruptions in the future. In fact enhanced trade 
should be conducted on terms that: complement efforts towards pushing for 
harmonized global norms on free and fair trade, provides a level playing 
field and access to all members and builds a position that allows South Asia 
to collectively play a more assertive role in seeing the successful 
culmination of the Doha Round of Talks. Further, a lot of studies at present 
are being conducted by academics and trade bodies on the merits, de-merits 
and potential of trade within SAARC. While these exercises may provide 
good material for a classroom discussion but in practical terms they serve 
scant little than just stating the obvious.  
The point being that it does not require any genius to determine that 
trade if conducted fairly is a win-win for all stakeholders. Also, it is of little 
practical consequence that what numerical figure is gauged as a potential, 
because what truly matters is the trend and quality of mutual trade. When 
assessing nations‘ failure to achieve sustainable healthy growth the famous 
Austrian economist, Freidrich Hayek, only worried about two counts: 
Misallocation of ‗Spending‘ and ‗Trade‘ by countries. He argued that 
spending in the wrong areas, and trading in the wrong products and places 
can actually be extremely damaging to a country‘s economy and its people, 
let alone being beneficial in any way!  
In the 18
th
 century, a French social critic and political philosopher, 
Montesquieu, thought that commerce improves manners and cures most 
destructive prejudices. The concept is now gaining currency that intra-
regional as well as inter-regional trade will lead to peace among nations that 
have conflicts and seen many wars. Not only does trade promote peace, but 
the enhanced trading relations also multiply collective benefits for all 
stakeholders. There is no denying the fact that furthering of regional trade 
on equitable terms will surely be very beneficial to solving long standing 
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issues between Pakistan and India. The dynamics of smooth Pak-India 
bilateral trade in tandem with free flowing trade within the entire South 
Asian region can not only play a pivotal role in strengthening the economies 
of the region, but especially of Pakistan and India, by unleashing a soft 
process, which over time can be the key to resolving long standing sticky 
issues between the two sides. However, the culture of free and fair trade in 
essence stands for equal opportunity and can only succeed when there is a 
level playing field for all, including the smaller and developing nations, and 
an environment that generates unpredictable dynamic benefits of open 
markets cum access to more customers for everyone involved by allowing 
exporters from across the region to exploit economies of scale. Competition 
encourages not only specialization (known to be the classic result of more 
open trade), but also increased productivity.  
 
Implementation Framework 
Given a long standing history of conflict between India and Pakistan, the 
fact that Bangladesh is a break away arm of the former East & West 
Pakistan, continuous war in Afghanistan, the looming American withdrawal 
in 2014, and that Sri Lanka is still grappling with the after effects of a long 
drawn Tamil separatist war, it would be reasonable to fear that amidst such 
a politically charged environment, is there a way by which economic 
cooperation can truly be enhanced in the near-term within the troubled 
South Asian region? And provided that there indeed is such a possibility to 
independently kick-start economic cooperation before solving existing 
political/territorial disputes, then what should be the framework for such 
cooperation? 
As for the first question the inspiration should be taken from China on 
how it conducted itself in its different neighbourly disputes in the East 
China Sea with Japan and in the South China Sea with the Philippines. 
Under Deng Xiaoping, when China truly began to emerge as a global 
economic power, the policy on territorial disputes was to set them to one 
side and where required, to also work with the opposing party to exploit 
mutual resources and potential. Sovereignty could be dealt with later. Back 
in 1978 Deng said that the Diaoyu/Senkaku (with Japan) tangle could be 
unravelled by ―a future generation‖. And this indeed is being done today - 
to China‘s wishes — since today they have worked their way up to being 
the biggest boy in the neighbourhood! In fact, so confident are the Chinese 
today of their ability to secure their rightful boundaries that in spite of 
knowing fully well that it is they who are calling the shots, their current 
leader, Xi Jinping, after assuming power has once again reaffirmed Deng‘s 
approach. Mr. Jinping maintains that today‘s transformed China gives as 
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much weight to maintaining stability in the region as to safeguarding 
China‘s rights. So if countries around us can cast aside territorial disputes 
(at least in the short term) to address poverty and lack of development at 
home, so why can‘t we do it in our region? 
On the second question, on what should be the framework of our 
mutual cooperation, there are again lessons to be learned from successful 
examples of regional trade, Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and common currency 
zones. We must remember that at the heart of the linkage/integration 
benefits are the tremendous synergies that exist among regional with 
distributed and diverse strengths in manufacturing, resource development, 
and trading and related services. The underlying benefits of integrating 
markets with large populations — especially the ones that in addition are 
also quickly climbing the wealth ladder — become visible over longer term 
in the shape of emergence of optimized and highly competitive regional 
supply chains. On the other hand, so are the challenges of integrating such 
markets and supply chains, and these challenges mainly come down to the 
sheer willingness and ability of nations to balance national interests with the 
benefits of bilateral economic linkages. The three key issues that thus 
emerge from this are: 1) Identification of the existing frameworks of 
regional, sub-regional and bilateral cooperation, 2) Reflections on the path-
making. Here, China-Japan- Republic of Korea (ROK) Free Trade Talks 
(FTT) can be used as a model, and 3) Implications of Pakistan-India 
economic linkages and an invitation for new thinking on SAARC 
integration. 
Discussing points one and two, a detailed paper written in 2012, by 
Steve Howard, Secretary General, The Global Foundation, provides a good 
insight into these aspects. He argues, that unlike other countries across the 
globe, exports of both India and Pakistan were less affected during the time 
of the financial crisis and it is with this positive in mind that the leading 
multinational corporations (MNCs) should be lured to invest by expanding 
their operations in the Sub-Continent in particular and South Asia in 
general; thereby treating it as a single market. For this it will be necessary 
to put in place the right and common systems in the areas of technology and 
research & development (R&D). And to do this he recommends a ‗job-
specific‘ study group to ensure implementation.  
Further, the history and role of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariats: 
A North-East Asian inter-governmental organization comprising China, 
Japan and ROK, where participating countries agreed to establish a 
permanent organization to systemize and institutionalize cooperation 
between the three countries, can also be replicated by Pakistan and India. 
The other similar frameworks in Asia include: Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECP). He 
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emphasizes that especially in the case of Pakistan and India there is no need 
to reinvent the wheel and to just learn from the success of other cooperating 
countries. History is full of examples, which tell us that despite diversity in 
market-size, openness, expectations and strategies of each country, a larger 
common market-size by itself boosts each member country‘s international 
trade and investment. Further, benefits of economic linkages are not just 
limited to economic aspects, but also tend to promote institutional 
development and the global leverage of every cooperating country. In 
essence economic integration or enhanced economic linkages should always 
be viewed as a long-term solution to build mutual trust.  
Finally, the SAARC framework should jointly look at and work on 
food security and water solutions, since given the high population growth 
rate in the region this will in years to come become the biggest common 
issue. Mr. Howard also talks about the need for reorganization in 
cooperation (both between Pakistan and India and also within SAARC) to 
determine how to grow, distribute and consume food in the coming years. 
The true challenge according to him is for economic cooperation to create 
investment driven relations within the ambit of a liberalized trade 
environment. Such a linkage would in fact imply that bilateral cooperation 
would not just remain limited to regional boundaries, but if properly 
leveraged can also be directed to incorporate a global view that in-turn can 
yield positive global dividends for the entire South Asian region. In order to 
succeed though, the litmus test here will be to agree and ―draft‖ a 
comprehensive economic framework, which ensures that the nature of 
respective national regulations directly affects the ability of the region as a 
whole to cooperate freely and build sustainable economic linkages. 
Regulations are invariably national in nature, whereas, large scale activities 
in both real and financial economies are increasingly transnational. As a 
result, the nature of national-regulations bears directly on the ability to work 
synergistically. In the end it will all boil down to our (Pak-India) 
willingness and courage to come up with a framework that allows trade, 
efficient flow of resources and judicious use of capital across the region. 
Finally, to conclude I come to the question, which is invariably asked 
at the end of every debate or discussion: All very well, but how to do it? 
The straight and simple answer to this question is that we the people must 
make it happen. We have to look to ourselves to create a sustainable, just, 
peaceful and a secure neighbourhood. We cannot sit back and expect the 
respective or anyone else to rescue us. The political will needs to be created 
by us because simply on their own our political leaders cannot do it. 
Quoting from Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s memoirs he revealed that, ―After 4 
hours of meeting with the labour leaders back in 1934, I told them, you 
have convinced me that you are right. Now go out there and FORCE ME 
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TO DO IT.‖ What he meant was that pressures on the leadership to stay 
with the status quo are enormous and to move in a different direction it 
needs vociferous forces to push it in the direction it wishes to go itself. The 
leadership also counts on the public opinion to be confident that it is doing 
the right thing. Abraham Lincoln‘s confidence about, ―government of the 
people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth‖, was 
only possible through the active participation of the American citizens for 
abolishing slavery and creating a just, peaceful, secure America where 
economic stability could be available to all its inhabitants.  
What the SAARC leaders need to remember is that economic 
dynamism through mutual economic reliance creates its own peace 
dynamics and generates growth. However, only a carefully thought out 
process of negotiations and a comprehensive package of agreements 
followed by a sound monitoring & management mechanism that is 
practical, efficient and comprehensively addresses long standing concerns 
of all nations can bring about sustainable progress and a win-win for the 
region. In an entirely different setting altogether the second round of talks 
between China, Japan and South Korea for a trilateral free trade agreement 
(FTA) ended on August 16
th
, 2013, in Shanghai. As expected, the three 
nations made virtually no progress worth reporting during these talks, but it 
does not mean that the talks achieved nothing. The three nations are 
scheduled to hold a third round of talks in Japan by the end of this year, 
which in itself indicates the strong willingness to connect the three nations 
by cementing their mutual trade and economic inter-linkages. The post talks 
joint communiqué simply stated: ―China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade 
Agreement is irreversible‖ — SAARC ought to learn from their resolve! 
 
Free Trade is God’s diplomacy. There is no other certain way of uniting 
people in the bonds of peace and prosperity. ~ British politician Richard 
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Meeting Energy Requirement: Potential 
For Intra-regional Energy Trade 
 




More than one‐fifth of the global population resides in 
South Asia which embraces Nepal, India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Maldives. 
Despite rapid economic growth of six per cent since 1990, 
the nations of the group are having among the lowest per 
capita income in the world. The region is endowed with 
diverse sources of energy out of heaven (solar, wind, hydro) 
and hell (coal, fossil fuel). Few countries have more 
resources than its requirements such as Bhutan and Nepal 
while others are lacking the appropriate sources to meet the 
diversified need of the country. Analysis of daily load 
curves of these nations‘ power system demonstrates that 
there is complementarity in the demand and availability of 
specific type of power. If these power systems are 
integrated, obviously there is availability of supply of the 
requisite type of power for the intra‐regional energy trade. 
Further, the need is to develop infrastructure, establish 
regulatory framework and energy trade-friendly policies to 
harvest there quire benefit. South Asian countries will suffer 
from energy security if collective measures to avoid the 
situation are not planned and implemented. Harmonization 
of energy policies, facilitating cross‐border trade, providing 
non discriminating open access for transmission and 
developing a model for commercial negotiation of power 
purchase are the major steps to be realized for pooling the 
resources and distributing the output in the region as 
on‐required basis in commercially competitive price and 
establishment of power pool could be the answer to 
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Introduction 
ore than one‐fifth of the global population resides in the South Asia 
region, which embraces Nepal, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, 
Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Maldives. The region nations have 
diversified source of energy such as coal, natural gas, hydroelectricity, 
petroleum and renewable energy source such as wind and solar energy. 
However, the energy situation is acute in this region. The energy sector 
must grow on an average of 2‐3 per cent over the GDP growth rate just to 
sustain the prevailing economy. 
The present access to electricity supply is also decimal with as low as 
8 per cent of the population having access to electricity in Afghanistan. The 
maximum access to electricity to population is in Sri Lanka with 70 per cent 
followed by India and Bhutan. About 45 per cent Nepalese population has 
access to electricity. The per capita consumption is one of the lowest in the 
world — 8kwh/annum to 644kwh/annum. Nepal‘s per capita consumption 
of electricity is recorded as 93 kwh/capita. (See table 1) 
 
Table-1 
Energy/Electricity Scenario of SAARC Countries 
 
 








India  755.0 1170.0 1246.0 518.67 181.44 644 
 
Nepal  29.960 10.070 8.900 1.3200 2.780 93.0 
 
Pakistan  173.59 134.80 64.30 20.300 79.27 457 
 
Sri Lanka   20.860 33.250 5.540 4.1000 9.28 445 
 
Afghanistan  15.500 14.480   2.00  
 
Bhutan  0.6500   
 
   
Maldives  0.3500   
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As earlier mentioned, the SAARC countries have diversified sources 
of energy both from ―Heaven‖ as well as ―Hell‖. Naturally the energy 
source originating from ―heaven‖ are clean, renewable and cheap in terms 
of life cycle analysis (wind, solar, hydro) whereas those originating from 
―hell‖ are non‐renewable, costly to operate and maintain. The former types 
of resources are nature dependent and therefore unpredictable whereas the 
latter are human‐exploited and therefore predictable so far as the 
availability is concerned. If proper balance between these two sources in 
utilization can be maintained, combination of these sources of energy can 
create an optimum generation mix. 
Presently, the SAARC‐region is fed by energy, predominantly from 
the following source: coal43 per cent, petroleum 35 per cent, natural gas13 
per cent, hydroelectricity 8 per cent and nuclear 1 per cent. The contribution 
to the energy generation by different sources is not balanced and does not 
provide a cheap generation mix. Especially the hydroelectricity is poorly 
exploited even in the global context, where it generates about 16 per cent of 
global electricity and by 2020 is expected to exceed 1400 GW, which is 
barely one third of the global hydro potentiality. The regional generation 
mixis obviously not representative of the generation mix of individual 
countries of the region. (See table 2) 
 
Table-2 
Generation Min SAARC Countries (in percentage) 
 
Country  Gas  Petrol Coal Hydro Renewable Nuclear 
 
Afghanistan  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Bangladesh  73.7 20.6 4.10 1.20   
Bhutan   1.00 99.0     
India  19.0 9.00 57.0 19.0 12.0 2.0 
Maldives  100     
Nepal   5.00  95.0   
Pakistan   65.0  31.0  4.0 
Srilanka   31.0 20.0 42.0 7.00  
SAARC  13.0 35.0 43.0 8.00  1.0 
 
 
The trend in the utilization of electricity generating sources shows 
that each individual country of the region is dependent on one source of 
electricity. While Bhutan and Nepal are entirely hydro-powered, India 
predominantly relies on coal. The hydro source contributes significantly to 
the Pakistan and Srilanka electricity generation. By 2015 Sri Lanka 
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envisages to increase the share of coal to 54 per cent and drop the share of 
oil to 8 per cent and hydroelectricity to 28 per cent. 
 
Present Power Scenario of SAARC Countries 
The nations of SAARC are at different levels of economic development and 
therefore have different requirements for electricity. However, there is one 
common element — each nation finds it difficult to sustain the present level 
of economic development because of the lack of adequate power. The 
average annual growth in the demand of power is about 7‐8 per cent. With 
the growing pace of industrialization and urbanization the growth is likely 
to increase. Therefore, every nation in the region has ambitious growth of 
electricity demand. 
 
Bangladesh is targeted to achieve a GNP growth of about 8.7 per cent for 
which the peak electricity dem and is projected at 17500 MW and energy 
growth of 92402 Gwh in the reference scenario. Even in low economic 
growth scenario, the anticipated peak load of electricity is 11794 MW and 
61988 Gwh of electrical energy by the year 2020. 
 
Bhutan has set the goal of electricity for all by 2020. By the end of the 
year, Bhutan aims at exporting additional 10000 MW on top of its domestic 
need. 
 
India will be the major producer as well as user of electricity in the region. 
In the high growth scenario to support a GDP growth rate of 9 per cent, the 
capacity required in Indian system is at 337GW in 2017, to grow to 488 
GW in 2022 and 685 GW in 2027. 
 
Nepal‟s market is starved of electricity. Its total installed capacity is 762 
MW of which 708MW is hydro and 54 MW is thermal. The load shedding 
has been a regular feature for last 10years. Presently, the system peak is 
about 1000 MW, resulting in system peak deficit of 238MW. As Nepal is 
unsaturated market of electricity, the annual demand growth is expected to 
be 10 per cent on an average. According to the load forecast carried out by 
Nepal Electricity Authority in2011, the projected peak load is about 1400 
MW to be increased to 2052 MW in the year 2020and 3680 MW in the year 
2027. In comparison to the hydropower potentiality of 83000 MW, the 
demand is a small fraction of the resource potential. 
 
Pakistan is facing crisis in electricity supply as electricity generation has 
shrunk by up to 50 per cent in recent years due to heavy reliance on fossil 
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fuels. The production fell by 6000 MW resulting in supply deficit by 15 per 
cent. Today its total installed capacity is 21000 MW, mainly generated by 
fossil fuels (65 %), hydro (31 %), and nuclear (4 %). The independent 
power producers have contributed significantly by generating 7070 MW. 
According to the water vision 2025 of WAPDA, it is expected to generate 
16000 MW of hydropower. As per the PEPCO normal load forecast by 
2020 the load demand will grow to 41192 MW and to 84832 MW by the 
year 2030. 
 
Sri Lanka: The challenge of Sri Lanka is to maintain a strategic balance 
between indigenous energy resources and imported fossil fuels. The same is 
true for the electricity supply. Sri Lankan electricity supply relies heavily on 
imported fossil fuels, which at present is used to generate above 45 per cent 
of electricity need while hydropower meets 52 per cent of the electricity 
system. 
Actually Sri Lanka‘s strategy is to reduce the imported fuels to and boost 
the use of indigenous sources. The annual load growth is registered at about 
6 per cent. 
 
Review of Daily Load Demand Curve 
The demand of electricity is sensitive to the climate, human activity, type of 
consumers and level of development of a country. The SAARC nations 
have diverse demand in different time of month and day. This spatial and 
temporal diversity impacts the demand pattern of the electricity, which if 
integrated in a single market can create complimentary role in satisfying the 
electricity demand with proper load management. 
 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh experiences a shortage of about 270 MW per day on an 
average. The daily load of Bangladesh Power Development Board shows an 
increase in demand from 6 pm to 9 pm otherwise the load curve is 
comparatively flat. Usually the ratio of the base to peak load is 0.5 and the 
peak period is relatively static. There are morning sub‐peaks, when the 
demand load grows to1.16 times, the base load is however less by 1.2 times 
than the peak‐load. The picture is likely to change once coverage of 
electricity grows, which at present is 32 per cent of the population. 
Industrial and household demand is at par with over 40 per cent of total load 
for each sector. (Annex‐1) 
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Bhutan 
Bhutan‘s electricity is produced almost entirely by hydroplants. Its river 
dependence has a strong seasonality. In not so distant past, Bhutan‘s load 
was dictated by domestic/residential load. However, because of growth of 
industrial load, the load curve has undergone some changes. The load curve 
has a peak extending from 7 pm to mid‐night. The demand of the so called 
base load is about 5 times less than the average peak load. Bhutan‘s main 
challenge is to establish an optimum generation mixin view of the volatile 
hydrological behaviour of rivers. (Annex‐2) 
 
India 
India is the comparatively more developed country of the SAARC region. 
This developed status impacts the daily load curve of Indian system, where 
it has significant load even in daytime from 9 am to 18 pm, because of 
industrial activities. It has a distinct peak from 19 pm to 23 pm. 
The ratio between the peak and between the load of 9 am to 18 pm is 
lightly more than 1.There is a period between 1 am to 8 pm when load 
curve is lowest, which is about 0.9 per cent of the peak. However, it has got 
to be noted that the figure is based on the Typical All India Daily Load 
Curve which may not represent the opportunity of power trade because of 
the federal nature of the country and electricity trade is not under federal 
jurisdiction. It is reported that India is suffering from peak load deficit of 11 
per cent which translates into about 22000 MW. (Annex‐3) 
 
Nepal 
 Nepal‘s Power System load curve is dominated by a prominent peak load 
starting from 18 pm and lasting for 3 hours. The peak load on November 
13, 2012 was recorded at 1094 MW and the base load during day was about 
400 MW. This peak to base ratio of 2.8 dictates to manage load through 
reasonably planned generation mix. The problem is further complicated as 
Nepalis solely dependent on hydropower generation for its electricity 
supply. The total installed electricity capacity is about 765 MW which 
results in the deficit of 320 MW during peak hours. 
With upgrading of transmission lines in major interconnection points, 
Nepal is importing 256MW of electricity from India. Even this import does 
not meet the peak load and suffers deficits of 64 MW.  Nepal has to resort 
to load shedding. (Annex‐4) 
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Pakistan 
In its daily load curve, Pakistan has a small hump during 21‐23 pm during 
summer and 18‐20 hours during winter. In summer time, the peak load is 
1.17 times higher than the base load. The load curve does not have 
prominent shape at peak time. The total installed capacity of Pakistan‘s 




The daily load pattern of Sri Lanka Power System shows two peaks, the 
magnitude of both the peaks seems to be the same. The lesser peak occurs 
daily 5:30 to 6:30 in the morning and the other peak between 7:00 to 8:00 in 
the evening. The morning peak is attributed to domestic activities such as 
washing machine operation, ironing load etc. Industrial load occurs 
predominantly during day time starting from 8 am till 18 pm. The evening 
and morning peak loads are basically due to domestic activities and uses of 
domestic appliances. Electricity Board is putting emphasis on energy 
efficiency of the appliances and demand side management to smooth out 
the demand curve. (Annex‐6) 
The following table summarizes the peak timing of the various 
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Table-3 













Bangladesh 19:00‐21:00 Peak not so prominent 4567.0 













Morning and daytime 























Resource of Electricity Generation in SAARC Countries 
The primary sources of electricity generation in SAARC region are coal, 
petroleum products (gas and petrol), hydro and other renewable resources. 
The resources are distributed unevenly and few countries have to rely on a 
single source of electricity. The following table shows the resource for 
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Table-4 
 Resources for Electricity Generation in South Asia Source 
 
 






























It is reported that these resources except for the renewable, are going to be 
consumed by SAAR Countries by 2020, if the expected electricity growth is 
to be met. 
The generation mix of the SAARC countries does not correspond to 
the availability of natural resources for electricity generation. 
 
Table-5 
Types of Deficit and Generation Mix 
 
Country Generation Mix Type of deficit 
Afghanistan  
Petroleum Products + 
Hydro 
Overall acute 
Bangladesh  Gas + Hydro  
Peak deficit 
 





Coal + petroleum 
products + gas + 
hydro +nuclear 
Peak 
Nepal  Hydro Overall 
Acute 
 
Pakistan  Hydro + Gas 
Peak 
 
Sri Lanka  
Coal + Gas + Hydro 
Nominal 
Deficit 
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SAARC Initiative for Intrastate Transmission 
None of the SAARC countries suffer deficit due to lack of resources but 
because of either the financial resource constraints or wrong planning 
implementation. Nepal and Bhutan has hydropower potentiality which far 
exceeds the country‘s requirement. In case of other countries there is 
sporadic surplus which can be exported to other countries at a given time; 
however, such spot trade requires a power pool with the mandate to supply 
the power under economic dispatch concept. But before such pool comes 
into operation, the extensive transmission interconnection among the 
countries of SAARC will have to be effectively working. 
In view of the need to have an effective transmission network, 
SAARC envisages to create SAARC energy ring in 2004. Prior to the 
conception of SAARC energy ring, studies were made to establish the 
viability of developing transmission connection in the region. In a two steps 
study, first interconnection was envisaged to be made between four 
countries of the region — Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and India. The four-
border interconnection was commissioned by South Asia Regional Initiative 
in Energy Programme in August 2001. The objective of this study was to 
develop and characterize alternatives for a cross border interconnection in 
terms of accessing the technical viability and the associated investment 
cash. It was projected that by 2010 India will require more than 4500 MW 
from regional power exchange. By 2007 Bangladesh‘s requirement for 
regional power exchange was estimated to be 1340 MW. By 2010, Bhutan 
will have about 1300 MW of surplus power available for regional 
exchange; by 2011 Nepal will have 550 MW of surplus power available for 
regional exchange. However, the study failed to gain universal acceptance, 
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Four Borders Interconnection Location 
 
 
The viability of interconnection between India and Sri Lanka was studied in 
January 2002. Thus transmission interconnection between the two countries 
was expected to provide advantage to both the systems in terms of 
optimizing the installed capacity by way of utilization diversity in peak 
demand and thus optimize the overall generation mix. Various alternatives 
were examined in which Madhurai in India and Anuradhapura via Manner 
in Sri Lanka was considered to be having greater advantages. Sri Lanka 
generation plan, to a large extent, depends heavily on imported fuel and 
interconnection between the two countries is expected to have positive 
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This Inter Connection was Envisaged through Laying a 84 km 
underwater transmission line. The Bangladesh‐India interconnection will 
connect Bheramar to Behrampur and proceed to Farraka. Further 
development plan of the interconnection transmission line has yet to be 
agreed upon once the regional load dispatch centre is worked out. The 
picture presented in the foregoing paragraph is the preliminary strategy 
developed as concrete policy decision is yet to be made by the SAARC 
Energy Centre. 
Contributing meaningfully to the interstate‐electricity trade, each 
country will face different issues which should be urgently and effectively 
addressed. Each country has encountered specific type of problems and 
therefore there is no single formula to address the issues. For example, 
Afghanistan has suffered tremendous damage to the infrastructure related 
to electricity production and supply. The rehabilitation work of structures is 
a major task to quickly improve the electricity supply system. Small 
hydropower projects need to be established to give access to electricity to 
the people of isolated areas. To be an active player in regional electricity 
trade Afghanistan could play a major role by developing as a power transit 
route and also could serve as a pipeline corridor for natural gas trade from 
Turkmenistan to Pakistan and further down. 
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Bangladesh faces the problem of management of natural gas resources and 
it has also to improve the electricity access to the people. The accurate 
assessment of the gas reserves is one of the initial major tasks to establish 
universally acceptable gas reserves. Nepal can be a good source of 
hydroelectricity to replace part of the Bangladesh gas utilization for 
electricity. Hence Bangladesh has to focus itself to develop a regional 
electricity grid. 
 
Bhutan has significantly improved its economy by exporting hydro-
electricity to India. Bhutan has rightly focused on hydropower development 
with a target of adding of 10000 MW installed capacity within next 10 
years. Bhutan has a unique opportunity to play a significant role in the 
electricity trade by diversifying electricity to export not only to India but to 
Bangladesh also. 
 
India has an impressive GDP growth rate of above seven per cent. This has 
obliged it to increase electricity growth by nine per cent. This would mean 
to advance a growth of 650 GW in 2027. Its present total is slightly more 
than 200 GW. This is a real challenge. The electricity trade, basically 
importing electricity from its neighbouring countries has assumed an 
emergency dimension. The March 2013 initiative of India allowing multiple 
electricity traders to enter into electricity import from the neighbouring 
countries assumes special significance. Apart from this, India needs to 
exploit its hydropower potential estimated at 84000 MW. The electricity 
trade with Nepal and Bhutan has got to be expedited with rational approach 
for such transaction. India has surged ahead with the development of wind 
power and should continue to exploit more efficiently. Being a big 
consumer of electricity, the energy efficiency should be encouraged to 
increase the efficiency by more than five per cent. India is the country 
through which all roads to other SAARC countries pass. 
This creates tremendous responsibility on India for developing ways 
to facilitate the electricity trade through its territory. 
 
Nepal is wholly hydro‐based electricity system. It has resources potentiality 
of about 83000MW of which 43000 MW has been established as 
technically and financially feasible. Its 23 storage projects with total of 
25000 MW, puts in a commanding role of supplying peak hydroelectricity. 
Therefore, it has to encourage commercially feasible trade. Once a viable 
electricity grid is established, Nepal can be in a position to supply 
hydroelectricity to India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Nepal has to exploit 
differences in resources endowment by interconnecting its hydro‐dominated 
system to predominantly thermal system. The complementarity in energy 
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resource endowments, hydropower in Nepal and Bhutan, gas in Bangladesh 
and Pakistan and coal in India is well established. 
 
Pakistan has vast indigenous resources much of which have remained 
untapped. It has to sustain the development of natural gas, develop 
hydropower and increase the use of coal for electricity generation. A large 
portion of Pakistan population does not have access to electricity. 
Pakistan has to pay special attention to the problem. For the economic 
benefit of the country, Pakistan‐India cooperation in the electricity trade has 
got to be promoted. The realization of India‐Pakistan electricity trade will 
facilitate Nepal‐India‐Bangladesh‐Bhutan‐Pakistan electricity trade as a 
follow‐up of this opening. 
 
In Sri Lanka hydropower which dominated the generation system has 
given way to thermal plants. The government is determined to check this 
trend. Sri Lanka is focusing on introducing fuel diversity in electricity 
generation. It has also attached importance to energy efficiency programme. 
This policy is aimed at reducing the impact of petroleum products and 
enhances the role of indigenous sources of electricity such as hydropower 
and alternative sources of electricity such as wind. The interconnection 
transmission lines Rameswaram‐Manner will effectively connect Sri Lanka 
with South‐Asia Power system. 
 
The Way Forward 
In general, all the countries of SAARC have not achieved ―electricity for 
all‖ so far. Some countries have a figure of 70 per cent (Sri Lanka), while 
others like Afghanistan have only eight per cent. Almost all countries suffer 
load shedding, the magnitude of the shedding being different for different 
countries. In the scenario of constraints in domestic supply of electricity 
naturally the question generally asked is about attitude towards export of 
electricity. However, electricity trade is not limited to the access of 
electricity to the population but deals with the problem of the optimum 
generation mix in the region. One of the major benefits of the electricity 
pooling system is to make cheap electricity available to consumers through 
economic dispatch of electricity to the system. 
It is evident that there is need and potentiality for intra‐State 
electricity trade among SAARC countries. This realization is reflected in 
the formation of SAARC Working Group on Energy with a commitment to 
an open process to advise on the development of the market design. The 
market will be designed and developed in a rational manner that will 
optimize the resources of the member countries in an effective and secure 
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manner. In order to achieve this objective, the draft Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Regional Energy Market in South Asia envisages to 
create National Electricity Market Model, State Electricity Authority, an 
Electricity Regulatory Authority, Transmission System Operators, and 
Distribution System Operators. However, the implementation of these steps 
is too slow and the weak policy and regulatory arrangement remains the 
major barrier for Regional Electricity Market. The lack of limited mutual 
understanding among key stakeholders on regional cooperation has been a 
major issue. In practical fronts also the inadequate policy and regulation for 
cross‐border trade and limited cross‐border transmission infrastructure has 
been a major hurdle. 
The prerequisite to the establishment of a power pool is the need to 
tackle the practical issues related to this. The foremost and basic 
requirements are the development of open access policy to transmission, 
development of grid codes, wheeling charges and cross‐border transmission 
plan. 
Together with regulatory arrangement, a dispute resolution 
mechanism should also be at place before the cross‐border transmission 
plan is developed. Institutional arrangement should be devised with 
establishment of a nodal agency to power trade and technical issues which 
should be addressed through some transmission utility forum. The SAARC 
Energy Working Group should be more proactive to create infrastructure 
regulatory forum in SAARC and work on details of the power pool. 
The creation of Power Pool will enable the region to utilize their 
source of electricity in an optimum way by balancing the requirement and 
supply through various sources of electricity generation, could make the 
supply of electricity cheap and reliable by eliminating the need for a 
spinning reserve and balancing the source of peak and base power by way 
of avoiding costly peak power. Moreover, this will create a situation of 
interdependence among SAARC nations thus avoiding tensions and conflict 




It is obvious that each country of SAARC Region faces unique challenges 
to address before the concept of Regional Power Pool can take off. The 
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Afghanistan 
• fghanistan needs to improve/rehabilitate infrastructures related to 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution damaged by 
the civil war 




•  The most valuable asset‐natural gas resources has got to be 
managed efficiently 




• Supply of hydroelectricity has got to be diversified from one 
nation to multiple nations of SAARC countries 
 
India 
• There is a need to meet demand with proper generation mix 
specially to achieve a mix ratio of 40:60 for hydro and other 
sources 
• Energy efficiency has got to be enhanced to save significant 
amount of electricity 
 
Nepal 
• Diversification of hydroelectricity market among neighboring 
countries 
• Access of electricity to the population has to be enhanced 
 
Pakistan 
• Fuel diversity in electricity generation has to be introduced. 
• Supply of electricity should be made more reliable and adequate. 
 
Sri Lanka 
• Development of indigenous resources for electricity generation 
should be significantly promoted. 
• Electricity efficiency for domestic as well as industrial uses 
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Maldives 
• As Maldives relies wholly on imported petroleum products to 
meet its electricity demand, the efficient use of electricity will go 















































Building Regional Transport  
And 
 Communication Infrastructure 
 
Ms. Arshi Saleem Hashmi 
 
 
egional connectivity in South Asia can enhance regional trade, lower 
cost of transportation, benefit land lock countries and help access to 
remote areas. Poverty can be significantly reduced with the 
dissemination of benefits of economic growth. Regional leaders have been 
reluctant to actively pursue the case of regional integration for domestic 
political reasons. There has been slow progress to acknowledge their shared 
interests in development and security and resolution of complex issues 
confronted by them. The inaction raises the question of whether South Asia 
is, in fact, a region at all, it is argued by some that South Asia is a ―natural 
region‖ by virtue of its geography and integrated pre-colonial history and 
culture, while others have argued that regions do not exist naturally.  
Despite positive indicators in the economies of some of the countries 
in the region, there is severe lack of horizontal economic development in 
the region. Transport connectivity is directly linked with sustained regional 
trade and economic activity, however, an on-going   problem is to ensure a 
good quality transportation system for the entire region. ASEAN is often 
quoted as a model for SAARC countries, it is noted that interregional trade 
in SAARC countries is only 5 per cent
1
of the total trade compared to 26 per 
cent of the ASEAN countries
2
 and lack of transport and communication 
connectivity. 
Transport is the backbone of economic activity and social 
development. When it comes to improving connectivity, each mode of 
                                                          
1






  Syetarn Hansakul  , Asian Economic Community, Deutsche Bank, DB Research,  
June 14, 2013 , available at  
http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-
PROD/PROD0000000000315342.pdf, page 4 
R 
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transport — roads, railways, maritime shipping and aviation — has its own 
physical and operational characteristics which require different 
considerations. The present level of connectivity reflects a restrictive policy 
regime. South Asia suffers from excessive direct costs and time taken to 
cross borders and from inefficiency in cross-border transactions, which 
ultimately affect trade negatively.  
South Asia lacks in intra- and inter-regional connectivity. 
Infrastructure quality varies widely across countries, showing a huge gap 
between developing and LDCs in South Asia. Lack in connectivity 
undoubtedly plays a critical role for such a below average performance in 
regional trade. Better infrastructure would encourage fragmentation of 
production, enhance the regional and global trade, and help realize the 
integration process. Therefore, agreeing to a regional transit would mean a 
―win-win‖ gain for all the countries in the South Asian region. The paper is 
an attempt to identify the challenges and the contours of the potentials for 
regional cooperation in regional connectivity and trade facilitation and 
provides some policy perspectives.  
Regional integration initiatives, according to Van Langenhove
3
, 
should fulfil at least eight important functions: 
 
 Strengthening of trade integration in the region 
 Creation of an appropriate enabling environment for private 
sector development 
 Development of infrastructure programmes in support of economic 
growth and regional integration 
 Development of strong public sector institutions and good 
governance; 
 Reduction of social exclusion and the development of an 
inclusive civil society 
 Contribution to peace and security in the region 
 Building of environment programmes at the regional level 
 Strengthening of the region‘s interaction with other regions of the 
world.  
 
Regional Integration through Regional Connectivity 
Regional integration is of long-standing concern in South Asia. Despite 
increasing general levels of prosperity observed in some of its countries, an 
on-going problem is how to ensure a good quality transportation system for 
the entire region. The economic integration moves well when rising intra-
                                                          
3
 Van Langenhove Luk and Philippe De Lombaerde, ―Regional Integration, Poverty 
and Social Policy,‖ Global Social Policy, 7 (3)- 2007, pp 377-38. 
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regional trade is supported by developed infrastructure, stronger 
connectivity networks and improved trade facilitation measures. However, 
this is not the case in South Asia at present. South Asia has relatively 
stronger trade links with neighbouring regions, but it lacks in intra-and 
inter-regional connectivity.  
Economic integration depends heavily on the density and quality of 
connectivity or regional infrastructure. A stronger connectivity not only 
strengthens the intra-and-inter-regional trade but also generates higher 
income and prosperity. What then holds the South region to realize a higher 
trade potential? Why regional integration across South Asia has been 
relatively slow? Lack of connectivity undoubtedly plays a critical role for 
such a below average performance in regional trade. Improved trade 
facilitation, better infrastructure, stronger connectivity, institutions, skilled 
human resources, etc. are the keys for success of regional integration 
process. More importantly, better infrastructure would encourage 
fragmentation of production, enhance the regional and global trade, and 
help realize the integration process. 
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Based on the study undertaken by B. Derudder, X. Liu, C. 
Kunaka and M. Roberts, this map summarizes information on the 
connectivity of 67 important South Asian cities in infrastructure networks. 
It combines four information layers to reveal a city‘s overall stature in the 
region‘s infrastructure networks, i.e. rail, road, air, and information 
technology networks. The map shows that major connections tend to be 
within-country linkages between large cities
4
.  
There are five communities in South Asia‘s urban infrastructure 
networks, which largely follow national borders. Delhi, Mumbai, Lahore, 
Karachi, Chennai, Colombo and Dhaka are shown to be important nodes for 
the infrastructural integration of South Asia, as these cities mediate flows 
between relatively unconnected communities and cities. 
In contrast to other parts of the world, connectivity is very strongly 
impacted by national borders. 
There are 5 communities in South Asia‘s infrastructure networks: 
there is a community bringing together Pakistan‘s cities plus Kabul; a 
northern and a southern Indian community, the former centred on Delhi and 
including Kathmandu and Thimphu and the latter including Mumbai, 
Kolkata, Hyderabad, Chennai, Bangalore; and two smaller communities for 
Dhaka and Chittagong in Bangladesh on the one hand and Male and 
Colombo on the other hand. 
Lahore has a relative fast road link with Amritsar. In addition, there is 
also a (low-frequency) transnational train service between Lahore and 
Amritsar/Delhi and a (low-frequency) flight between Lahore and Delhi. 
This makes the Lahore-Amritsar and Lahore-Delhi connections, although 
not very strong per se, into vital links for interconnecting Pakistan and 
India, and explains the large values for Delhi, Lahore and Amritsar. 
Dhaka‘s gateway function is the consequence of being the only go-
between for Chittagong‘s (and probably also most other cities in 
Bangladesh if the population threshold were to be lowered) connections 
with the rest of the network. This in turn fuels Kolkata‘s position, as this 
city — together with Delhi — functions as Dhaka‘s main gateway to the 
rest of the network. 
And finally, Colombo functions as a gateway to Male given dense 
airline connections between both cities on the one hand, and Colombo‘s 
relatively strong air transport connections to the Indian subcontinent on the 
other hand. Given Colombo‘s solid connections with Chennai, the latter city 




, X. Liu, C. Kunaka and M. Roberts, ―The Connectivity of South 
Asian Cities in Infrastructure Networks,‖ Globalization and World Cities 
(GaWC) Research Network, http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb428.html 
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also plays an important mediating role between Male/Colombo and the rest 
of the network. 
Non-tariff policy barriers have gained importance as tariff-based 
barriers to economic cooperation have generally declined. Demand for both 
national and international infrastructure services, for both production and 
consumption, and international trade purposes, has been rising in South 
Asia. If we fail to respond to this demand, the region‘s trade will slow down 
which would hamper the integration process. Development of cross-border 
infrastructure, especially transportation linkages and energy pipelines, 
across the region, will contribute to regional integration by reducing 
transportation costs and facilitating intra-regional trade. Therefore, the 
connectivity challenges, both hardware and software, before the South 
Asian countries, particularly those that are landlocked and island, require 
better understanding and adequate support. 
Large-scale increases in production and trade have been made 
possible with advances in transport, such as the diffusion of 
containerization. When it comes to improving connectivity, each mode of 
transport — roads, railways, maritime shipping and aviation — has its own 
physical and operational characteristics which require different 
considerations. 
 





Note: *Data not available -Source: WDI Online Database 
                                                          
5
  Rabir De, ―Connectivity, Trade Facilitation and Regional Cooperation in South 
Asia‖, Commonwealth Secretariat-April 2013, 
http://ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/pdf/South%20Asia%20meeting%202-
3%20may%2020013%20PPT/Prabir%20De.pdf 
 Road density (km of road per 
100 sq. km of surface area)  
Roads, paved 
(% of total 
roads)  
2000 2010 2000  2011  
Afghanistan  *  6.00  23.66  *  
Bangladesh  166.00  171.00  9.53  9.50  
Bhutan  20.00  36.00  62.00  62.00  
India  89.00  125.00  47.46  49.54  
Maldives  29.00  *  *  100.00  
Nepal  11.00  14.00  52.10  53.94  
Pakistan  32.00  32.00  56.00  65.36  
Sri Lanka  148.00  163.00  85.84  81.00  
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Table 2 







Rail density (km per 










Afghanistan * * * * 
Bangladesh 2768 2835 19.22 19.69 
Bhutan * * * * 
India 62759 63974 19.09 19.46 
Maldives * * * * 
Nepal + + + + 
Pakistan 7791 7791 9.79 9.79 
 
Notes: *Railway does not exist. +A negligible portion of railway.  
Source: WDI Online Database 
 
The performance of South Asian countries in land-based transport has 
been mixed. Tables (a) and (b) present road and railway lengths in South 
Asia, respectively. In particular, performance of India in improving road 
density in the last decade has been phenomenal. There is high potential in 
improving the road conditions since many South Asian countries are still 
having substantial unpaved roads. In railways, landlocked South Asian 
countries do not have any considerable presence of railways. Developing 
South Asian countries have relatively higher presence of railway network. 
However, railways in South Asia suffer from lack of safety and improved 
technology. This calls for a stronger cooperation with both developing and 
developed countries where both availability of technology and financing are 
available. At the same time, investment is greatly needed for strengthening 
national road and rail networks and removing the missing links in regional 
networks such as Trans-Asian Railways (TAR). 
 
                                                          
6
 Ibid 
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Past Initiatives for South Asian Connectivity 
 
SAARC Initiative 
The Islamabad SAARC Summit (2004)‘s decision to strength transport 
transit and communications, was followed by a SAARC Regional 
Multimodal Transport Study (SRMTS), completed June 2006. 
SRMTS identified 10-road corridors, 5-Rail, 2-IWT corridors, 10-
Maritime and 16 Aviation Gateways, for regional transport connectivity. 
14
th
 SAARC Summit in April 2007 in New Delhi adopted SRMTS 
recommendation and urged their Transport Ministers to oversee 
implementation and (a) extend SRMTS to include Afghanistan, and (b) to 
develop a model regional transit and transport agreement. 
Sub-regional projects were proposed by Bhutan, India and Sri Lanka, 
and their implementation reviewed by Transport Ministers Meeting, 
Colombo, July 2009. A new activity ―to run a demonstration container train 
from Pakistan to Bangladesh through India and Nepal‖ was also included. 
The Bhutan project focused on improvement of border crossing, 
immigration, parking, cargo handling at Phuentsholing. India‘s projects 
focused on (a) opening rail route: Birgunj-Katihar-Rohanpur-Mangla/ 
Chittagong with rail links to Biratnagar & Agartala (b) Agartala-Chittagong 
rail link (c) Improvement of Kathmandu-Birgunj-Kolkata/Haldia link and 
(d) Direct air connectivity: Male-New Delhi, Islamabad-New Delhi. The Sri 
Lanka project focused on opening up (a) rail corridor Colombo-Chennai (b) 
Ferry service; Colombo-Cochin, and Colombo-Tuticorn. However, progress 
in implementation has so far been marginal. A SAARC expert group is, 




Recent Regional Road Initiatives 
South Asian governments have invested in major national roads, as well as 
rural road networks. Some major rural road development initiatives have 
been implemented in, for example, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. In 
addition, the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Asian Highway Network, 
adopted under the auspices of UN Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and Pacific (UNESCAP) on 18 November 2003, established technical 
specifications for the regional road network. The Asian Highway Network 
                                                          
7
 Paper presented by Dr. M. Rahmatullah, ―Strengthening Physical Connectivity in 
South Asia‖, International Conference on SAARC organized by IIC & RIS, 16-
17 September, 2010, New Delhi. 
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South Asian countries are also struggling to maintain their Asian 
Highway routes due to limited finances and institutional capacity. It is often 
difficult to fund cross-border projects unless such projects are part of a 
broader integration strategy, such as the Almaty-Bishkek Regional Road 
Rehabilitation project funded by ADB under the Central Asia Regional 
Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programme or the Northern Economic 
Corridor of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). 
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 ―Towards Seamless Connectivity in South and South-West Asia,‖ UN-ESCAP, 
South and South West Asia Office. August 2013,   
http://sswa.unescap.org/pdf/Towards_Seamless_Connectivity_in_South_and_So
uth_West_Asia.pdf 


















A number of regional routes that have been agreed upon if materialized 
would revolutionize the entire region. Unfortunately due to lack of political 
will, ad-hocism, lack of funds or security reasons, the proposed plans have 
not been implemented. For instance, Asian Highway (AH), SAARC 
Highway Corridor (SHC), BIMSTEC Road Corridor (BRC): (Bay of 
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), 
SASEC Road Corridor (SRC): (South Asia Sub-regional Economic 
Cooperation), BCIM Route (BCIM): (Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar 
Forum for Regional Cooperation). Here are some proposed connectivity 
routes: 
 
SHC1, BRC1, SAS5A, AH1 
Lahore, New Delhi, Kolkta‐Petrapole/Benapole‐Dhaka‐khaura/Agartala  
Connects Pakistan, India and Bangladesh 
Length: 478 km 
 
SHC1, BRC1, SAS5A, AH1 
Kathmandu‐Kakarvita‐Phulbari‐Banglabandha‐Mongla/Chittagong 
Connects Nepal, India, Bangladesh 
Length: Mongla 1314 km, Chittagong 1394 km 
 
BRC5, SHC5, AH1(A2) 
Sandrup Jhonker‐Shillong‐Sylhet‐Dhaka‐Kolkata 
Connects Bhutan, India, Bangladesh 
Length: 906 km 
 
BRC9, SHC9, SAS 
Agartala‐Akhaura‐Chittagong 
Connects India, Bangladesh 
Length: 227 km 
 
BRC9, SHC9, SAS 
Thimphu‐Phuentsholing‐Jaigaon‐Chngrabandha‐ 
Burimari‐Chittagong/Mongla 
                                                          
9
  Connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia, Interim Report, A Joint Study of the 
Asian Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank Institute, 2013 
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Connects : India and Bangladesh 




Connects India and Bangladesh 
Length: 253 km 
 
BRC11, AH41 
Chittagong‐Ramu‐Cox‘s Bazaar‐ Teknaf‐ Maungdaw 
Connects Myanmar and Bangladesh 
Length: 225 km 
 
BCIM, SHC5,BRC5, BRC1,SHC1, AS5A, AH1 
Kunming‐Mandalay‐Imphal‐Jaigaon‐Sutarkandhi‐Sylhet‐ 
Dhaka‐Jessore‐Kolkata 
Connects Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar 
Length: 2800 km 
 
Rail Links in South Asia 
Rail connectivity can also be increased by developing more inland container 
depots and dry ports with rail connections. Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bhutan 
and inland parts of India and Pakistan should set-up more container depots 
and dry ports. Nepal has been successfully running a container depot at 
Birgunj (mainly for Nepal‘s international traffic) and another one is 
coming-up at Kakarbhitta (to facilitate Nepal‘s trade with eastern South 
Asia sub region)
10
. The same model can be extended to other parts of South 
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 Towards Seamless Connectivity in South and South-West Asia, UNESCAP, 
August 2013,  
http://sswa.unescap.org/pdf/Towards_Seamless_Connectivity_in_South_and_So
uth_West_Asia.pdf 








Some countries are expanding and improving their networks through the 
construction of new tracks, double tracking or electric signalling, but the 
region as a whole has yet to realize its rail potential. The Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the Trans-Asian Railway Network, which entered into force 
in 2009
11
 has raised the profile of the region‘s railways and is encouraging 
governments and financing institutions to increase investment in the sector. 
 
Air Connectivity in South Asia 
Increase in passenger and cargo transported by air is partly due to the 
improvement of air transport connectivity in the region. During the past 
decade, more low-cost carriers have entered the market, flight frequencies 
have increased, and countries have invested in new and existing airports.  
Most countries in South Asia are now linked, either directly or through 
hubs, and have taken progressive steps towards developing air service 
agreements and liberalizing their air transport industry. However, the region 
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 Network Formalization Agreement, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-
Asian Railway Network, came into force on June 11, 2009,  
http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/common/tis/tar/TARintergovagreement.asp 





Maritime Connectivity in South Asia 
The expansion of international trade across the world has depended on 
building the capacity and efficiency of its major seaports, particularly 
container ports. For the past two decades, the container terminals in South 
Asian region have been handling increasing higher cargoes, dominated by 
Indian container terminals.  
However, none of the world‘s top 10 busiest container ports is from 
South Asia.  
Asia‘s most important liner routes, by volume, still run from Asia to 
Europe and North America. But there has been a substantial increase in 
intra-Asian shipping, particularly between India and Southeast and East 
Asian countries. Driven by trade between India and China, containerized 
trade in South Asia has also been growing rapidly. Almost all the coastal 
countries in South Asia are now linked by direct shipping services or by 
trans-shipment and transit operations through hub ports (e.g. Colombo). 
Nevertheless, there is significant inter-country variation; shipping 
connectivity is still poor between South Asian countries. According to the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Liner 
Shipping Connectivity Index, which includes measures of the number and 
capacity of ships and the extent of services, between 2006 and 2011, 
shipping connectivity increased markedly in a number of South Asian 
economies such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India, while that for Maldives 
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deteriorated.
12
 To address the issue of insufficient shipping services, 
countries can achieve economies of scale through collective shipping 
arrangements. To start with, we can route the liner shipping services 
between the ports of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, and also 
with the ports in neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia and Gulf. 
A regional commission in South Asia may be set-up at exchanging 
information on regulations and encouraging competition of shipping 
services. There is further scope to improve connectivity, particularly for 
landlocked countries through reduction of trade processes and procedures at 
transit ports. A faster port not only increases the productivity of home 
country but also improves the competitiveness of traded goods, more 
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 Towards Seamless Connectivity in South and South-West Asia, UNESCAP, 
August 2013,  
http://sswa.unescap.org/pdf/Towards_Seamless_Connectivity_in_South_and_So
uth_West_Asia.pdf 
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Connectivity through Trade and Transit
13
 
The table shows the situation in South Asia. There are a number of 
agreements between the states, but instead of broad regional agreement, 
most of the connectivity is bilateral. While bilateral relationship is as 
important in international relations, for regions to prosper, bilateral interests 
should give way to regional interests which may help the least developed 














India-Bangladesh  Bilateral  Yes  No  Yes  
India-Nepal  Bilateral  Yes  Yes  Yes  
India-Bhutan  Bilateral  Yes  Yes  
India — member  
Bhutan  — observer  
India-Pakistan  Bilateral  Yes*  No  Yes  
Pakistan-
Afghanistan  
Bilateral  Yes  Yes  
Pakistan — member 
Afghanistan  — observer  
Bangladesh-
Nepal  
Bilateral  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Bangladesh-
Bhutan  
Bilateral  Yes  Yes  
Bangladesh — member 
Bhutan — observer  
Bhutan-Nepal  Bilateral  Yes  No  
Nepal — member  
Bhutan — observer  
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 Prabir De, Abdur Rob Khan, Sachin Chaturvedi, ―Transit and Trade Barriers in 
Eastern South Asia: A Review of the Transit Regime and Performance of 
Strategic Border-Crossings,‖ Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on 
Trade Working Paper Series, no. 56, June 2008. 
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Benefit of Regional Connectivity to Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) 
The benefits of regional transit favour the LDCs in the region such as 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh could earn hefty revenues (over US$ 1 billion) as 
transit fees from Indian vehicles plying to and from India‘s north-eastern 
region to the rest of India, using Bangladeshi territory through two 
corridors.
14
 The amount may go up if other corridors between India and 
Bangladesh are also counted. Similarly, transit arrangement between India, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan would provide hefty royalties to Pakistan for the 
movement of vehicles between India and Afghanistan, using Pakistani 
territory. Studies indicate that there are also huge gains associated with 
energy conservation due to transit and efficient use of resources.  
 
Major Challenges in Regional Connectivity 
The present level of connectivity reflects restrictive policy regime. It can be 
inferred both on the counts of geopolitics and geo‐economics that South 
Asia is undergoing hiccups, if not outright constraints. It is taking time to 
create regional flavour, understanding, metaphors, trust, and socialization.  
Institution building is far from satisfactory. Inter‐state connectivity, 
when seen in the regional plane, is almost non‐existent. South Asian 
countries are racing more towards globalization than regionalization. Due to 
lack of integration, logistic costs in South Asia are very high and range 
between 13-14 per cent of the commodity value, compared to 8 per cent in 
US. Intra-regional trade in SAARC is around 5 per cent, compared to 26 per 





The most critical challenge to integration in South Asia is the huge trust 
deficit. As the largest and most powerful state in the region, India has been 
unable to engender enough confidence among member states in its 
commitment to non-interference, to resolve bilateral disputes and to provide 
leadership.  
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 Prabir De,Regional Cooperation for Regional Infrastructure Development: 
Challenges and Policy Options for South Asia, RIS-DP # 160, New Delhi 
15
 Paper presented by M. Rahmatullah, former director UN-ESCAP, Bangkok, High 
Level Policy Dialogue on Regional Cooperation and Inclusive Development in 
SSWA held on 18-19 October, 2012, New Delhi,  
http://sswa.unescap.org/meeting/documents/High-level-forum/Rahmatullah.pdf 
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Public Perception 
While an overall understanding of regional integration is there in SA, 
political and security issues do affect public opinion. Geographical 
proximity, travel and historical experiences have contributed in creating 
public perceptions on the issue of regional integration in South Asia.  
Opinion of the stakeholders like business/industry members, 
lobbyists, bureaucracy leads to an unconvincing/reluctant approach towards 
increasing integration. In this context, it becomes particularly important to 
improve public perception through soft diplomacy and increased 
interaction. This will also bridge the information deficit among the South 
Asian Nations.  
 
Structural Challenges 
The major challenge facing South Asia in its quest for regional integration 
and increasing competitiveness is the poor quality and inefficient 
infrastructure services, both hardware and software, which raise costs of 
transportation and production and constrain the capacity of the South Asian 
economies to gain from a liberal trading environment. Cross-border and 
transit transport is still hampered by many non-physical barriers that lead to 
excessive delays, high costs and uncertainties. These are multiple technical 
standards, inconsistent and complex border-crossing procedures and 
excessive documentation. In addition, goods are often inspected on both 
sides of the borders by different authorities, and sometimes even while in 
transit, rather than being inspected either at loading or unloading points. 
The importance of tariffs as barriers to trade has gradually come down, 
however, high-tariffs still exist for certain sensitive products, and there is a 
strong presence of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) including high border 
transaction costs in the region. Landlocked countries, which depend on 
inter-country land transport for much of their external trade, could benefit 
the most from multilateral facilitation; despite being connected to regional 
networks, they still depend for their transit on neighbouring countries for 
their goods to reach sea ports and beyond. Many organizations have been 
bringing stakeholders together to remove these barriers. ESCAP, for 
example, through resolution 48/11 adopted in 1992, has been urging 




                                                          
16
 Resolution 48/11, Facilitation Across International Borders,  
http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/Publications/TPTS_pubs/pub_2307/pub_2307_ch1
6.pdf 
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Among the major causes of high trade transaction costs in South Asia 
are the cumbersome and complex cross-border trading practices, which also 
increase the possibility of corruption.  
The goods carried by road in South Asia are largely subject to trans-
shipment at the borders, which is a serious impediment to regional and 
multilateral trade. The position is further compounded by lack of 
harmonization of technical standards. The foremost critical factor 
prohibiting South Asia in achieving its regional connectivity is absence of 
regional transit trade. South and South West Asia region does not have 
regional transit arrangement, although partial transit exists for landlocked 
countries like Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal. Therefore, transit is one of 
the central challenges facing the South Asian countries.  
 
Overcoming the Challenges & Prospects 
South Asian region, with its geographical contiguity, has great potential for 
cooperation in connectivity sector. Therefore, agreeing to a regional transit 
system would mean a ―win-win‖ gain for all the countries in the South 
Asian region. Reasons are primarily as follows: 
First, smaller countries in South Asia (e.g. Afghanistan, Bhutan, 
Bangladesh and Nepal) are having higher trade with the region. However, 
lack of transit trade is impeding their intra-regional trade and economic 
exchange to grow and integrate further. Connecting South Asia requires 
massive investment. It will be a difficult challenge to mobilize such a large 
investment particularly due to ongoing financial and economic crisis. This 
calls for an appropriate financing mechanism to mobilize the region‘s huge 
savings for infrastructure development.   
Second, bilateral transit trade (MFN type) does not exist among all 
the countries in South Asia on reciprocal basis due mainly to geographical 
asymmetry, political misunderstanding, among others. For example, India 
and Bangladesh or India and Pakistan do not have transit arrangement even 
though both the countries are adjacent and share a common border. At the 
same time, India has bilateral transit arrangement with Bhutan and Nepal, 
with which India share an international border.  
Third, transit would help smaller countries to earn revenue, which 
could be utilized for social and infrastructure development and enterprises 
at border areas.  
Fourth, South Asian countries have accorded a regional Free Trade 
Area (SAFTA) and they are signatories of GATT. The greater benefits of 
SAFTA and multilateral free trade are clearly contingent upon regional 
transit. 
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Time is ripe South Asian countries signed both a Motor Vehicles 
Agreement and Regional Transport and Transit Agreement together. A 
regional overland road link from Istanbul to Yangon via Delhi can be 
revived for regional trade with some effort.  A major part of this corridor is 
domestically operational, as a dual carriageway, and an integral part of the 
old Sher Shah Road, or Grand Truck (GT) Road is in place. The opening of 
the route will mark a revival of the old linkages existing in South and South 
West Asia dating back to the British period. The APIBM corridor 
representing Afghanistan-Pakistan-India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Transport 
Corridor, is meant for making each and every country in South Asia as a 
transport hub for trade in the broader region; it deserves a high priority for 
operationalization. 
The APIBM corridor would facilitate trade and investments in 
infrastructure sector in the Southern Asia, bring rich rewards for bordering 
regions; can make Pakistan and Afghanistan as hubs for India‘s trade with 
Iran, Middle East and Central Asia. However, that would need upgrading of 
infrastructure and Land Custom Stations (LCSs) at the Afghanistan border 
with the Central Asian countries (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan). Bangladesh will become a hub for India‘s trade with Myanmar 
and other Southeast Asian countries and a transit for India‘s North Eastern 
Region. Myanmar itself will become a transit hub for India‘s trade with 
other ASEAN countries. Sri Lanka is already well placed to be a maritime 
hub in South Asia with a lot of India‘s trade trans-shipped through the port 
of Colombo. Apart from transit revenues, there are huge gains associated 
with energy conservation due to transit and efficient use of resources. This 
APIBM corridor would be Asia‘s new silk route, linking Central and West 
Asia with East Asia, where South Asia is the land bridge and would play as 





A comprehensive approach and collaborative measures are needed to 
address the physical infrastructure issues, including roads, rail, inland 
waterways, maritime transport, dry ports, airports, seaports, and information 
and communication technology, and non-physical soft infrastructure issues 
like cross-border transit facilitation measures; customs clearance, and other 
facilitating policies and regulations. 
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Political Will and Decision Making 
A policy paradigm is needed to connect the contributions of the diverse 
countries into one whole — making them synergistic. The threefold 
situation, a mix of internal reforms, an increasing awareness of the region‘s 
socio-economic specificities, and external dimensions in the making, does 
not imply losing national identity. But it does suggest a path towards 
realising the strength of an efficient positive complimentary, cohesive and 
cumulative strategy which is a challenge faced by all the SAARC countries. 
SAARC requires transforming common policies and politics of economy 
and empowerment. It needs introduction of a strategic mix of emotions and 
economics towards incremental value chain creation for the individual 
countries and their people. Open and frequent bilateral and multilateral 
mobility of products and people will promote equitable and efficient benefit 
distribution. Hard politics is an acknowledged fact. Without confronting the 
hard politics upfront or minimizing its negative impacts economic 
integration in South Asia may be a difficult proposition. It is generally 
believed that the greater is the common threat perceptions, be it traditional 
or non-traditional, the better is the drive for coordination for regional 
integration as happened in the EU region.  
To make regional integration work, member states, specifically the 
leading state, need to be sufficiently motivated. It must be realized that an 
approach of accommodation would be more productive than that of 
isolation, suspicion and mistrust. India is moving fast to assume 
globalization role but it has a great responsibility to take all other smaller 
nations of South Asia on board to enjoy the benefits. Bilateral connectivity 
slows down regional cooperation. Finally, to quicken regional connectivity, 
India and Pakistan should settle their issues as comprehensively as possible.  
Composite dialogue or other peace talks should move towards solution of 
long standing issues as lack of this prevents efforts taken in enhancing trade 
or connectivity. 




Developing Energy Corridor from Central and 
West Asia to South Asia 
 
 
Prof. Savita Pande 
 
ross-border energy trade is a strategic issue with high potential for 
cooperation. Unfortunately, this is also the reason why such energy 
trade has not taken place. The cooperation  potential lies in 
―reduction of energy inequality in the region in question; a win-win 
scenario for the exporting country (by bringing in revenues), for the 
importing country (by reducing energy poverty), and for the transit 
countries, if any (by generating revenues through transit fees; the requisite 
infrastructure development across remote, difficult terrain of border areas, 
providing connectivity to inaccessible areas stimulating economic activities; 
and the cross border energy trade facilitates may improve political 
relationships among the trading and transit countries‖.1 The challenge lies in 
the fact that while it is governed by supply-demand rules, it is also deeply 
steeped in security risks and investment economics. Creating energy 
corridors is no exception to the rule, those across South Asia included. This 
paper seeks to explore the issue in the context of South Asia — Central 
Asia as well as South Asia and West Asia energy corridors in the context of 
two proposed pipelines: the Iran-Pakistan (IP) (earlier Iran-Pakistan-India 
(IPI)) and the Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India Pipeline (TAPI).  
The issue is treated in the background of the theory of relative gains 
which explains why cooperation between states takes place or does not take 
place, and tests how it works in the context of the two pipelines. 
 
Theoretical Background: Relative Gains 
Emphasis on Relative Gains has attracted much attention in the context of 
the International Relations Theory in general and the Realism and 
Neorealism theories in particular. Rejecting the claim of institutionalists 
that institutions would make states forego short term gains for the sake of 
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long term ones, realists like Grieco and Stephen Krasner have argued that 
anarchy forces states to think about both absolute gains and the distribution 
of gains among all. Simply stating, states aim not only to increase absolute 
wealth and power but also widen the gap between them and other states. To 
quote Walt, ―If one state accrues more gains than its partners‖, it will 
gradually become stronger and its partners will eventually become more 
vulnerable.‖2 Mearshimer says, ―States are not primarily motivated by the 
desire to achieve prosperity. Although economic calculations are hardly 
trivial to them, states operate in both an international political and an 
international economic environment, and the former dominates the latter 
when the two systems come into conflict. Survival in an anarchic 
international political system is the highest goal a state can have.‖3 
The pursuit of relative gains is rooted in anarchy and the resultant fear 
for survival independence and security. Waltz says states in anarchy ―are 
compelled to ask not will both of us gain?‘ but ‗who will gain more?‘ If an 
expected gain is to be divided say in a ratio of two to one, one state may use 
its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or 
destroy the other. Even the prospects of large absolute gains for both parties 
does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use 
its increased capabilities.‖4 Mearshimer also almost echoes it when he 
argues, ―Competition for security makes it difficult for states to cooperate, 
which, according to the theory of economic liberalism, they must do. When 
security is scarce, states become more concerned about relative than about 
absolute gains. They ask of an exchange not ―Will both of us gain?‖ but 
―Who will gain more?‖ They reject even cooperation that will yield an 
absolute economic gain if the other state will gain more, from fear that the 
other might convert its gain to military strength, and then use this strength 
to win by coercion in later rounds.‖5 
 
Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline  
 
The trilateral Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, or IPI as it is popularly 
called, has become a bilateral pipeline, between Iran and Pakistan, as the 
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two signed an agreement in March 2010, leaving options open, the 
questionable economic viability of the project notwithstanding.
6
 The much 
debated and negotiated IPI pipeline was proposed to be 2,775-kms (1,724 
miles) in length and if and when successfully completed is expected to 




The pipeline idea dates as far back as 1989, when the then head of the Tata 
Energy Research Institute (TERI), R.K. Pachauri, invited Iran‘s former 
Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Shams Ardekani to New Delhi to deliver a 
paper on the subject. Pachauri recalls, ―At that time, policy- makers and 
others thought of it as nothing more than a pipedream.‖7 However, Abbas 
Maleki says the first serious proposal on natural gas export to India on land 




Sometimes in 1990, former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani put forward the proposal for the IPI pipeline. Three years later 
India and Iran signed an MoU for the project and the focus was initially on 
laying an offshore pipeline outside the territorial waters of Pakistan.
9
 
Pipeline Engineering GMB of Germany and Sazeh consultant of Iran were 
given the job of feasibility study by the Joint Working Committee of the 
National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) and Gas Authority of India Limited 
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Many analysts, however, trace the origin of the idea to 1993, when 
Iran and Pakistan declared their intention to construct a natural gas pipeline, 
which the former, subsequently, proposed extending into India and was 
popularly came to be known as the IPI or the so called ―peace pipeline‖,  
which starts from Asalouyeh in southern Iran and stretches 1,172 kilometres 
through the country; this( Iranian) section is known as Iran's Seventh Cross-
Country Gas Pipeline and has already been constructed.
11
 In Pakistan, the 
proposed length of the pipeline is 785 kilometres and is to pass through 
Baluchistan and Sindh. In Khuzdar, a branch would go to Karachi, while 
the main pipeline will continue towards Multan; from Multan, the pipeline 
may be expanded to Delhi.
12
 
Initially, a total of 60 million cubic meters of gas was stated to be 
transported daily from Iran to Pakistan and India, (half for each), later it 
was to be raised to 150 million cubic meters.
13
 Another estimate said, the 
proposed pipeline was expected to transport 90 million standard cubic 
meters of gas every day from Iran's South Pars fields to India from 2009-10 
onwards while Pakistan would receive 60 million standard cubic meters.
14
 
Another estimate said the initial capacity of the pipeline was to be 22 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas per year, which was expected to be raised later 
to 55 billion cubic meters. However, as a bilateral project between Iran and 
Pakistan, the pipeline will carry only 8.7 billion cubic meters of gas per 
year as contracted and 40 billion cubic meters as the maximum capacity.
15
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The construction of the pipeline is expected to cost $ 7.5 bn.
16
 The pipeline 
talks remained deadlocked from 1999 to 2003 largely because of the state of 
Indo-Pakistani tensions, gained momentum only after the dialogue started 
between them in 2004. In July 2005, Indian and Pakistani officials after a 
meeting said that they plan to appoint separate legal and financial 
consultants to begin work on the project. The two-day talks in New Delhi 
also discussed issues such as financing and security of the pipeline, pricing 
and sharing of the gas.
17
 A meeting to approve the tripartite agreement 
scheduled for December 31, 2005 was postponed because of delays in Iran-
Pakistan talks and the October 2005 earthquake.
18
 
The initial hurdle came in July 2006 when Iran demanded a price of 
$7.20 per million British thermal unit of gas against India's price of $4.20 
per mBtu., The Iranian offer was 50 per cent above the prevailing market 
price in India.
19
India and Pakistan finally agreed in February 2007 to pay 
Iran US$ 4.93 per mBtu, while some details still needed to be 
resolved.
20
Since mid-2007, India has been boycotting trilateral meetings on 
the IPI pipeline, stating it first wanted to resolve the issues of transit fees 
and transportation tariffs with Pakistan.  
Differences between parties over issues of pricing, transit fee and 
security have practically paralysed negotiations on the pipeline for quite 
some time. India wanted Iran to take responsibility for safe passage of gas 
through pipeline length in Pakistan and would pay for the fuel only when it 
is delivered at Pakistan – India border. Iran, on its part wanted this to be 
done by trilateral mechanism. Pakistan and Iran have now signed a gas 
pipeline accord, without India's participation according to which Iran is to 
give 750 million cubic feet of gas per day to Pakistan for the next 25 
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 ―Peace Pipeline Contract Soon, Gas Flow by 2011,‖ Iran Daily, July 01, 2007, at 
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years.
21
Another account says Iran-Pakistan pipeline ―is supposed to deliver 
21.5 million cubic metres of gas per day to Pakistan.‖22 
 Iran has almost completed its side and the project got inaugurated by 
the presidents of both countries in March 2013 to mark the start of 
construction on Pakistan′s side of the pipeline.23 When Pakistan signed the 
Gas Sales Purchase Agreement (GSPA) with Iran, both sides were required 
to complete the respective work by December 2014; however in August 
2013 Pakistan‘s oil minister said it would take two more years, i.e. 2015.24 
Media reports in March 2013 had said Iranian contractors will also 
construct the pipeline in Pakistan — Tehran-based Tadbir Energy 
Development Group would undertake all engineering procurement and 
construction work for the first segment of the project, which would start 
from the Iran-Pakistan border. The Iranian firm would also carry out the 
second segment of the project, while the remaining amount was expected to 
be generated by Pakistan through Gas Infrastructure Development Cess 
(GIDC).Tehran has agreed to lend Islamabad $500 million, or a third of the 
estimated $1.5 billion cost of the 750 km Pakistani section of the pipeline.
25
 
Iran's deputy oil minister, Ali Majedi, said in November 2013 that based on 
initial agreements each side ―must bring its own share‖ in financing the 
project, adding the ―Pakistanis need Iran's gas and they should accelerate 
their work.‖26 Both countries had agreed to commence the project before 
October 2012 and finish by December 2014. It was decided that Pakistan 
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would import 750 million to one billion cubic feet of gas per day.
27
 Media 
reports in November 2013 citing a report compiled by Pak Petroleum 
ministry said that India was still part of the Pipeline as, ―modalities between 





Benefits are rooted in the fuel itself: apart from fuel efficiency and cost, it 
can be transported to customers without energy transformation and costly 
processing; transmissions are unaffected by climatic changes, 
environmentally friendly, non-toxic, etc.
29
 Other benefits  include 
employment creation along its route; improved political cooperation; 
promotion of multilateralism, and last, but certainly not the least, energy 
security — India and Pakistan are increasingly import-dependent for their 
energy needs, Iran‘s economy being what it is despite having the potential.30 
A utopian extent is presented in the view the pipeline ―could also 
serve as the mother of all confidence-building measures….. In one stroke, 
the joint stake-holding of an economic resource will defuse the five and a 
half decade long India-Pakistan hostility. Many tightly-wound bilateral 
problems, including the matter of Kashmir, will suddenly become 
manageable.‖31 
This project benefits both Pakistan and Iran enormously. For 
Pakistan, the benefits are manifold: securing supply of two-thirds of the gas 
to be delivered to India, the remainder going to Pakistan; transit fees, and a 
control button over India‘s energy supply as well as a place in Indo-Iran 
relations.....Pakistan itself had hoped to earn about $14 billion in 30 years 
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from the project, including $8 billion in transit fees, $1 billion in taxes and 
$5 billion in savings.
32
 Another estimate says Pakistan will earn $500 




Similarly for Iran, pipeline benefits include: (1) a major boost for job 
creation and economic prosperity of the provinces on the pipeline route; (2) 
the enhancement of Iran‘s strategic positioning and standing both regionally 




Problems and Challenges 
Depending upon time and negotiations, problems have ranged from massive 
financial implications, geo-political, environmental considerations, unsure 





Price of Gas/Cost of pipeline  
 
Concerns raised about the price at which Pakistan would contractually 
purchase Iranian gas are ―linked to international crude oil prices. Iran itself 
imports gas from Turkmenistan at USD 4/MMBtu while the price at which 
it would export to Pakistan is ..... USD 14/MMBtu….‖36 Questions have 
also been raised about the construction cost of the pipeline for Pakistan, 
―Pakistan needed $8 billion to lay the pipeline from Nawabshah to the 
Iranian border‖.37 
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 ―Iran Gas Pipeline Not in Favour of Pakistan: Report,‖  Dawn, October 24 ,2013, 
http://dawn.com/news/1051432/iran-gas-pipeline-not-in-favour-of-pakistan-
report 
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US Opposition 
 
The US stand on IPI is a subset of its Iran policy on the strategic issue of 
Iran‘s nuclear programme. In August 2006, the US Congress unanimously 
passed the ―Iran, Libya Sanctions Act‖ (ILSA), which provides for 
imposition of US sanctions on companies, irrespective of their ―corporate 
nationality‖ that invest more than $20 million annually in the Iranian oil and 
gas sector. In 2006, US Advisor on Caspian Energy Stephen Mann is 
reported to have said that although the US has been supporting pipelines in 
the Caspian region, but it ―remains absolutely opposed to pipelines 
involving Iran.‖38 
In April 2010, Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for South 
and Central Asia, said that ―we don‘t think that this is the time for such 




In February 2010, Iranian Foreign Minister Manucher Mottaki reportedly 
urged Pakistan not to give away to American pressure, as it (Iran) was 
prepared to launch the pipeline at any time – even without India – as China 
could soon replace India.
40
 As far as China‘s joining the pipeline is 
concerned, a Chinese firm sometimes in the past offered financing of $500 
million for Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline. It has now pulled out of the 
project after Pakistan has expressed its unwillingness to extend the bid 
validity period. Pakistan now needs Iran‘s assistance in financing almost the 
entire project.
41
 Conjectures have also been made about the Russian 
company Gazprom‘s interest in the deal expressing willingness to join the 
project. The Russian limited objectives are easy to discern: prevent Iran 
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So, basically, for the IPP, Pakistan would first have to conjure up the 
$ 2 billion needed to construct its half of the pipeline, convince the US to 
keep the sanctions gun in its pocket, keep Balochistan peaceful and, at the 
end of it all, get natural gas at $ 10/MMBtu, more than what Iran pays when 
it imports gas from Turkmenistan — the country that has the Yolotan-
Osman gas field, the origin of TAPI. 
 
Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) Pipeline  
The original plan for the gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan with southern 
neighbours extended only to Pakistan, through Afghanistan. Negotiations 
for the pipeline are traced to 1995 with the Turkmen government by an 
American Company UNOCAL, which considered the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan as a guarantor to safe passage of oil and gas supplies; however 
they broke down, after bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi and 
Daar Es Salam.
43
As India joined it officially in April 2008, it became 
commonly known as the TAPI pipeline, reflecting the initials of the four 
participating countries – Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. An 
August 2008 report said India has quoted over $200 for Turkmen gas, 
competing with Russia's Gazprom‘s hikes.44 The project has the backing of 
the United States, more on that a little later. The four participating countries 
have regular steering meetings with the ADB as facilitator which has 






The proposed route of TAPI pipeline traces an old trade route linking South 
and Central Asia to South Asia. The route for the TAPI pipeline would start 
from Turkmenistan′s Yoloten-Osman gas field. It would run through Herat 
and Kandahar province of Afghanistan, before entering Pakistan. In 
Pakistan, it will reach Multan via Quetta before ending at Fazilka (Punjab) 
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in India.
46
 First mooted in the 90‘s, interest in the pipeline was shown by 
Argentinian company Bridas as well as American firm UNOCAL.
47
 A BBC 
Report in 1997 said that ―a senior delegation from the Taleban movement in 
Afghanistan was  in the United States for talks with an international energy 
company that wanted to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across 
Afghanistan to Pakistan and that it was in competition with an Argentinian 
firm, Bridas for the purpose...‖48 The latter had in November 1997 
announced that, ―it was close to signing a two-billion dollar deal to build 
the pipeline, which would carry gas 1,300 kilometres from Turkmenistan to 
Pakistan, across Afghanistan.‖49 A Taleban Radio had also reported visits 
by both delegations, the Taleban Minister of Information and Culture, Amir 
Khan Muttaqi, said the Taleban had ―held talks with both American and 
Argentine-led consortia over transit rights but that no final agreement had 




In May 2002, the heads of state of three countries — Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Turkmenistan met in Islamabad and decided to cooperate on 
project implementation.
52
 They set up a steering committee having oil and 
gas ministers from the participating countries. The latter, in its first meeting 
in Ashgabat in July 2002, requested the ADB to finance project-related 
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studies through the provision of regional technical assistance. Initially two 
routes were envisaged: One was from Dauletabad, Turkmenistan through 
southern Afghanistan (an area under strong control of the then Taliban 
government) before entering Pakistan, and second was through ―north of 
the rigid and hostile Afghan terrain.‖53 
In December 2002, ADB ―approved the first technical assistance 
(Phase 1 TA) to prepare the Project by financing a techno-economic 
feasibility study that covered pipeline routing, preliminary design, cost 
estimates, and rapid environmental impact assessment, and to assess 
volume-price sensitivity‖ and in 2003 the ADB financed a technical 
feasibility study of the pipeline completed by a British consulting firm, 
Penspen, in 2004.
54
 The official statement issued after the 2003 Steering 
Committee meeting said, ―Since the viability of the project depends upon 
the extension of the pipeline project to India, it was agreed during the 
steering committee meeting that the parties acting jointly would forward the 
documents of the TAP to the government of India, inviting it to join the 
project.‖55 On February 23, 2003, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(TAP) signed a protocol for gas pipeline project, which the three and the 
ADB requested India to join.. The decision was formally announced after 
the fourth steering committee meeting of the three participating countries 
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 ―India Urged to Join Trans-Afghanistan Gas Pipeline Project,‖ vol. 8, issue no. 6, 
March 20, 2003 Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, News & Trends E &SE 
Asia Emphasis Added  
56
 Chaudhry Naurez Shakoor, Pakistan‘s Minister for Petroleum and Natural 
Resources, Yully Qurbanmuradov, Deputy Prime Minister and Tagive Techberdi 
Minister for Petroleum of Turkmenistan and Afghan Mines and Industries 
Minister Juma Mohammad Mohammadi announced the decisions taken in the 
meeting. ―All the three participating countries and the ADB have decided to 
request India to join in,‖ said Naurez Shakoor. He said official request would be 
sent to the Indian government shortly. ―India urged to join trans-Afghanistan gas 
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In the 2006 declaration adopted in New Delhi at a two-day regional 
economic cooperation forum on Afghanistan, which was attended by 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the four countries vowed to accelerate 
work on the four-nation project to bring natural gas from Turkmenistan to 
India.
57
 The 2nd Technical Working Group Meeting and the 10th Steering 
Committee Meeting for the Project held in Islamabad on 21–24 April 2008 
in which the ministers of petroleum from each participating country 
initialled the Gas Pipeline Framework Agreement, marked India‘s 
participation. At the 3rd Technical Working Group Meeting in Ashgabat in 
late May 2008, the Heads of Agreement was initialled.
58
 The Inter-
Governmental Framework Agreement (IGFA) signed in December 2002 
was amended in April 2008 to facilitate Indian participation. At that 
meeting, the ADB presented an update of the feasibility study done three 
years ago. It noted that the estimated capital cost has doubled to $7.6 billion 
(2008 prices) but expressed willingness to submit the project to its Board 
for financing.
59
 All four governments initiated the revised IGFA, but a 
formal signing of the agreement (awaiting completion of some ‗enabling 
actions‘ required to be completed by Turkmenistan and Afghanistan), was 
completed in 2013.
60
 In July 2013 Afghanistan signed an agreement with 
Turkmenistan for import of 500 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd) of gas; 
and contribution of $5 million to the company. All participants agreed to 
establish a consortium or a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) called TAPI 
Ltd., which is to include the national gas companies of the member 
countries. The sides agreed to prepare the constituent documents to register 
TAPI Ltd. by the end of 2013.
61
 The participating countries also agreed to 
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 Tavus Rejepova , ―Turkmenistan and Afghanistan Sign Agreement Over TAPI 
Gas Pipeline,” The Central Asia Caucasus Analyst,  August 9, 2013, 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12790-turkmenistan-
and-afghanistan-sign-agreement-over-tapi-gas-pipeline.html 
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contribute $5 million as seed money to the TAPI Company.
62
 Pakistan 
media reports said in October 2013 that the US energy giant Chevron had 




The original estimate of the pipeline project in 2004 was $3.3 billion, 
which was revised to $7.6 billion in 2008. The price increase was due to 
sharp increase in the price of steel, construction cost and the cost of 
compressor stations.
64
 In August 2013, the TAPI members agreed to sign an 
agreement with ADB as the TAPI transaction advisor, ―which is expected to 
generate over US$ 7.5 billion to finance the project in the near future, 
though some energy analysts claim that the true cost of the pipeline 
construction is between US$ 10 and US$ 12 billion‖. 65 
Afghanistan is to get about 5.0 mmscmd during the first and second 
year and 14 mmscmd from the third year onwards, with the rest of the gas 
being equally shared by India and Pakistan. The gas is to be supplied from 
Douletabad and other fields in Turkmenistan applying the principle of 
unobstructed transit of natural gas; and the safety and security of the 
pipeline and related infrastructure is to be provided by the concerned 
governments in their respective territories and transport tariff will be based 
on the cost of service method.
66
 As for the US role, a 2008 report said that 
the ―United States was willing to police the pipeline infrastructure through 
permanent stationing of its troops in the region. The US Exim Bank, the 
Trade and Development Agency (TDA) and the Overseas Private Insurance 
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Corporation (OPIC) had also shown readiness to finance such a project, if 
leading American energy giants came forward.‖67 
According to reports, Afghanistan has planned more than 1,000 
industrial units (300 of these units already been established) near the 
pipeline route and would need gas for their operation.
68
 In May 2009, the 
Pakistan government decided to reactivate (TAPI) gas pipeline project, and 





Problems and Concerns 
Conditions in Afghanistan are the major cause for concern for the TAPI 
project. — 735 kilometres of the pipeline‘s total 1,735 kilometres will cross 
through the territory of Afghanistan.
70
 
Taliban are active in the southwest of the country, near the pipeline‘s 
proposed route. Going by the current situation, mitigation of security threats 
is hardly a possibility in the near future. Leaders in Pakistan and India speak 
publicly about their concerns regarding pipeline safety and security.  
Afghanistan has assured stakeholders that all landmines will be cleared 
from the pipeline route within two years, and the route will be freed from 
Taliban influence.
71
 Afghanistan‘s Petroleum and Mines Minister told 
journalists on July 17, 2013 that Afghanistan will ensure the security of the 
project by deploying 9,000-12,000 police for this purpose; Afghan media 
reports also said that Afghanistan will cover all the deployment expenses.
72
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The project is conditioned on India-Pakistan relations. On August 22, 
2013, the US had invited Pakistan to participate in talks on the TAPI 
pipeline in India but Islamabad ―refused to attend apparently because of 
tension with New Delhi, leading to postponement of the dialogue‖.73 
Interestingly the joint statement issued during Prime Minister Nawaz 




The US has been pressing Pakistan to go ahead with the TAPI gas 
pipeline and shelve the Iran-Pakistan pipeline project, but Islamabad has 
been firm in its commitment on the IP project. 
Experts are divided over the amount of gas reserves in Turkmenistan 
to meet all its assurances to China, Russia, Pakistan and India. The current 
trend of increase in output did not seem to correspond with the number of 
projects on the drawing board. Pipeline TAPI plans could unravel if 
Turkmenistan‘s gas reserves prove less than expected. Ashkabad produced 
70 billion cubic meters of gas in 2007, which was short of the previous 
year‘s target by 10 billion cubic metres.75 
Contrary to the claims of the Turkmen Government, energy experts 
opine that ―it will be next to impossible to implement such a complex 
project without attracting major international oil and gas companies (IOCs) 
and that these IOCs are very reluctant to participate unless Turkmenistan 
agrees to some type of upstream concessions‖, although  Turkmen media 
reported that companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, BG Group, BP, 
Petronas and many other companies are interested and are preparing their 
individual proposals to the government of Turkmenistan. 
76
 
In the July 2013 steering committee meeting, the four countries failed 
to negotiate the advisory fee for hiring the ADB as transaction adviser: the 
bank demanded $100 million as fee and $50,000 per month as retaining cost 
of the project. However, all the countries termed the fee too high and asked 
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the ADB to cut it to $30 million. However, the bank agreed to reduce the 
fee to $50 million.
77
 
India‘s stated reluctance has been that it was not sure the gas reserves 
in Dauletabad could service the requirements of all three countries over a 
period of 30 years. The unstated reasons though have as much to do with 
the politically unstable situation in Afghanistan and related security fears. 
The reserves feeding the TAPI pipeline were originally estimated at 1.7 
TCM by Russian geologists. In an audit carried out by DeGolyer & 
MacNaughton along with Gaffney Cline in 2003, the estimated reserves 
were raised to 4.5 TCM, more than sufficient to meet a demand of 90 
MMSCMD over 30 years. Nonetheless, in 2008 Gaffney Cline was asked to 
make an independent assessment of all of the country‘s gas reserves.78 
 
Benefits  
Calling it ―transformative‖ in which ―the United States is working closely 
with Turkmenistan to help move the project forward‖, the US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Lynne M. 
Tracy listed the benefits as: TAPI‘s construction, operation, and 
maintenance would generate thousands of jobs, and the pipeline would 
represent a major step forward in economic cooperation between Pakistan 
and India.‖79 Representatives of the ADB also call the project having 
crucial economic and political importance to the region. Besides bringing 
electricity to many Afghan families, the construction of the project is 
expected to create thousands of jobs along the route.  
Yet, if the pipeline goes ahead successfully, it could be Afghanistan‘s 
largest development project. According to the Interim National 
Development Strategy for Afghanistan (2005), transit revenue could 
amount to US$160 million per year, or about half of the Afghan 
government‘s domestic revenue.80 According to other estimates by energy 
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experts, Afghanistan will earn about US$ 500 million per year in transit 
fees through the pipeline.
81
 The gas exported from Turkmenistan is reported 
―mainly [to] be used to generate power for homes and industry facilities 
along the villages in Herat and Kandahar provinces in Afghanistan. Afghan 
officials claim that ethnic Turkmens and Afghan people living in villages 
along the pipeline will help protect the pipeline in the future as they will 
generate electricity directly out of the Turkmen gas.‖82 
As the Turkmen President said, ―The pipeline between Turkmenistan, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India will be a weighty contribution to the 




The issues and processes are far more complicated than perhaps even the 
Relative Gains theory can explain. These corridors between South Asia, 
Central Asia and West Asia, that is the pipelines, are at best pipedreams! 
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Chapter 5 
New Silk Road Initiative: Economic Dividends 




his paper focuses on the economic impact of the ―New Silk Road‖ plan 
which has attracted the attention of international actors and particularly 
of the South Asian region. Furthermore, it elaborates the logic behind 
the strengthening of economic and regional cooperation and integration 
among the Central and South Asian countries.  
Afghanistan as a fragile state is vulnerable to many socio-economic 
changes, especially when international forces leave Afghanistan in 2014 
and reduce their financial assistance to the government. In this critical 
timeframe, Afghanistan needs a strong economic development strategy to 
change the future of the country. The ―New Silk Road‖ plan is the best 
option for the economic development of Afghanistan as well as for regional 
cooperation among the nations of South Asia. 
For the past 12 years, Afghanistan has remained dependent on donors 
where 95 per cent of the development budget funded by them. While the 
mines sector is the most promising asset of Afghanistan which can make its 
economy strong and viable, it is a pity it has remained dormant without any 
long term plans for its development. According to US information sources, 
the United States of America has invested almost USD 1.2 trillion in the 
past 12 years. Had a small part of it been spent on this sector Afghanistan 
would have had something to look up to after the US withdrawal. 
The US Geological Survey estimated that Afghanistan has more than 
$2.0 trillion worth of lithium mineral beside other valuable minerals that 
may value many more trillions. The exploitation of this mineral wealth 
could make Afghanistan a rich nation of the world. Therefore, Afghanistan 
needs a strategic development framework to develop its valuable assets for 
the prosperity of its economy. The ―New Silk Road‖ strategy is the best 
option towards that end. This economic initiative will open business 
markets for the Central and South Asian countries to interact with each 
other and integrate their economy.  
 
T 
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In this strategy, Afghanistan as a land-bridge between Central and 
South Asian countries can play its strategic role in integrating the regional 
economy. Furthermore, Pakistan has its great role as the second land-bridge 
between Central Asia and India, and further with the rest of the South Asian 
countries. Definitely, Iran as a strong economy in the region will be part of 
the economic and regional cooperation. 
 
Afghanistan in Brief 
What we have learned from the history, Afghanistan has been an ancient 
focal point of the Silk Road and human migration for thousands of years. 
Archaeologists have found evidence of human habitation from as far back 
as 50,000 BC. This land as a strategic corridor of the East and West has 
attracted the attention of the superpowers of the time and witnessed many 
military conquests since antiquity. 
 
The “New Silk Road” Initiative: Economic Dividends 
The ‗New Silk Road‘ initiative in its current form was launched by 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011 as one of the United States‘ 
major contributions to the post-2014 period in Afghanistan and designed to 
direct international investment to favour regional trade, linking South Asia 
and Central Asia. Hillary Clinton said: ―Let‘s work together to create a New 
Silk Road. That means building more rail lines, highways, energy 
infrastructure, like the proposed pipeline to run from Turkmenistan, through 
Afghanistan, through Pakistan into India.‖  
The New Silk Road would once again create trade routes between 
Central Asia and South Asia and furthermore, connect the Eastern with the 
Western world, and facilitate construction of modern highways, rail links, 
energy lines and pipelines. 
 
The „New Silk Road‟ Initiative would: 
 
 Attract foreign investments. 
 Integrate Afghanistan in the regional economic life. 
 Welcome professional business opportunities to the market. 
 Create trade incentives, job opportunities, people to people 
connection. 
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 Lead to construction of railway from Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-
Mazar-e-Sharif and from Turkmenistan-Herat-Kandahar-
Pakistan-India. 
 Reduce tariffs and trade barriers and increase economic 
cooperation and integration. 
 
The hope and potential for the ‗New Silk Road‘ is that there will be 
opportunity for the Central Asian countries to interact with South Asia, 
China and the Far East and with Europe and beyond. Opening the routes 
and reducing business transaction barriers will not be only improving lives 
of the Afghans, but the whole region. USA is focusing on economic 
renewal in Afghanistan through job creation, provision of basic services, 
infrastructure development, and fiscal sustainability. 
The ‗New Silk Road‘ strategy may change the mode of business and 
open India to Afghanistan and Central Asia through Pakistan and that is the 
tool which can bring peace and stability to the region. This strategy has the 
potential of creating significant economic growth and at the same time 
contributing greatly to the establishment of peace and security throughout 
the region. 
Here we can use modern facilities to connect those ‗silk road regions‘ 
again and promote better economic cooperation. We need to use the 
historical fact of the ‗ancient silk road‘ to create a better sphere among the 
nations. Talking about the project General Patreus said: ―Sound strategy 
demands the use of all the instruments of power. This vision for 
Afghanistan and the region makes a compelling case that transport and 
trade can help restore the central role of Afghanistan in Central Asia. By 
once again becoming a transport hub, Afghanistan can regain economic 
vitality and thrive as it did in the days of the Silk Road.‖  
In the same vein Indian Pime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh said: ―I 
dream of a day, while retaining our respective identities, one can have 
breakfast in Amrtisar, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul. That is how my 
forefathers lived. That is how I want our grandchildren to live.” 
For the purpose of this paper all references to ―Greater Central Asia‖ 
should be understood to include Afghanistan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The 
inclusion of Pakistan and Iran is essential because of their proximity and 
territorial ties but the inclusion of India is of yet greater importance because 
of its significant presence in all aspects of regional life. In addition to the 
greater Central Asian region, a second group of relevant countries and 
regions include China, Russia, as well as the Middle East, Europe, Japan 
and the United States. 
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The countries in the Greater Central Asia region share many common 
economic characteristics such as difficult topography and lack of direct 
access to the seas. They are also characterized by underdeveloped transport 
infrastructure and commodity-oriented economies. However, many of the 
countries also share significant cultural, social, and ethnic bonds which 
make the further development of ties quite natural.  
Despite many common characteristics, trade among countries of 
Greater Central Asia constitutes only a fraction of the region‘s total trade. 
Moreover, Central Asian countries are under-trading with Western Europe 
and South and East Asia compared to their potential. Economists use the so-
called Afghanistan 35 ―gravity model‖ to assess trade potential. This 
estimates potential bilateral trade using a simple model that takes into 
account two countries‘ relative economic size and the distance between 
them.  
The results of such estimates can then be compared to actual trade 
flows to provide estimates of lost trade. For example, Babetskii finds that 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan traded much less 
from 1997 to 2002 than the countries of the European Union (EU), 
accounting for relative size, GDP, and distance from trading partners. 
Further, Elborgh-Woytek find that the countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) sharply under-trade with the EU. In particular, the 
study found that the ratio of actual to potential trade in 2001 was only about 
0.3. 
Our understanding of the existence of ―under trading‖ in the region 
compels us to examine its causes. Such an examination leads to the 
important realization that closer coordination and better trade policies will 
unlock significant, yet existing potentials and pave the way for regional and 
indeed continental trade to increase substantially. 
 
Regional and Transcontinental Potential 
Central Asian countries could benefit greatly from closer cooperation at the 
regional and continental levels. As mentioned, empirical studies indicate 
that landlocked countries are at a great natural disadvantage in achieving 
growth, which makes a liberal trading process and effective regional 
cooperation all the more important. Over the period 1960-92 landlocked 
developing countries grew at an average of 1.5 per cent per year, slower 
than countries that were not landlocked. Over a span of decades this weak 
growth adds up to a significant loss of opportunity for these developing and 
impoverished countries. Thus, examining alternatives become a requisite. 
Indeed, in a study of human development factors in Central Asian countries, 
the United Nations found that the largest aggregate economic gains come 
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from reductions in the cost of trade, and the largest losses come from civil 
war.  
This study reported that over ten years, the GDPs of Central Asian 
countries could be 50 per cent higher as a result of comprehensive and 
continuous regional cooperation. It follows that the growth and 
sustainability of the entire region is largely and directly dependent on strong 
and effective cooperation for genuine regional trade integration. In this 
regard, Afghanistan becomes particularly central to this endeavour as it has 
the potential of connecting traffic between Central and South Asia and of 
linking China to the Arabian Sea and beyond.  
Through increased economic integration with the world beyond their 
regional borders, trading economies can acquire and diffuse new 
technologies from more advanced countries and help reduce poverty.  
 
Infrastructure Development in Afghanistan 
Infrastructure development can play an important role in expanding trade 
and commerce and allowing goods and services to move along the countries 
and find suitable markets. Indeed, the construction of canals, railways, and 
roads play a great role in strengthening economic and regional cooperation.  
In the past 12 years, there has been a lot of good development in the 
infrastructure sector and future plans are aimed at achieving more results to 
pave the routes for better economic growth in this country.  
 
Some Key Achievements in Transport Sector 
o Regional Highways    3,360 KM. 
o National Highways    6,100 KM. 
o Provincial Roads   15,000 KM. 
o Rural Roads    18,000 KM. 
o Urban Roads     3,000 KM. 
o Planned Target of Road Network 35000 KM. 
o Railway Construction 106 KM, 5-Stations, Iran-Herat 120km is 
(Under construction) 
o Railway planned Target  1,650 km (in the next 3  
     years) 
 
Energy Sector 
o Afghanistan has the potential to produce 23000 MW energy. 
o At present it produces only 270 MW energy  
o It imports 335 MW energy from the Central Asian countries. 
o 700 water dams constructed and rehabilitated since 2002. 
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ICT Sector 
o 6-telephone companies, 44-Internet companies, 6-postal companies. 
o 19-million telephone subscribers covering (86%) of the population. 




o There are 17 banks in Afghanistan: 3 government banks, 9 private 
and 5 foreign. 
o 45 per cent Operating Budget comes from Grants  by donors 
o 95% Development Budget comes from Grants by donors 
o The ministries of defence, industry and education have the highest 
Operating Budgets.  
 
Education Sector 
o 14400 schools built in past 10-years.  
o 9-million students enrolled (3.5mln) female, 
o 185000 teachers are on duty (56000-female), 
o 70 Government and Private universities, 
o 285 faculties are operational, 
o 62 technical and vocational institutes 
 
Health Sector: 
o 85 per cent of the population has access to basic health services. 
o 65 per cent births delivered with non-skilled persons.  
o 57 per cent people have access to sources of safe drinking water. 
o 111/1000 Live Births (Infant Mortality Rate).  
o 2.7 Doctors & 4.6 Medical Helpers/1000 People.  
o 2025 hospital beds.  

































Regional economic collaboration is for the benefit of all participating 
parties. The region as a whole must focus on setting the broad context for 
sustainable growth, because they all have an economic as well as a security 
incentive in doing so.  And the international community must continue to 
find ways to support and encourage that growth. In Hillary Clinton‘s simple 
words, the ―New Silk Road‖ vision ―means upgrading the facilities at 
border crossings, such as India and Pakistan are now doing at Wagah. 
The agreement will adopt international best practices at border 
crossings and harmonize customs arrangements, reduce smuggling, and 
increase government revenues from legitimate trade.  Other initiatives seek 
to match energy from Central Asia with Pakistan and India — two markets 
with significant electricity needs.  The TAPI pipeline project would bring 
on-shore natural gas from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to markets in 
Pakistan and India.  Other efforts would facilitate the transmission of 
electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. 
In closing, we must not forget that this effort is about bringing lasting 




GDP Growth Rate       : 10% (CSO Yr Bk, 2012) 
GDP Per Capita           : 776 USD (CSO Yr Bk 2013) 
Agriculture Sector  : 35% Contribution to GDP  
Services Sector  : 35% Contribution to GDP 
Industrial Sector              : 30% Contribution to GDP 
(CPI) -Inflation           : 8.4% (CSO 2011/2012) 
Poverty Rate               : 36% of the Population 
Imports Value             : 7 billion     -95%  (MoCT 2013), 
Exports Value             : 400 million -5% (MoCT 2013) 
Domestic Revenue      : 2.2 Bln 
Unemployment            : 37% (CSO 2011/2012) 
Literacy Rate   : 25% (CSO 2012/13 Report) 
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America has lost many brave young men and women and spent billions and 
billions of dollars in Afghanistan over the past decade. It is important to 
know that continued investments are putting Afghanistan on the path to 
sustainable self-sufficiency. 
We cannot forget that, as history has shown us, simply abandoning 
Afghanistan could potentially have terrible consequences for regional and 
global security.  Therefore, putting our efforts together to ensure peace and 
economic prosperity in this country is for the best of the whole region. 
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China‟s Growing Economic Relations with South 





Although economic relations between China and SAARC have 
developed very fast in the past ten years, economic integration 
between China and this regional grouping is the lowest 
compared to other regional organizations of the area. Many 
scholars have concluded that China‘s economic engagement 
with South Asia is consistent with normal economic interests. 
Now SAARC needs outside dynamics to realize its integration. 
As a neighbouring country joined by common mountains and 
rivers, China‘s prosperous economy is the best driving force for 
South Asian countries‘ development and SAARC integration. 
Chinese leaders have put forward plans like the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, BCIM economic corridor, and China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) to enhance Sino-SAARC 
cooperation. Now the main obstacles are from SAARC and 
South Asian countries domestically. In order to realize 
economic and social development and SAARC integration, 
SAARC countries‘ political leaders must reach consensus on 
their own domestic reform and opening-up, achieve security 
stability in the region and in each country, and maintain smooth 
relations among all countries, also including Sino-Indian 
relations. 
 
n the past years, some terms, such as ‗Asian Century‘, ‗the rise of Asia‘, 
‗the rise of China and India‘ have become very popular in international 
society. For international observers, these terms just reflect a global 
tendency; but for Asian people, they are better visions. As members of Asia, 
China and South Asian countries have responsibility to make these visions 
come true, and we are trying our best to do so.  
The rise of China is the rise of her economy in nature. China has 
achieved a unique miracle in nearly 300-years of its history, with an average 
annual growth rate of nearly 10 per cent ever since the reform and opening-
up
1. China‘s GDP surpassed Japan‘s in 2010, and it became the second 
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 Li Yang(李扬), 2013, ―Nuli shixian wu shuifen de jingji zengzhang‖ 
(―努力实现无水分的经济增长 ‖, Try to achieve economic growth without 
exaggeration), Qiu Shi (《求是》杂志), no.10.  
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largest economy in the world. Today, China is the largest merchandise 
exporter, second largest merchandise importer, second largest recipient of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the largest holder of foreign exchange 
reserves. The root reason for China‘s economic achievement by far is the 
reform and opening-up, which means reforming unsuitable rules, 
regulations and laws domestically, absorbing foreign investment, and 
involvement in world market. Now China‘s reform and opening-up is 
stepping into Version 2.0 after the third Plenary of 18
th
 Central Committee 
of CPC. 
 
Fast Growing Sino-SAARC Economic Cooperation and Its 
Problems 
South Asia is a very important neighbouring region to China. China is one 
of the observers of SAARC. In the new century, the bilateral economic 
relations between China and SAARC countries developed very quickly. 
Firstly, China‘s trade volume with SAARC countries grew very fast 
between 2001 and 2012. As shown in Form 1, the bilateral trade volume 
expanded from 6.5 billion USD in 2001 to 73.9 billion USD in 2012, with 
an average growth rate of 26 per cent. This expansion surpasses the increase 
in China‘s world trade volume. The vast majority of China‘s trade growth 
with South Asian countries, however, was in exports to South Asian 
countries; their exports to China increased only slightly. China‘s exports to 
these countries combined made up 1.59 per cent of China‘s total exports in 
2001; and it‘s 3.44 per cent in 2012. Although these countries' export 
growth to China has been swift, the starting point was very low. In 2001, 
China‘s import from South Asian countries combined made up 0.95 per cent 
of China‘s total import, and in 2012, this ratio is 1.29 per cent. In short, 
imports and exports by these five countries are of small importance to 
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  Ministry of Commerce of People‘s Republic of China, 2010 Statistical Bulletin of 
China‘s Outward Foreign Direct Investment.  








Export to  
South Asia 
Total 




to SA to that 
to the World 
China's 







 from SA to  
that from  
the World 
2001 4221.9 266098.2 1.59% 2312.7 243552.9 0.95% 
2008 44389.9 1430693.1 3.10% 21468.2 1132562.2 1.90% 
2009 41859.2 1201646.8 3.48% 15192.3 1005555.3 1.51% 
2010 57607.3 1577763.6 3.65% 22963.6 1396001.6 1.64% 
2011 71301.3 1898388.4 3.76% 26111.1 1743394.9 1.50% 
















(Ministry of Commerce of PRC: 2012年1-12月我对亚洲国家(地区)贸易统计) 
 
But there are some problems in China-SAARC bilateral trade:  
 
1. Trade balance problem: As shown in Form 2, almost every South Asian 
country has a trade deficit with China, and trade deficits have increased 
constantly. We can find from Form 2 that most countries‘ trade deficit 
with China in 2012 increased compared to that of 2011. Before 2005, 
India enjoyed trade surplus in the bilateral trade with China, but after 










































South Asia 93067 70451 22616 47835 
45190 
 
India 66472 47673 18799 28874 
27169 
 
Pakistan 12417 9276 3140 6136 
6316 
 
Bangladesh 8451 7971 480 7491 
7362 
 
Sri Lanka 3168 3007 162 2845 
2836 
 
Nepal  1998 1968 30 1939 
1167 
 
Maldives 76.67 76.49 0.19 76.3 
97 
 
Bhutan 15.62 15.60 0.01 15.59 
17 
 





(Data Source: Ministry of Commerce of PRC) 
 
2. Unbalanced trade structure: We can find in Form 3 that the exported 
merchandise from China to South Asian countries comprise mainly 
machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, and nuclear 
reactors, and other manufactured products; while the imported 
goods from South Asia to China are mainly ores, slag and ash, 
cotton, copper, and some other raw materials. Almost every South 
Asian leader has complained about the trade deficit and this 
















products of China 
 
Major Imported 
Products of China 
India Machinery, nuclear 
reactors and boilers, 
electrical and electronic 
equipments, organic 
chemicals etc. 
Ores, slag and ash, cotton, 
copper and articles thereof, 
pearls, organic chemicals etc. 
Pakistan Electrical and 
electronic equipments, 
machineries and rubber 
and articles thereof etc. 
Cotton, cereals, copper and 
articles thereof, ores and 
slags etc. 
Bangladesh Cotton, machinery, 
electrical and electronic 
equipments, man-made 
staple fibres etc. 
Vegetable textile fibres, 
articles of apparels, fish, 
crustaceans etc. 
Sri Lanka Knitted or crocheted 
fabric, vehicles other 
than railway, tramway, 
man-made staple fibre 
etc. 
Vegetable textile fibres, 
coffee, tea, ores and slags, 
rubber and articles thereof 
etc. 





Oil seed, oleagic fruits, 
miscellaneous articles, raw 
hides and skin etc. 




Electrical and electronic 
equipments,  fish, 
crustaceans, meat, printed 
books etc. 
Bhutan Manufactures of 
plaiting materials, 
furniture, electrical and 
electronic equipments, 
manmade staple fibres 
etc. 
Machinery, miscellaneous 
articles, electrical and 
electronic equipments etc. 
Afghanistan Pharmaceutical 
products, articles of 
apparel and accessories, 




Wool, animal hair, oil seed, 
fruits, pearls, optical and 
medical apparatus etc. 
 
(from Dr. K. G. Moazzem of Centre for Policy Dialogue, Bangladesh) 
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Secondly, in the past several years, China‘s ODI towards SAARC has 
also increased fast. Since the implementation of China‘s ―Go Global‖ 
initiative in 2001, Chinese government has relaxed its foreign exchange 
controls, procedures, and investment restrictions. From 2003 onward, 
privately owned enterprises have been allowed to apply for permission to 
invest internationally. Since that time, Chinese ODI has rapidly expanded, 
from less than $3 billion in 2003 to $68 billion in 2011 and $77.22 billion in 
2012 (including M & A and Greenfield project).
3
 While the state-owned 
enterprises continue to be the largest investors—mainly in petroleum, 
construction, telecommunications, and shipping, many private companies 
also have started to invest abroad. Although the major part of China‘s ODI 
is directed toward Asia, but it is mainly related to Southeast Asia. But since 
2003 China has increased its ODI towards South Asia. As for the reasons 
for strengthening economic ties with South Asia from that time, China, on 
the one hand, wanted to enhance its export-led growth strategies and expand 
trade routes; on the other hand, Indian prime minister Vajpayee‘s visit to 
China improved Sino-Indian relations, which created a good atmosphere for 
China to invest in South Asia, because in the past India was very concerned 
about China‘s close relations with its neighbours. In 2012, while China‘s 
ODI towards SAARC was about $400 million, with a growth rate of 39 per 
cent compared to that of 2011, South Asian countries‘ real investment in 
China was $500.2 million. At the end of 2012, the stock of China‘s ODI 
toward SAARC was about $4 billion, and the stock of South Asian 
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 ―The Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and South Asian Countries 
Develop Fast (中国与南亚国家经贸合作发展迅速)‖, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/xwfb/2013/14/5/Document/1320707/1320707.htm 




China‟s ODI Towards South Asia (in 10 Thousands US$) 
 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 3322222 4477726 5720562 7502555 11791050 18397071 24575538 31721059 
Asia 2660346 3347955 4095431 4797804 7921793 13131697 18554720 22814597 
S.A. 4567 6022 25526 22645 124880 173829 195092 263266 
India 96 455 1462 2583 12014 22202 22127 47980 
Pakistan 2748 3645 18881 14824 106819 132799 145809 182801 
Bangladesh 845 866 3296 3966 4330 4814 6030 6758 
Sri Lanka 654 679 1543 846 774 1678 1581 7274 
Nepal  181 332 299 359 866 867 1413 1594 
Maldives - - - - - - - - 
Bhutan - - - - - - - - 
Afghanistan 43 45 45 67 77 11469 18132 16859 
 
(Data Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China‘s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment) 
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A sizable portion of Chinese ODI has come in the form of large 
construction projects, mainly in the sectors of agriculture, energy, and 
transportation. China‘s 2010 and 2011 annual investments were highest in 
Sri Lanka, where Chinese firms have completed or are in the process of 
completing a number of large-scale projects. These projects span multiple 
sectors, including investments in transportation, a 35,000-seat cricket 
stadium, a large convention center, a $209 million international airport, and 
a $1.5 billion deep seaport located on strategic sea-lanes.
5
 
China has several ongoing large-scale projects in Bangladesh. These 
projects are similar to those in Sri Lanka and include deep seaports in 
Chittagong and Sonadia Island. China also has plans to build a road and rail 
link through Myanmar to connect the Chinese city of Kunming with 
Chittagong. Moreover, China has invested in Bangladesh‘s agricultural 
sector, providing $226 million for the Pagla Water Treatment Plant project 
and $559 million for a fertilizer factory in Shahjalal.
6
 
Similar to the portfolio in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, China has 
invested heavily in Nepalese energy and transportation, including a $1.6 
billion hydropower plant and a $1.9 billion railroad project to connect 
Lhasa to Kathmandu. Other transportation projects include the Pokhara 




China has also pledged to vastly increase its investment in Pakistan's 
economy and infrastructure. Among other things, China has been helping to 
develop Pakistan's infrastructure through the building of power plants, roads 
and communication nodes. China is the largest investor in Pakistan's 
Gwadar Deep Sea Port. Now Pak-China Economic corridor plan is in the 
making. This ambitious long term project approximately costing $18 billion 
would include building around 200 kilometers of tunnels. The Strategic 
Communication Organization of Pakistan and the Huawei Company will set 
up communication link between Pakistan and China, and a local home solar 
solution project will be built in Punjab.
8
 
                                                          
5
 Shihar Aneez, ―RPT-Sri Lanka Takes Next Step to Opening Strategic China-Built 
Port,‖ Reuters, March 4, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/srilanka-
port-china- idUSL4N0BX1DU20130305. 
6
 Emily Brunjes, Nicholas Levine, Miriam Palmer, and Addison Smith, ―China‘s 
Increased Trade and Investment in South Asia,‖ 
 http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workshops/2013/China.pdf 
7
 Emily Brunjes, Nicholas Levine, Miriam Palmer, and Addison Smith, ―China‘s 
Increased Trade and Investment in South Asia,‖ 
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workshops/2013/China.pdf 
8
  ―Pakistan, China sign deal on economic corridor,‖ 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C07%5C06%5Cstory_
6-7-2013_pg1_6 
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With India, China also has a lot of cooperation projects. As India's 
power gear makers have struggled to compete on price, many Indian power 
companies have been ordering equipment from overseas, especially from 
China. Now China is a big supplier of power equipment and other 
infrastructure to India. The Power Construction Corporation of China has 
signed a $2.4 billion contract to build the second phase of a massive coal-
fired power complex in southern India to help meet soaring local demand 
for electricity. The project will create more than 10,000 jobs in India.
9
 Now 
India's ministry of Power and China's National Energy Administration have 
signed an agreement allowing power equipment makers from China to set 
up power equipment service centres (PESCs) in India to further strengthen 
and deepen cooperation in the energy sector under the India-China strategic 
economic dialogue mechanism. 
10
 
In Afghanistan, China also contributed a lot of money to transportation 
and other infrastructure.  
Although the economic exchanges between China and SAARC 
developed very fast in the past ten years, the economic integration between 
China and SAARC is the lowest compared with other regional economic 
integration organizations around China, such as ASEAN and SCO. The 
bilateral trade between China and SAARC is only 2.5 per cent of China‘s 
total foreign trade in 2012. And China‘s ODI towards SAARC is less than 
0.5 per cent of its total ODI.  
 
 
Positive Implications of Sino-SAARC Economic Cooperation and 
Its Obstacles 
China and South Asian countries are linked together with mountains and 
waters. The Himalayas cannot block the mutual economic attraction 
between China and SAARC. China has a very large market and the fastest 
growing economy, while South Asian countries have plenty of natural 
resources and human resources. The economic integration of China and 
SAARC will create a huge market with 2.8 billion people, which will bring 
new driving force for not only China and South Asian economic 
development but the whole world. 
The economic integration of China and SAARC will push forward the 
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 ―India opens doors to Chinese power equipment makers news,‖ October 23, 
2013,  
http://www.domain-b.com/industry/power/20131023_power_equipment.html  
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economic development of South Asian countries and China at least from 
three aspects:  
1) Most of the SAARC countries are at a lower level of 
industrialization, and unemployment problems are very 
pressing for South Asian governments. China is now at the 
medium level of industrialization. Chinese capital will ―go 
global‖. With the restructuring of Chinese economy, a lot of 
labour intensive industries in China will move to other 
countries. Although some Chinese economists take Africa as 
the best choice for these industries
11
, South Asian countries 
enjoy better geographic advantages. It has a vital significance 
for South Asian countries to resolve the employment 
problem, raise the proportion of manufacturing sector in their 
economies, and improve their economic growth. At the same 
time, the further reform and opening-up of China will provide 
a huge market for South Asian countries. 
2) China has been playing an active role in power project, 
transportation, and other infrastructure construction overseas, 
particularly in developing countries, taking advantage of state 
financing as well as experience and technology acquired 
through three decades of economic boom. Most SAARC 
countries are backward in infrastructure. If South Asian 
countries absorb Chinese financing and experience on 
infrastructure strongly, which will change the backward 
situation of South Asian countries‘ infrastructure, put forward 
the social and economic development, and create better 
conditions for absorbing further FDI. Last month, Indian 
Prime Minister Singh visited China, and signed an agreement 
with Chinese government on railway construction. This is an 
encouraging win-win achievement for both sides.  
3) In the past three decades of economic reform and opening-up, 
China got a lot of experience beyond economic development 
and infrastructure construction. In this era of globalization, if 
a country wants to get economic development, first of all, it 
must have social stability and peaceful periphery. Political 
leaders and the whole society should have an open mind 
towards the outside world, especially concerning FDI; and 
political leaders should be willing to reform those unsuitable 
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 Lin Yifu (林毅夫), 2013, ―Zhongguo chanye shengji yao shiru ‗lanhai‘‖ 
(中国产业升级要驶入‗蓝海‘，China‘s industrial upgrade should sail into ‗Blue 
Ocean‘), Renmin Ribao (人民日报People’s Daily), August 21, 2013,  A5. 
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rules, regulations and laws. China is very cautious in 
communicating with other developing countries about this 
experience since some Western countries condemn the so 
called ―China model‖. But this experience is very helpful to 
South Asian countries along with China‘s economic and 
technological aid to South Asian countries and their people to 
people communications. These communications of 
experience will improve South Asian countries‘ social and 
economic development, hasten the integration of SAARC, 
and create better conditions for the resolving regional 
conflicts. Besides, Sino-SAARC cooperation on international 
financial issues will enhance South Asian countries‘ 
capability to respond to international financial crises, and 
benefit the reform of international financial system.  
 
 
However, there are lots of obstacles facing Sino-SAARC cooperation. 
Firstly, economic obstacles. As I mentioned above in this article, there are 
trade imbalances and unbalanced trade structure between China and South 
Asian countries. This phenomenon is harmful for the establishment of 
China-SAARC free trade area. But China‘s trade surplus from bilateral 
trade with South Asian countries is not deliberate. China announced a 
Generalized System of Preferences to many developing countries, including 
most SAARC countries. Maybe China should do more for importing South 
Asian goods. The main reason of this trade deficit is the backwardness of 
South Asian manufacturing sectors. How to deal with this issue. The only 
way lies in opening-up and absorbing FDI, introducing advanced 
technologies and production, which will help increase the employment rates 
in these countries, improve their manufacturing, and boost their exports. 
Protectionism can play some role, but it cannot resolve the problem from 
the root. It seems that opening-up and protectionism are contradictory, but 
they are not in fact. Among SAARC countries, India is the biggest trade 
partner of China. India is also among the countries that take most serious 
anti-dumping and countervailing measures towards China. Before 2005, 
when India enjoyed trade surplus with China, India never initiated to sign 
free trade agreement with China. But since 2006, with its trade deficit 
growing, Indian government has faced a lot of opposition on this issue. 
During his recent visit to China, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also 
raised the trade imbalance issue. 
Secondly, as far as political and security obstacles are concerned, Sino-
Indian relations are becoming better, but it‘s a relationship driven by top 
leaders and business circle. The basis of Sino-Indian bilateral relations is 
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fragile, and there is a lack of mutual strategic trust. Indian strategic and 
security circle is concerned about China‘s activities in South Asian 
countries and the Indian Ocean. On the one hand, India has imposed many 
restrictions on Chinese companies and Chinese investment; on the other 
hand, India pays close attention to China‘s economic activities in other 
South Asian countries. She is afraid that China will encircle India; and at 
times India has interfered in other South Asian countries‘ economic 
agreements with China openly and covertly. Together with some Western 
countries‘ alienating manoeuvres this situation has created problems. Some 
western scholars created a ―string of pearls‖ strategy for China (as shown in 
Map 1), and it is accepted by many Indian scholars. Actually, even western 
scholars don‘t believe this ―string of pearls‖ strategy. Just as Emily Brunjes 
and his colleagues said, ―China‘s economic engagement with South Asia … 
does not reveal activity inconsistent with normal economic interests. … that 
the ―string of pearls‖ theory is plausible, but building ports and roads 
facilitates trade as much as it increases the ability to project power. …we 
caution against interpreting China‘s activity as threatening to regional 
stability or Indian security.‖ The signing of the Border Defense Cooperation 
Agreement between China and India was hailed by Indian media as the 
most significant and enduring diplomatic achievement since the birth of the 
US India Civil Nuclear Agreement. We hope Prime Minister Singh‘s recent 



























Map 1: the so-called “String of Pearls” 
 
Thirdly，the social stability and security situation in some countries 
influenced the economic interactions between them and China. Terrorism 
became the biggest obstacle to these countries economic and social 
development. Not only Chinese private enterprises, but also state-owned 
enterprises would not choose these countries to conduct business. Even if 
they have invested in such countries, they will withdraw or stop when the 
situation worsens. As we know, China National Petroleum Corporation 
stopped its oil project in northern Afghanistan because of the disturbance 
created by the local warlord. Sri Lanka is a good example. After Sri Lanka 
government restored peace domestically, China increased a lot of ODI 
towards Sri Lanka, and their bilateral trade has grown very fast in recent 
years.     
Lastly, the fragmentation of economic integration: Now SAARC is 
divided between the India-eastward camp and the Pakistan-westward 
camp.
12
 Although the India-eastward camp is more integrated, India cannot 
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 Yang Xiaoping, ―The Security Architecture of South Asia: Problems and 
Prospects,‖ http://indiachinainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Yang-
Xiaoping-Security-Architecture-of-SA.pdf 
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play a leading role in their economic development. Among SAARC 
countries, transportation facilities are far from enough. Trade volume 
between India and other SAARC countries is much less than that with 
countries outside the region. The reason of is both economic and political. 
As for the whole SAARC, political factors play a more negative role than 
economic factors. As the most influential member in SAARC, India has too 
many contradictions with other members, which badly affects the 
construction and development of SAARC. Now SAARC needs outside 
dynamics to drive its integration. As a neighbouring country joined by 
common mountains and rivers, China is different from other SAARC 
observers. South Asian countries‘ peace, stability, and development are 
closely related to the stability and development of Southwest China. 
Furthermore, the security of energy and trade channel in the Indian Ocean is 
vital to China. China is like any other country of the region in this respect. 
However this makes some SAARC countries suspicious of the integration 
process dominated by India. If SAARC were to follow the example of 
ASEAN‘s ―10+3‖ system, and include China as a formal member, its 
integration will be quickened with China and India as ―dual drivers‖. It is 
said that China and Russia had supported India‘s membership of Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization,
13
 so maybe India would reciprocate by 
supporting the formal membership issue of China in SAARC. 
 
How and What Should China Do Next? 
 
Since assumption of power by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqing, 
China‘s foreign policy has shown some new trends and innovations. Among 
them, two aspects are closely related to Sino-SAARC relations:  
The first is about ―the Chinese dream.‖ During his trips abroad or 
meetings with visiting foreign guests at home since the 18th Party 
Congress, President Xi has spoken at length to leaders and people of foreign 
countries on the importance of the Chinese dream, namely, to achieve the 
great renewal of the Chinese nation. The Chinese dream requires a peaceful 
and stable international and neighbouring environment, and China is 
committed to realizing the dream through peaceful development. Since the 
Chinese dream is closely linked with the dreams of other peoples around the 
world, China is committed to helping other countries, developing countries 
and neighbouring countries in particular, with their development while 
                                                          
13
 Pyotr Akopov, Vzglyad, ―SCO membership precursor to Russia-India-China 
alliance,‖ October 10, 2013, 
http://indrus.in/world/2013/10/10/sco_membership_precursor_to_russia-india-
china_alliance_30051.html  
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achieving development of its own. China will share more development 
opportunities with other countries so as to facilitate their efforts to realize 
their dreams. China hopes to see win-win cooperation and common 
development with the rest of the world. While working to realize the 
Chinese dream, the people of China are desirous of realizing the world 
dream through concerted efforts with the people around the world.
14
 
The second aspect is the right approach to upholding justice and 
seeking interests with a view to enhancing friendship and cooperation with 
neighbouring countries and developing countries. Inheriting the fine 
traditions of Chinese culture and the diplomacy of New China and keeping 
in mind the new tasks in the new period of China's relations with other 
developing countries and its neighbours, President Xi underscores the need 
to adopt the right approach to upholding justice and seeking interests in 
growing relations with these countries. Politically, China should uphold 
justice and fairness as a guiding principle. Economically, China should 
pursue mutual benefits and common development. In growing relations 
with our neighbours and other developing countries that have long been 
friendly towards China yet face daunting challenges in development, China 
will accommodate their interests rather than seeking benefits at their 
expense or creating troubles for them. China will follow the right approach 
to upholding justice and seeking interest in strengthening relations with its 
neighbours and other developing countries. During his visit to Africa, 
President Xi stressed China's commitment to cooperation with Africa with 
sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith. In particular, he emphasized 
the win-win nature of China-Africa cooperation. He reiterated that China 
will fully honour its commitment to Africa, attach no political strings to aid 
to Africa, help African countries translate their strength in natural resources 
into progress in development and achieve diverse, independent and 
sustainable development.
15
 These principles also apply to South Asian 
countries.  
As for China‘s foreign policies related or directed to Sino-SAARC 
economic cooperation in practice, President Xi and Premier Li have put 
forward the Silk Road Economic Belt, BCIM economic corridor, and 
China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) ideas (shown as Map2, 3, 4) 
respectively to Central Asian leaders, Indian and Pakistani leaders in 
addition to bilateral economic cooperation and people to people interaction 
                                                          
14
 Yang Jiechi, ―Innovations in China's diplomatic theory and practice under new 
conditions,‖ Qiushi (Seeking Truth), 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8366861.html 
15
 Yang Jiechi, ―Innovations in China's diplomatic theory and practice under new 
conditions,‖ Qiushi (Seeking Truth), 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8366861.html 
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steps.. These policies coincide with ―go west‖ strategy proposed by 
Professor Wang Jisi. Next, China will lay a lot of emphasis on Silk Road 
Economic Belt, BCIM economic corridor, and China-Pakistan economic 
corridor, improving inter-connectivity process, including policy, road, trade, 
currency and public thinking. Among them, the inter-connection of roads is 
the base for the building of these economic belts or corridors.  
The Silk Road Economic Belt, BCIM economic corridor, and China-
Pakistan economic corridor are complementary. The Silk Road Economic 
Belt will connect East Asia and EU, and improve the development speed of 
Central Asian natural resources. Much before the United States suggested a 
new Silk Road project to connect Central Asia with Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and India, China had already put forward its Silk Road plan. There‘s no 
conflict between these two Silk Road plans. Now Afghanistan is very 
interested in China‘s Silk Road Economic Belt plan. If Afghanistan‘s 
situation becomes stable, these two Silk Road plans can combine. China-
Pakistan economic corridor can also be connected with the Silk Road 
Economic Belt. Many CPEC projects will not only boost Sino-Pakistan 
bilateral relations, but also serve the larger regional interests including 
Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Gulf, and Iran. While BCIM is another 
interconnection between China and SAARC, the idea would also aid 
China's Silk Road diplomacy and trade. Maybe in the future, BCIM can be 
connected with Megon-Ganga Cooperation Initiative (MGCI). Thus the Silk 
Road, Southern Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road can be combined 
together.    
There are several preconditions to establish these economic belts or 
economic corridors. First of all is political and security stability in the 
region and in each country; the second is international relations among 
those countries along the economic belt or economic corridors must 
maintain smooth and improve strategic trust. A smooth Sino-Indian 
relationship will pave the way for close coordination for those projects 
among many stakeholders. Pakistan must see the development of Sino-
Indian relations from this important perspective. The success of the China 
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) also greatly depends on the 
normalization and bolstering of ties between China and India.  
Besides, political consensus must be reached. Take BCIM as an 
example. Indian top leaders are very positive on Premier Li‘s proposal of 
BCIM. India has been suffering an economic slowdown in recent years. 
Singh did not get any substantial commitments from the US during his visit 
there last month, since Washington primarily intends to take advantage of 
its military force to contain China. As a result, cooperation with China to 
develop its economy has become a realistic choice for New Delhi. What's 
more, this corridor is pertinent to security and prosperity in north-eastern 
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India. However, there is still some opposition.  
India's domestic concerns about the BCIM Economic Corridor mainly 
come from three aspects: Given the unsettled Sino-Indian border disputes, 
the opening-up of the north-eastern area may pose a threat to its defence 
security once conflicts take place; a number of rebel groups that share 
ethnic ties with people in both Myanmar and China have been causing 
turbulence in this part of the country, and regional frictions are likely to turn 
into international conflicts once the district is opened up; further, 
commodities from China and some Southeast Asian nations sell well in the 
Indian market, which, therefore, may be occupied by foreign products amid 
regional economic integration. 
Such worries actually expose the fact that domestic vested interest 
groups in India are a strong obstructing force to its social development and 
international economic cooperation. The opening up of the borderlands will 
bring about redistribution of social and economic interests, and directly lead 
to the declining status of such interest groups. The signing of the border 
defence cooperation may help dispel India's worries on national security, 
since it ensures that the two sides will not resort to force to solve border 
controversies by law. And economic integration will not only inject vitality 
to the region, but also weaken popular support for the rebels. India has to 





144  Seminar Book 
 
 
(Map 2: Silk Road) 
 
 
(Map 3: BCIM economic corridor) 
 
 
Map 4: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 




Although the economic relations between China and SAARC have 
developed very fast in the past ten years, the economic integration between 
China and SAARC is the lowest compared to other regional economic 
integration organizations around China. Many scholars have proved that 
China‘s economic engagement with South Asia does not reveal any activity 
inconsistent with normal economic interests.  
Now SAARC needs outside dynamics to realize its integration. As a 
neighbouring country joined by common mountains and rivers, China‘s 
prosperous economy is the best driving force for South Asian countries‘ 
development and SAARC integration. While the Chinese dream requires a 
peaceful and stable international and neighbouring environment, and China 
is committed to realizing the dream through peaceful development, China is 
also committed to helping other countries, developing countries and 
neighbouring countries in particular, with their development while 
achieving development of its own. China will share more development 
opportunities with other countries so as to facilitate their efforts to realize 
their dreams. 
Chinese leaders have put forward plans of the Silk Road Economic 
Belt, BCIM economic corridor, and China-Pakistan economic corridor 
(CPEC) to enhance Sino-SAARC cooperation. Now the main obstacles are 
from SAARC and South Asian countries domestically. In order to realize 
economic and social development and SAARC integration, SAARC 
countries‘ political leaders must reach consensus on their own domestic 
reform and opening-up, achieve security stability in the region and in each 
country, and maintain smooth relations among all countries, also including 
Sino-Indian relations.  






Fast Tracking Economic Collaboration in SAARC 
Countries 
 
Dr. Pervez Tahir 
Introduction 
his paper focuses on the extent to which fast-tracking is possible in 
the areas of economic collaboration in the SAARC region. It also 
comments on the extra-regional incentives for regional cooperation. 
Five years elapsed between the origin of the idea of SAARC in 1980 
and the formal adoption of its Declaration in 1985 by the heads of state.  
Given the vicissitudes of history in the region, a cautious start was made. 
Only five areas of cooperation were selected. Under the rubric of the 
SAARC Integrated Programme of Action (SIPA), these included 
agriculture, rural development, telecommunication, meteorology and health 
& population. With predominantly agricultural economies and rural 
populations, poor tele-connectivity, climatic linkages and underinvested 
social sector, the choice of areas made sense. None of these linkages could 
be described as economic, though. Trade, the characteristic feature of 
regional economic blocs, was missing as an area of cooperation. It took 
another six years to mandate economic cooperation in 1991. The SIPA was 
reconstituted to add areas left out earlier. The total number of areas of 
cooperation rose to 15, listing agriculture & rural, biotechnology, culture, 
economic and trade, education, energy, environment, finance, funding 
mechanism, information, communication and media, people to people 
contacts, poverty alleviation, science and technology, security and social 
development and tourism. 
Under the reconstituted SIPA, deliberations were initiated on the 
expansion of intraregional trade. A step by step approach was adopted. It 
was envisaged to go through the stages of trade preferences, free trade area, 
customs union, common market and eventually an economic union. As a 
first step, the agreement on the South Asian Preferential Trade Area 
(SAPTA) was signed in April 1993.  Differential treatment was given to 
members categorized as least developed countries (LDCs) and non-LDC 
members. Special concessions were provided to LDCs — Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal. Market access under SAPTA was limited. 
T 
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Even this took four rounds of negotiations. It provided limited market 
access to member states.  
The next important step was the establishment of the South Asian 
Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Discussions on SAFTA started in 1995. It took 
the next nine years to sign the SAFTA agreement on 6 January 2004 in 
Islamabad. Another two years were consumed by the ratification process. 
At long last, the agreement was enforced on January 1, 2006 (Appendix I). 
Trade liberalization started with effect from July 1, 2006. The process is 
steered by the SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC) consisting of commerce 
ministers, which is mandated to meet at least once a year. Seven meetings 
have been held so far, the last one in Colombo on August 23, 2013. 
In addition to tariff reductions to liberalize intraregional trade, trade 
facilitation measures are necessary in the form of improved connectivity 
through the development of linkages of rail, road and telecommunication 
networks. Energy has provided a strong impetus to collaboration in other 
regional economic groupings and free trade agreements. SAARC is, 
however, an energy deficient region, with limited potential for cooperation.  
 
Gradualism in Regional Integration 
Economists generally agree that regional economic collaboration is 
mutually gainful for the participating countries. The whole, in their view, is 
greater than the sum of the parts. Regional integration provides the best 
arrangement for increasing benefits from spill overs and externalities in an 
interdependent world. Distribution of gains is not necessarily equal, but the 
provision of safeguard clauses protects the weaker member countries. In 
spite of the theoretical consensus on benefits and empirical evidence of 
mutual gains for the late comers, nearly all regional groupings went through 
a gradualist or evolutionary process rather than rushing into full integration. 
This is true across the continents — EU in Europe, NAFTA in North 
America MERCOSUR in South America, ASEAN in Asia and the African 
Union. Even in cases of near absence of political conflict or historical 
enmities, caution, gradualism and evolution characterized the development 
of regional integration. 
The SAARC region is no exception. In about three decades of its 
existence, it has moved from a preferential to a free trade area. On the 
ground, however, the movement is not beyond the preliminaries of a free 
trade area, which economists define as free or freer trade between members 
but without a common external tariff for third countries. At the same time, 
the SAPTA continued until 2008 for non-LDC member preferences for 
LDCs and 2012 for LDC members. The prolonged, dirigistic rounds of 
negotiations under SAPTA covered over 5000 items. Each Round 
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contributed to an incremental trend in the product coverage and the 
deepening of tariff concessions over previous Rounds. The next stages of 
customs union, common market and economic union are distant dreams. All 
the trappings of a free trade area are there. Tariff reduction programme, 
rules of origin, safeguards, dispute resolution and an institutional 
mechanism are in place. Notifications to give effect to the SAFTA Trade 
Liberalization Programme are issued continually. Certificates of origin are 
regularly notified (Appendix II, Table 1). In addition, cooperation in 
standards is happening. The SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services has 
also been signed. Cooperation in avoidance of double taxation is taking 
place. SAARCSTAT has been set up to generate and disseminate data. 
SAARC trade fairs area regular feature. SAARC Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry is active to promote cooperation in the private sector. 
This is an impressive institutional and policy architecture. But it has 
not led to the desired outcome of rapid expansion of intraregional trade. 
Despite SAFTA, access of SAARC members to the markets of third 
countries in Europe is much better than the access to each other‘s market. 
Are these free trade measures the building blocks or the stumbling 
blocks in the process of regional integration in South Asia? Before 
addressing this question, it is important to analyse the progress made so far 
in the field of intraregional trade.       
 
Trends in Intraregional Trade 
At present, SAFTA has a small share in world exports. In 2006, the first 
year of SAFTA, its member countries exported goods worth of $158.9 
billion to the world or 1.3 per cent of the world exports. This share 
increased to 1.8 per cent in 2010. Within this small global share, exports of 
members to each other attributable to the emergence of SAFTA were just $ 
0.69 million in 2006 or a fraction of their total exports. In 2010, the 
SAFTA-related exports were only 0.24 per cent of total exports. Even the 
absolute numbers are less than inspiring. The latest figure for 2012 shows 
exports at$ 822 million, still less than a billion dollars. This is an impressive 
growth, but insignificant relative to the total trade volumes. As a matter of 
fact, the cumulative intraregional trade between 2006 and 2013 is valued at 
$ 2.92 billion. Of this the largest share was not contributed by the largest 
country, India, but by Bangladesh, defined as an LDC. Bangladesh 
contributed $ 1.344 billion while India‘s share stood at $ 1.328 billion. 
Information on Pakistan is not complete in the latest periods, but its 
availability is unlikely to alter the fact that she fares a poor third. Appendix 
II, Tables 1-2 may be seen for detailed information. 
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It is interesting to look at the pre-and-post-SAFTA shares of the 
member countries in their own international trade. The following table 
gives the information. 
 
Share of SAARC Trade in Total Trade 
 
Country % of Total Exports 
 
% of Total 
Imports 
2005 2008 2005 2008 
Afghanistan 42.8 39.1 43.1 42.2 
Bangladesh 2.6 3.6 16.5 17.4 
India 5.3 5.8 0.9 0.6 
Maldives 16.6 15.9 17.4 12.6 
Nepal 66.0 59.2 66.5 48.2 
Pakistan 11.2 13.2 3.0 5.9 
Sri Lanka 10.3 8.0 22.4 22.9 
SAARC 6.6 6.8 4.6 4.1 
 
Before SAFTA, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan gained in exports and the 
rest experienced decline. The impact on overall SAARC exports was a 
marginal increase from 6.6 per cent to 6.8 per cent. On the import side, 
there was an increase in the case of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
The overall SAARC imports declined from 4.6 per cent to 4.1 per cent. 
Only Bangladesh and Pakistan increased their exports as well as imports. 
Pakistan‘s gains are largely due to the entry of Afghanistan, its third largest 
export market, in SAARC.     
 
The Stumbling Blocks 
A number of stumbling blocks have slow-tracked the expansion of 
intraregional trade. Sensitive Lists are the most important. These Lists allow 
what are called items in the declared Sensitive Lists exceptions to the 
agreement. Often these Lists contain items that have a greater potential to 
contribute to the expansion of intraregional trade than those included in the 
Trade Liberalization Programme. In the case of India and Pakistan, there 
was some progress recently. In 2012, Pakistan abandoned its elaborate 
Positive List and replaced it with a smaller Negative List. This smaller list 
still has 1,209 tariff lines. According to Pasha, et al (2012b), the 
importables from India increased from 27 per cent to 82 per cent. It was 
also promised that a much shorter Sensitive List will be issued after the 
granting of full MFN status to India. Reciprocally, India scaled down its 
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Sensitive List by 30 per cent. By April 2013, India promised to limit the 
Sensitive List to 100 items. It also declared that the import duty will be 
reduced to 5 per cent by that date. 
April 2013 has come and gone. Neither Pakistan has granted India the 
MFN status, nor has the promised liberalization by India materialized.  
The analysis by Pasha, et al (2012b) reveals that the actual benefit of 
the measures announced by India are in fact far less. First, the quantification 
of the Indian Sensitive List on the basis of the 8-digit level of HS Code, 
India‘s tariff lines outnumber that of Pakistan. Second, Pakistan‘s 
preferential tariff lines cover 94 per cent of its exports, while Indian 
preferential treatment covers 65 per cent of Pakistan‘s exports. Third, 
Pakistan has a comparative advantage in agricultural products. India‘s 
Sensitive List is, however, biased towards agricultural products. Duties 
between 30-100 per cent are reinforced by 5.2 per cent GDP spent on 
subsidizing agriculture. The subsidy bill in Pakistan is one per cent of GDP 
and tariffs are low, ranging from 0-10 per cent. Fourthly, Pakistan‘s 
comparative advantage in textiles is also affected.  ―India‘s import duty is 
the higher of the rate of 10% or a specific duty. For several products the ad 
valorem equivalent of the specific duties exceeds 100%. As opposed to this 
tariff structure the maximum duty, excluding automobiles, in Pakistan is 
30%.‖ Finally, there are concerns that a much smaller Indian Sensitve List 
vis-à-vis Bangladesh can cause outflow of investment from Pakistan.  
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) have been another stumbling block. Any 
measure other than tariffs imposed or sponsored by the government is 
defined as an NTB. These measures thwart the impact of reduced tariffs and 
provide protection to a domestic activity by another name.  
India has a long list of NTBs:  Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations 
and rules, especially on foodstuffs; the complexities in licensing, permit and 
tariff regimes; quantitative controls applied as safeguards; duties and 
charges in addition to customs tariffs; reference prices with bimonthly 
revisions in response to changing world prices; and restrictions about the 
port of entry. There are also security related restrictions, as the SAFTA 
agreement permits members to take any measure considered important for 
national security. 
Pakistan has its own set of NTBs for reasons of national security, 
health, environment and religion. Federal Board of Revenue has issued a 
number of SROs restricting imports. In terms of the World Bank‘s Overall 








If the interregional trade is not moving fast because of the slow pace of 
tariff reductions, Sensitive Lists and prevalence of NTBs, can economic 
collaboration be put on a fast track in other areas of cooperation. 
Energy is sometimes mentioned as one such area. In the SAARC, energy 
sector was paid attention in 2000. A Technical Committee on Energy was 
set up. Subsequently, a specialized Working Group was also set up in 2004. 
In 2005, SAARC Energy Ministers formed an Expert Group which 
prepared a road map for energy conservation and efficiency. After the 
thirteenth SAARC Summit, SAARC Energy Centre was set up in 
Islamabad. It had an elaborate mandate going well beyond energy 
conservation and efficiency. It included development of energy including 
hydropower, renewable and alternative energy resources. Regional energy 
trade would also be promoted. The concept of Energy Ring was advanced. 
A common template on technical and commercial aspects of electricity grid 
interconnection is ready. Asian Development Bank has carried out the 
SAARC Energy Trade Study (SRETS), which identified four trade options. 
Another study was commissioned to explore the development of a regional 
power market. Concept papers on the Road Map for developing SAARC 
Market for Electricity and SAARC Inter-Governmental Framework 
Agreement for Regional Energy Cooperation have been taken up.  
A lot of paper work has been done.  However, South Asia is an 
energy deficient region. No member is endowed with surpluses of fossil 
fuels. Power outages are common. Demand outstrips supply and the gap is 
expected to widen in the coming years. Fast tracking any regional imitative 
in the energy sector is a difficult proposition. Two extra-regional initiatives 
have promise, but any breakthrough in near future is unlikely. The first is 
Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. India has already pulled out and Pakistan 
has neither the money nor the hope that the United States would exempt it 
from sanctions. Similarly, the fate of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India gas pipeline depends on the normalization in Afghanistan. 
There are also issues of the exact quantity of gas available and pricing.   
 
Connectivity 
Trade is hampered by poor regional connectivity. Road, rail, air and 
telecommunication links need to be improved. In a number of cases, it is 
cheaper to export to third countries than to the region. In terms of the 
logistic performance, India fares better than Pakistan. But this need not hide 
the fact that quality of infrastructure is unsatisfactory. A lot can be fast-
tracked here. A Regional Railways Agreement is under consideration. 
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Establishment of a cargo corridor can bring about considerable reductions 
in the cost of doing business. A demonstration run of a container train has 
been proposed to link Bangladesh, Nepal and India. The India-Sri Lanka 
Ferry Service is to be regularized. In 2011, the seventeenth SAARC 
Summit called for ―effective linkages and connectivity for greater 
movement of people, enhanced investment and trade in the region‖. As it 
provides East-West connectivity, grand designs for a wider Indian Ocean 
Cargo and Passenger Ferry Service have been mentioned.  
It must be remembered that the British had established an elaborate 
rail and road network linking what is now Pakistan with East India for the 
movement of food and troops. These links fell into disuse after the 
independence in 1947. They can be restored on a fast track basis without the 
high costs involved in initiating mega projects. Let the Bengals and the 
Punjabs, for instance, trade overland with each other. 
 
Economic Union in Politics, not Economics 
India and Pakistan in SAARC are the France and Germany of European 
Union. In the past six decades, peace broke out in Europe. Unlike Europe, 
India and Pakistan have found the legacy of revenge and conflict hard to 
overcome.  The Nobel Peace Prize 2012 was awarded to European Union 
(EU) "for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and 
reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe." In his Nobel 
Lecture, Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council 
maintained that mere symbolism does not work for peace. What worked 
was the European Union's "secret weapon" which he described as ―an 
unrivalled way of binding our interests so tightly that war becomes 
materially impossible.‖ The foundations of this peace were laid on 9 May 
1950, when the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman began his peace 
project by bringing the erstwhile enemies together in producing coal and 
steel, the very materials of war, to make peace. In his words:  "The 
solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war 
between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but 
materially impossible". 
The global financial crisis shook the foundations of EU. It has 
survived the crisis, not because of any economic initiative, but because of 
its political framework which is based on the principle of collective 
responsibility. The stronger economies are required to support the 
economies in crisis. As the afore-mentioned Nobel Lecture put it: ―Without 
this European cooperation, the result might easily have been new 
protectionism, new nationalism, with the risk that the ground gained would 
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be lost.‖ In sharp contrast, a single incidence can roll back years of work on 
peace between India and Pakistan and economic cooperation in SAARC. 
From committees to summits, discussions of bilateral issues are 
avoided in the deliberations of SAARC. These fora, however, do provide an 
opportunity to the leaders to engage in a political dialogue. The Kashmir 
dispute between India and Pakistan has cast the longest shadow over the 
economic cooperation in South Asia. There is no agreement on Kashmir. 
This is, however, not to say that agreements are implemented. Despite 
agreement, the issues of Sir Creek and Siachin remain a bone of contention. 
Even the settled issues such as the Indus Water Treaty are in danger of 
being reopened. The issue of the rights of co-riparians of Ganges and 
Brahmaputra basins is no less important.  
In recent years, terrorism has done more damage to the peace process 
than any other issue. The only time the SAARC looked at a political and 
security issue with bilateral implications was during the twelfth and the 
thirteenth SAARC summits. Fight against terrorism was on the agenda and 
regional cooperation was agreed. There is nothing concrete to show in this 
regard. 
Regional Cooperation is the subject of central governments of the 
member states. Even when these governments have the desire to move 
ahead in key areas, they are unable to develop national consensus in the 
enormously diverse populations. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made peace 
with India an elections issue. However, developments on the Line of 
Control undermined his position and that of Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh. Instead of regional cooperation to fight terror, the two Prime 
Ministers were taking positions at the United Nations which have been 
frozen in time. In case of Sri Lanka, India takes a position on terrorism 
which is the opposite of the position vis-à-vis Pakistan.  
 
Conclusion 
Most regional economic integration arrangements went through a step by 
step process. There are no quick fixes. This is especially so when the region 
has a history of conflict. The important thing is to keep engaged. SAARC 
has not made any significant progress in extending regional economic 
collaboration. The objective of a South Asian Economic Union by 2020 is 
unlikely to be achieved. Nor can it be fast-tracked by extra-regional 
incentives. Slow but steady progress in intraregional trade, facilitated by 
improved regional connectivity for ideas, people and goods, is the way 
forward. Increasing intraregional strength opens up greater possibilities of 
integration with the globalized world. If Germany and France could forget 
the past and lead the way towards sixty year of peace and progress in 
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Europe, India and Pakistan can also do it through political will exercised on 
behalf of democratically elected Parliaments. In the last elections in 
Pakistan, friendship with India was a campaign slogan. The route to 
economic progress in the region goes through politics. The great advantage 
of SAARC is that even when India and Pakistan are not talking bilaterally, 
it provides opportunities on the sideline of summits to keep the two 
mistrusting nations engaged. Economic fast tracking in SAARC is directly 
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Key Articles of the SAFTA Agreement 
 
Article - 8  
Additional Measures  
1. Contracting States agree to the following schedule of tariff reductions:  
 a) The tariff reduction by the Non-Least Developed Contracting States 
from existing tariff rates to 20% shall be done within a time frame of 
2 years, from the date of coming into force of the Agreement. 
Contracting States are encouraged to adopt reductions in equal annual 
instalments. If actual tariff rates after the coming into force of the 
Agreement are below 20%, there shall be an annual reduction on a 
Margin of Preference basis of 10% on actual tariff rates for each of 
the two years.  
 b) The tariff reduction by the Least Developed Contracting States from 
existing tariff rates will be to 30% within the time frame of 2 years 
from the date of coming into force of the Agreement. If actual tariff 
rates on the date of coming into force of the Agreement are below 
30%, there will be an annual reduction on a Margin of Preference 
basis of 5 % on actual tariff rates for each of the two years.  
 c) The subsequent tariff reduction by Non-Least Developed Contracting 
States from 20% or below to 0-5% shall be done within a second time 
frame of 5 years, beginning from the third year from the date of 
coming into force of the Agreement. However, the period of 
subsequent tariff reduction by Sri Lanka shall be six years. 
Contracting States are encouraged to adopt reductions in equal annual 
instalments, but not less than 15% annually.  
d) The subsequent tariff reduction by the Least Developed Contracting 
States from 30% or below to 0-5% shall be done within a second time 
frame of 8 years beginning from the third year from the date of 
coming into force of the Agreement. The Least Developed 
Contracting States are encouraged to adopt reductions in equal annual 
instalments, not less than 10% annually.  
 
2. The above schedules of tariff reductions will not prevent Contracting 
States from immediately reducing their tariffs to 0-5% or from following an 
accelerated schedule of tariff reduction.  
3. a) Contracting States may not apply the Trade Liberalisation Programme 
as in paragraph 1 above, to the tariff lines included in the Sensitive Lists 
which shall be negotiated by the Contracting States (for LDCs and Non -
LDCs) and incorporated in this Agreement as an integral part. The number 
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of products in the Sensitive Lists shall be subject to maximum ceiling to be 
mutually agreed among the Contracting States with flexibility to Least 
Developed Contracting States to seek derogation in respect of the products 
of their export interest; and  
 b) The Sensitive List shall be reviewed after every four years or earlier as 
may be decided by SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC), established under 
Article 10, with a view to reducing the number of items in the Sensitive 
List.  
4. The Contracting States shall notify the SAARC Secretariat all non-tariff 
and para-tariff measures to their trade on an annual basis. The notified 
measures shall be reviewed by the Committee of Experts, established under 
Article 10, in its regular meetings to examine their compatibility with 
relevant WTO provisions. The Committee of Experts shall recommend the 
elimination or implementation of the measure in the least trade restrictive 
manner in order to facilitate intra SAARC trade1 
5. Contracting Parties shall eliminate all quantitative restrictions, except 
otherwise permitted under GATT 1994, in respect of products included in 
the Trade Liberalisation Programme.  
6. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of this Article, 
the Non-Least Developed Contracting States shall reduce their tariff to 0-
5% for the products of Least Developed Contracting States within a 
timeframe of three years beginning from the date of coming into force of 
the Agreement.   
 
Article - 9  
Extension of Negotiated Concessions  
 
Article - 10  
Institutional Arrangements  
Contracting States agree to consider, in addition to the measures set out in 
Article 7, the adoption of trade facilitation and other measures to support 
and complement SAFTA for mutual benefit.  
These may include, among others: -  
a) harmonization of standards, reciprocal recognition of tests and 
accreditation of testing laboratories of Contracting States and 
certification of products;  
b) simplification and harmonization of customs clearance procedure;  
c) harmonization of national customs classification based on HS coding 
system;  
d) Customs cooperation to resolve dispute at customs entry points;  
e) simplification and harmonization of import licensing and registration 
procedures;  
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f) simplification of banking procedures for import financing;  
g) transit facilities for efficient intra-SAARC trade, especially for the land-
locked Contracting States;  
h) removal of barriers to intra-SAARC investments;  
i) macroeconomic consultations;  
j) rules for fair competition and the promotion of venture capital;  
k) development of communication systems and transport infrastructure;  
l) making exceptions to their foreign exchange restrictions, if any, relating 
to payments for products under the SAFTA scheme, as well as 
repatriation of such payments without prejudice to their rights under 
Article XVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the relevant provisions of Articles of Treaty of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF); and  
m) Simplification of procedures for business visas 
 
Article - 14  
General Exceptions  
 
Article - 15  
Balance of Payments Measures  
Notwithstanding the measures as set out in this Agreement its provisions 
shall not apply in relation to preferences already granted or to be granted by 
any Contracting State to other Contracting States outside the framework of 
this Agreement, and to third countries through bilateral, plurilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements and similar arrangements. 


















– Dec 2006 
0 0 0 0 3 0 4 0 7 
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0 346 0 0 0 0 9 0 355 
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Towards an Asian Century: Future of Economic 
Cooperation in SAARC Countries: A View from 
FPCCI 
 
Mr. Muhammad Ali 
e said that SAARC states are the one of the least in connected states 
in regional trade in the globe. Despite this region have many 
resources to progress in future. If we compare it to other states then 
it is the least connected region with regional least trade of 5% of the total 
trade. Question arises that what are the hurdles in its progress. He said, the 
presence of the non-tariff measures (NTM) is the reason by which trade is 
low. NTM includes all the measures include besides tariffs. NTMs are 
usually unforced to reinforce the market restrictions imposed by a tariff 
that‘s why NTMs are more important than tariffs. He highlighted the 
common NTMs which have been identified by The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is the following: 
 Price control measures 
 Quantity control measures 
 Para-tariff measures  
 Finance measures  
 Anti-competitive measures 
 Export-related investment measures 
 Distribution restrictions 
 Restriction on post-sales services 
 Subsidies 
 Government procurement restrictions  
 Intellectual property 
 Rules of origin 
 Arbitrary, inconsistent and discriminatory behaviour favouring 
specific producers or suppliers 
 Inefficiency 
 Procedural barriers including obstruction, non-transparent 
practices, legal obstacles and unusually high fees or charges 
H 
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Moreover, while discussing NTMs he said that the most common NTMs in 
SAARC which are following: 
 Sanitary and  phyto-sanitary measures through a number of 
laws 
 A strong focus on food security and self-sufficiency 
 Complexities and variations in licensing, permits and tariffs  
according to product or user 
 Safeguard measures (including anti dumping duties and 
quantitative restrictions) 
 Duties and charges, over and above tariffs 
 Reference prices for some products, which are revised to align 
with international market prices 
 Import of some specific products through specified ports only 
 Transportation restrictions 
 Import only by state trading agencies (particularly in 
agriculture) 
 Stringent visa requirements for a country  
 Import prohibitions and licensing for health, safety, security, 
religious and environmental reasons 
He further mentioned that the most NTMs in SAARC region as a 
survey conducted by LUMS that the following reasons were found to be 
most important when a survey was held: 
 Problems in land transportation (61 %) 
 Problems in getting visas and harassment during visits (more 
than 50 %); 
 Problems in handling at ports and dealings of Customs, etc (20 
to 60 %)  
 Problems in certification requirements (21 to 37 %) 
 Problems at the port of entry (30 %)  
 Problems in banking transactions (23 %)  
According to the said survey, SAARC states have weak transportation 
linkages and we often spent on transport the goods. South Asian enterprises 
pay 35% of the additional cost due to trading with the third country and 
10% times more confinements then those to the direct trade. Most of the 
SAARC countries do not share common borders like Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, and Pakistan and Nepal so 
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hurdles are present for the land trade. For this we have to gather and discuss 
each other regarding sound road linkages across the regional states borders 
with free charges. Only Bhutan and Nepal have the transit facility from 
India to trade with Bangladesh.   
SAARC states can easily multiply their trade. According to the Asian 
Development Bank, SAARC multi model transport has identify many cross 
roads within region, like Afghanistan-Pakistan, Afghanistan-Pakistan-India-
Nepal, Bangladesh-India-Nepal, which  need to be established for the future 
growth of the SAARC region. Further complex rules of the origin makes it 
difficult for the SAFTA due its preferences.  Many times exporters face 
duties regarding costs and compliances. 
He raised the question that, Why we need to liberalize the trade in 
SAARC region? Answering this question, he said one fourth of the world 
population lives in the SAARC countries. But we are producing 2 per cent 
of the total GDP due to political conflicts. We are in a category of least 
developing states accept India and Pakistan. India accounts 80 per cent of 
the total regional GDP, Pakistan is falling 10 per cent and Bangladesh 7 per 
cent. The establishments are not only failed to open trade and investments 
opportunities but also did not bring prosperity by integrating smaller 
economies into the large economic space. The ultimate result of the trade is 
not only limited to the current account or balance of the payment, but active 
utilization of the resources can minimize the economic measures, by 
controlling inflation and providing more employment opportunities. 
Discussing another question that how we can move forward? He 
replied and said that we need expansion of regional production. For that we 
have to extend the production expansion network in the global economy, 
FDIs, removing the investment barriers, so with this we have to prove the 
transport for logistic barriers. Trade between India and Pakistan has made 
some progress but it is limited because of trade barriers and insufficient 
regional cooperation. It is a need for tremendous improvements and we 
should also look beyond our neighbourhood. India has good relationship 
with the SAARC countries but we need to look forward to gather all the 
states together even who do not share the land borders.  
He added that we need efforts of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) to increase infra SAARC trade. Over 
the past two years private sector of Pakistan led by FPCCI has been 
engaged in an effort to improve trade and investment relations with India. 
With time we are in reading in exchange of delegations each year. We are 
also organizing the round table conference for normalizing India Pakistan 
trade. The FPCCI is also tolerating other South Asian states, an attempt to 
further increase in regional trade within SAARC, as Afghanistan is a 
Pakistan‘s biggest export market. We are also active in sending the 
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delegations to Nepal with Sri Lanka. We are trying to see how we can make 
existing FTA more useful for the business communities of the both 
countries Bhutan and Nepal but there are hurdles.  
In concluding remarks he focused on futuristic scenario of intra 
SAARC trade. He said that the progress of the SAARC trade rely on 
gradual improvements and normalization of the Indo-Pak trade relationship.  
If these relationships improve then we can expect that Pakistan‘s 
relationship with Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka will grow 
rapidly. Private sectors of the SAARC countries should take the leading role 
in trade promotion activities. Private sector should interact more with each 
other to visits and delegations that held in each country. Apart of this there 
is a vast potential of tourism in SAARC region but poor connectivity makes 
this area largely under develop. There is a strong need of connections and 
communication links is needed but political issues kept the process behind.  
Adding some recommendations, he said, South Asia trade and 
investment goes hand to hand. It is a time that policy makers should review 
the existing SAFTA agreement into a comprehensive cooperation 
agreement that cover not only trade and goods but the services with Trans 
border investments as well. This area needs attention for the rationalization 
of the trade documentation.  
Lastly, it is the collective responsibility of the regional governments, 
political parties, media and business communities that create such areas, 
where regional cooperation could take place to celebrate economic growth, 






















Economic Cooperation among SARRC Countries: 
Political Constraints 
 
Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan 
 
his paper discusses the political constraints on the trade relations and 
economic cooperation among the SAARC countries at bilateral as 
well as at multi-lateral levels, identifying their origins and impact on 
the process of regional cooperation in South Asia. The main argument 
underlining the paper is: although bilateral connectivity, trade and economic 
relations among the SAARC countries have shown encouraging  signs of 
growth during the last about one decade, they are still hostage to political 
constraints; and unless efforts are made to mitigate them, the goal of 
regional integration in the South Asian region will remain elusive.   
The paper is divided into three parts. Part one describes the distinctive 
features of the region such as its insular geographical location with India 
holding central position, asymmetrical economic development, colonial 
legacy and persistence of strategic discord between India and her 
neighbours. In part two the origin of political constraints with their 
implications for bilateral economic relations and the process of regional 
cooperation would be discussed. Part three of the paper comprises the 




In December 2015, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), grouping Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka would complete its 30 years of life. It was 
created to serve as a platform for promoting regional cooperation and trade 
among its members; but its performance in this direction has been 
abysmally low. According to latest data, intra-regional trade is less than five 
per cent despite the presence of strong imperatives, both domestic and 
regional, for accelerating the process of regional cooperation to address 
problems of socio-economic development. The region is inhabited by more 
than one and half billion people or 23 per cent of world‘s total population; 
but its share in global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is less than two and 
half per cent. A prominent feature of the region is stark diversity in the level 
of economic development. By regional standards, Pakistan and India, which 
T 
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also happen to be the most populous nations of South Asia, have the largest 
economies in terms of regional GDP. These two countries have attained this 
status largely as a result of economic reforms introduced in 1990s. For 
about two decades Indian GDP has grown at double digit level annually. 
The annual growth rate has shown a downward trend during UPA II; 
however, India still stands out as a dominant economy in the region with 
78.8 per cent of the region‘s GDP, 40.3 per cent of its trade and 75.8 per 
cent of incoming foreign direct investment (FDI). Geographically, India 
occupies a dominant position in the whole region, including the Indian 
Ocean area. Together with the insular position of the region with almost 
impassable Himalayas in the north, Karakoram and Hindukush mountain 
ranges in the north west and the Malaysian Peninsula and East Africa  
constituting the two walls of the Indian Ocean on the east and west, the vast 
area, large population, strong economy and powerful military bestow on 
India a unique role in the region, which can lead to both positive and 
negative consequences for efforts aimed at promoting regional cooperation 
in South Asia. 
Positive in the sense that four out of eight member countries of 
SAARC, namely Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh have common 
borders with India. Sri Lanka and Maldives also enjoy geographical 
proximity with their big neighbour as they are separated from the Indian 
peninsula only by the waters of the Indian Ocean-a very narrow waterway 
in case of Sri Lanka. The countries of South Asian region have had from 
times immemorial strong economic, trade and cultural ties. Two of the three 
ancient trade routes which connected East with the West through Persian 
Gulf and the Middle East on to the Mediterranean passed through India via 
Sindh and Arabian Sea along the Mekran coast. The areas now constituting 
Pakistan served as catchment areas of famous Silk Route adding Indian 
merchandize of spices, ivory, honey, cotton and precious metals to the 
goods from China and Central Asia carried by the trade caravans heading 
towards the ports located on the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean.  All 
these three trade routes converged on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean 
dotted with busy sea ports from areas south of Turkey to Palestine and the 
Nile Delta. From these ports the goods were transported to Europe through 
ships and boats. This pattern of flourishing trade continued to exist till the 
establishment of Ottoman naval supremacy over the Mediterranean in the 
fifteenth century. The arrival of Vasco da Gama on the western coast of 
India in 1498 marked a new era in the history of the South Asian region as 
the seaborne trade began to replace land based trade relations, which had 
not only knit various sub-regions of South Asia together economically and 
culturally but also connected South Asia with China, Central Asia and 
Southwest Asia. The dawn of European era in South Asia led to the 
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reorientation of trade and interaction between India and Europe through the 
sea. The triumph of the British over other European powers in the struggle 
for control over India in the nineteenth century further strengthened this 
trend. The onset of rivalry, also known as Great Game, between Russia and 
Britain sparked by the former‘s moves into Central Asia in late nineteenth 
century-a development perceived by Britain as a threat to its imperial 
interests in India-provided final touches to the closures of routes through 
which commercial and cultural interaction used to take place between India 
on the one hand, and Central Asia and West Asia on the other.
16
 The British 
colonial rule, however, brought about a fair amount of economic integration 
in the region. This is why the partition of India into two separate and 
independent dominions of Pakistan and India was called more a political act 
than an economic one. After independence, India for a couple of years was 
not only Pakistan‘s most important trading partner ―accounting for half of 
Pakistan‘s exports (agriculture produce and minerals) and 32 per cent of 
imports (mainly manufactured goods),‖17, the two countries were also 
bound together in a sort of customs union as Pakistan was allowed to export 
its jute without export duty through Kolkata (then Calcutta) and India 
enjoyed the facility of importing free of duty petrol and kerosene oil from 
the Middle East and the Persian Gulf through the Pakistani port of 
Karachi.
18
  India took a unilateral decision to bring this arrangement to an 
abrupt end in 1949, apparently as retaliation against Pakistan‘s refusal to 
devalue its currency to match similar decision by India; but the real reason 
behind the Indian decision was the rising tension with Pakistan over 
Kashmir. Thus trade and economic relations between Pakistan and India 
had been influenced by political disputes between them right from the 
beginning. Being the two largest economies in the region, their bilateral 
disputes held back the process of regional cooperation under SAARC; but 
Pakistan-India discord on political and strategic issues was not the only 
restraining factor on the process of regional integration in South Asia, 
economic cooperation among the SAARC countries has also been 
influenced by political differences India has had with other countries of the 
region or these countries have had among them. There are four sources of 
political constraints on the economic relations among the SAARC 
                                                          
16
  Ejaz Nabi, ―Lifting up the Indo-Pak trade game,” Hindu (Delhi), March 28, 
2012, Selections From Regional Press (hereafter referred to as SFRP) , Institute 
of Regional Studies, Islamabad, vol. 31, no. 6, March, 16-31, (2012), p. 1. 
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   Ibid. 
18
 Rashid Ahmad Khan, ‖Pakistan-India Trade Relations,‖ Regional Studies, 
Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, vol. XIII, no. I, 1995. See also Rashid 
Ahmad Khan, ―Pakistan-India Trade: Route to Inter-regional and Intra-regional 
Connectivity,‖ IPRI Journal, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Islamabad.  
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countries, namely strategic discord emanating from divergent perceptions of 
India and its neighbours on the issues of peace and security in the region, 
lingering bilateral disputes, especially between Pakistan and India, domestic 
political compulsions arising out of pressures from pressure groups, and the 
influence of extra-regional powers pursuing their economic and strategic 
interests in the region. 
 
Strategic Discord 
One of the main reasons for slow pace of regional cooperation in South 
Asia is the persistence of strategic discord between India on the one hand 
and most of the South Asian countries on the other. This strategic discord is 
reflected in divergent stands of India and some other countries in the region 
on the issues of peace and security in the region. Although all the members 
in the Dhaka Declaration of (first summit) SAARC acknowledged that they 
―could effectively pursue their individual and collective objectives and 
improve the quality of life of their people only in an atmosphere of peace 
and security,‖ the track record of the past six decades of the South Asian 
countries reveal sharp divergences in their foreign policy postures. During 
the Cold War era, Pakistan opted to become a close ally of the United States 
through bilateral security agreements with the United States and 
membership of US sponsored anti-communist military treaties such as 
Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and SEATO; whereas India went for 
neutrality and non-alignment.  Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru sharply 
reacted against Pakistan‘s aligning with the United States, claiming that it 
had brought the Cold War to India‘s doorstep. Although signs of strain in 
relations between Pakistan and India had surfaced in 1948 over the latter‘s 
entry into Kashmir, the formal joining of Cold War alliance system by 
Pakistan as the US ally,  pushed the relations between the two countries 
further down on the road to deterioration. India‘s negative reaction to 
Pakistan‘s alliance with the United States in 1950s was motivated by the 
former‘s firmly held view that South Asian region should remain free from 
the political and military influence of extra-regional powers. Two of India‘s 
early post-independence strategic thinkers-Jawaharlal Nehru and K M 
Panikkar-a historian, diplomat and one time Indian Ambassador to People‘s 
Republic of China- had propounded the exclusivist doctrine on the future of 
the region and India‘s role in it.  Nehru had even proposed a Monroe 
Doctrine for South Asia and Panikkar had suggested as early as 1941 a 
dominant role for India in the Indian Ocean stretching from the Arabian Sea 
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and Bay of Bengal because of its insular position.
19
 Guided by this doctrine, 
India has always sought to limit the foreign policy options of the smaller 
countries of South Asia. India not only opposed Pakistan‘s alliance with the 
United States, it also expressed concerns at the Nepalese efforts, under 
Ranas, to cultivate close relations with the United States. Indian refusal to 
endorse Nepali call for declaring Nepal as Zone of Peace and opposition to 
Sri Lankan bid to seek extra-regional help to fight Tamil insurgency could 
also be explained in the light of India‘s self-image of its role in the South 
Asian region. Indian opposition to foreign military bases in the Indian 
Ocean and call for its designation as Zone of Peace was also driven by the 
same doctrine. The divergent paths in the foreign policy realm and 
conflicting views on the issues of peace and security in the South Asian 
region, reflect lack of strategic accord and deep mistrust between India and 
the peripheral countries of South Asia.  
 
Mutual Mistrust 
The mutual mistrust is also reflected in the respective responses of South 
Asian countries to the various ideas and initiatives for regional integration 
in the region. For example, just on the eve of independence, Nehru 
proposed to link Nepal and Sri Lanka with India in a confederation on the 
basis of not only geographical proximity but also common historical 
experience, cultural links and economic imperatives. But the suggestion 
produced a sharp reaction in Sri Lanka and Nepal and all the political 
parties, although most of them were inspired by the Indian nationalist 
movement under the leadership of Congress, rejected the idea as a move to 
establish Indian hegemony in the region by undermining their sovereignty. 
Following independence, India convened first Asian Relations Conference 
in New Delhi. Pakistan refused to attend it, perceiving it as an Indian 
attempt to establish its hegemony in the region. Mistrust between India and 
her neighbours also stems from the former‘s allusions to its past glory as a 
dominant power in the Indian Ocean area and the latter‘s fear of being re-
absorbed in the much bigger and powerful state. ―From the first century of 
Christian era,‖ writes Nehru in Discovery of India, ―wave after wave of 
Indian colonies spread east and southeast, reaching Ceylon (modern Sri 
Lanka), Burma, Malaya, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Siam (modern Thailand), 
Cambodia and Indo-China. Some of them managed to reach Formosa 
(modern Taiwan), the Philippine Islands and Celebes.‖20 Statements such as 
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 K M Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea 
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these have reinforced the perception among the smaller countries of South 
Asia that regional integration under Indian hegemony would undermine 
their sovereignty and independence, limiting their freedom of action in the 
area of foreign policy. The same mistrust has also been responsible for 
perception in India that regional cooperation is a mere euphemism for its 
neighbours to ―gang up‖ against India and not recognizing its claims to be 
the pre-eminent regional power.
21
 This perception is thought to be behind 
the reported Indian insistence on inserting a provision in the SAARC 
Charter excluding contentious bilateral issues from the SAARC preview 
and taking decisions on the basis of consensus. However, there are signs 
that this perception is changing as India finds promotion of economic and 
trade relations with its neighbours more beneficial economically as well as 
politically. However fears still exit in the smaller countries of the region 
that free trade with India would not only lead to their markets being 
swamped by goods from a large and powerful economic and industrial 
power but could also enable it to influence public opinion and enhance its 
political influence in these countries  through a strengthened economic 
clout.   
 
Bilateral Disputes 
With the exception of Bhutan, all other geographically contiguous countries 
of the region, namely Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have 
bilateral disputes with India. However, Pakistan-India bilateral disputes, 
chiefly the dispute over Kashmir have been the biggest political constraint 
on the forward movement of the process of regional cooperation in South 
Asia. For a long time, Pakistan continued to maintain its position that trade 
normalization with India could take place only after the dispute over 
Kashmir was settled in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people 
as pledged in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. As late as 2004, 
Pakistan maintained that the issue of granting MFN (Most Favoured 
Nation) status to India was linked with Kashmir issue.
22
 Economic 
compulsions, however, forced the country to moderate its position with the 
assertion that lifting of official restrictions on free trade could be considered 
if there was a ―tangible progress‖ in Pakistan-India bilateral dialogue 
towards the settlement of Kashmir dispute. The peace process and 
Composite Dialogue process initiated in 2004 between Pakistan and India 
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  Rajiv Kumar, SAARC: Changing Realities, Opportunities and 
Challenges,(Bonn, German Development Institute 2009), p.3. 
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has helped promote bilateral trade between the two countries to a significant 
level. In fact the enhancement of bilateral trade is being called as the 
biggest achievement of Pakistan-India peace process, although it has 
suffered occasional interruptions as in the wake of Mumbai terrorist attacks 
in 2008 and again by incidents of ceasefire violations on the Line of Control 
in Kashmir in January and August this year. But despite these setbacks, 
there has been considerable expansion of bilateral trade between the two 
countries. Trance-LoC trade was not suspended during the post-Mumbai 
interruption period. It remained suspended for a month in September last 
due to tensions on the LoC; but was quickly restored on the demand of the 
trading and business communities from both sides of dividing line in 
Kashmir. In November 2011, Pakistan announced its decision to begin the 
process of granting MFN status to India by switching over from Positive 
List to Negative List of trade items and reducing the number of items on the 
Negative List progressively with the goal of  ultimately abolishing it 
completely by December 2012 for complete trade normalization with 
India.
23
  The process of trade normalization was accelerated following the 
resumption of stalled peace process as a result of a meeting between Prime 
Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani and his Indian counter-part, 
Dr, Mamohan Singh on the sidelines of SAARC Summit in Thimpu, the 
capital of Bhutan in April, 2010. By December 2012, the trade and 
economic ties between Pakistan and India had received such a big boost that 
they were being called as the biggest achievement of the dialogue process.
24
 
The announcement to normalize bilateral relations and start the process of 
granting India MFN status by the end of 2012 was preceded by an 
agreement between Pakistan and India as a result of a meeting between 
Pakistan‘s Commerce Minister Amin Faheem and his Indian counterpart, 
Anand Sharma in New Delhi in September 2011 to boost their bilateral 
trade to $6 billion, more than double the current level of $2.7 billion during 
the next three years. On the road to further liberalizing their bilateral trade, 
the two countries also agreed on a move to open a second customs point on 
their international border at Wagha and implement new business visa 
regime by November 2011. According to media reports these measures 
were being taken by the leadership of the two countries in the belief that 
increased trade and economic interaction would enhance the trust level 
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between them and become a helpful instrument for the resolution of bigger 
and more complex issues like Kashmir.
25
 
Pakistan‘s announcement to grant MFN status to India in November 
2011 was, however, met with protests by ‗hundreds‘ of people in Lahore 
and Muzaffarabad. The participants in these protests, according to media 
reports, were largely the members of right-wing political parties and 
extremist groups such as Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Jamaatud Daawa (JuD), 
Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad JM). JI had been in the 
forefront of organizing country-wide protests against the plans of PPP-led 
coalition government in Pakistan (2008-2013) to normalize trade relations 
with India for quite some time, but the participation of banned jihadi groups 
or groups associated with banned outfits did raise the question about the 
timing of these protests and who instigated them.
26
 The PPP Government of 
Pakistan, however, could not fulfill its pledge to grant MFN status to India 
by January 2013 due to a sudden rise of tension between the two countries 
over incidents such as hanging of an alleged Kashmiri militant, Afzal Guru 
and acts of repression by the Indian security forces in the Kashmir valley. 
The clashes on the LoC in early 2013 resulting in the suspension of planned 
meetings under the revived dialogue process further dimmed the prospects 
of granting of MFN status to India. Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz 
Sharif spoke about his ardent desire to promote regional peace and security 
through improvement of Pakistan‘s relations with India and Afghanistan. 
He specifically called for expanding trade and economic ties with India. His 
statements brightened the prospects of Pakistan‘s granting of MFN status to 
India. But the eruption of new clashes between the border security forces of 
the two countries on LoC in August this year dampened the chances of 
Pakistan implementing the decision by the newly elected government of 
Nawaz Sharif. In view of the continuing firing across LoC, Pakistan felt 
constrained to postpone the decision on MFN status to India. On August 12, 
2013 Finance Minister Ishaq Dar announced that the issue was no longer 
under the consideration of the Government of Pakistan as, he said, there 
was need to first normalize relations between the two countries.
27
 
Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have also bilateral disputes with 
India. In case of Bangladesh, the major dispute is over the sharing of 
                                                          
25
 ―Pakistan, ―India agree to boost bilateral trade to $6 billion,‖ Daily Times 
(Islamabad), September 29, 2011, SFRP, vol. .XXX, no. 18, (Institute of 
Regional Studies, Islamabad), p. 8,9. 
26
 ―MFN protests,‖ Dawn (Islamabad), November 3, 2011, SFRP, vol. XXX, no. 
22, November 16-30, 2011, p.13. 
27
 ―MFN Status for India not under Consideration-Pak,‖ The Tribune (Chandigarh), 
August 13, 2013, SFRP, (Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad), vol. XXXII, 
no.15, August 1-15, 2013, p.9. 
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Ganges River waters. The two countries signed an agreement in 1996 when 
Hasina Wajid of Awami League was head of the government as Prime 
Minister in Bangladesh. The agreement established a thirty year water 
sharing arrangement between India and Bangladesh. But Awami League‘s 
bitter opponent, BNP‘s Khalida Zia, has continued to oppose the agreement 
as unjust and terming it contrary to the interests of the country. 
Consequently, the issue still remains as a subject of conflict and a source for 
anti-India campaign by the right wing political parties and extremist groups. 
Moreover, the agreement on sharing the waters of the Ganges represents 
only one instance of the ability of India and Bangladesh to resolve a critical 
water issue. The two countries share 54 rivers. The failure to sign a deal on 
the Teesta River during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‘s visit to 
Bangladesh in September 2011 shows the power of domestic political 
compulsions to influence bilateral relations in the region. The Chief 
Minister of West Bengal Mamata Bannerjee of Trinamool Congress refused 
to accept the proposed deal to gain the support of regionalist lobby in the 
state. Unlike the chief ministers of Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya and 
Mizoram, who accompanied Prime Minister Sigh on his visit to 
Bangladesh, Mamta declined to join the delegation. As a result the deal, 
which had been worked out in a series of meetings between the Indian and 
Bangladeshi teams of experts, fell through. Seeking to allay the 
apprehensions of Bangladesh, the Government of Prime Minster Sigh 
assured Dhaka that his government was trying to build domestic political 
consensus to implement the deal on the Teesta River. 
However, during his visit in 2011, Prime Minster Singh announced a 
number of concessions to redress Bangladeshi grievances in the areas of 
trade and demarcation of more than 4000km long and highly porous land 
boundary. Ten agreements/Protocols/MoUs were signed by the two sides, 
including a framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development and 
Protocol to the Agreement concerning the demarcation of Land Boundary. 
With the objective of correcting gross imbalance in Indo-Bangladesh 
bilateral trade, the visiting Indian Prime Minister announced the decision to 
import 48 textile items from Bangladesh duty free. In a later move India 
extended this facility to all items except 25. It should be noted that the 
balance of Indo-Bangladesh bilateral trade is heavily in favour of India. In 
Financial year 2011-12, the volume of bilateral trade between India and 
Bangladesh amounted to $5.42 billion. Out of this, Indian exports to 
Bangladesh were worth $4.73 billion; whereas its imports from Bangladesh 
were of less than $498 million.   
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Domestic Political Compulsions 
Almost in all member countries of the SAARC, domestic political 
compulsions act as serious constraints on improvement of bilateral relations 
arresting the process of regional cooperation. We have already seen how 
these compulsions have worked in case of a move by the previous PPP-led 
government in Pakistan to grant MFN status to India. Defence of Pakistan 
Council (DPC) — a conglomerate of about 40 extremist and right wing 
political parties and groups, launched a nation-wide campaign against the 
decision of the previous government to grant MFN status to India. Although 
Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Ms. Firdous Ashiq 
Awan, while announcing in 2011 the decision of the federal cabinet to grant 
MFN status to India had claimed that the army was on board, reports in a 
section of the media revealed that the security establishment had cautioned 
the PPP-led government against taking hasty steps in promoting trade with 
India. The decision by the present government of Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif to defer the issue is solely motivated by the domestic political 
compulsions as Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, while declaring on August 12, 
2013 that the Government of Pakistan had no immediate plan to grant MFN 
status to India had also acknowledged that increased trade between Pakistan 
and India was beneficial for both as it will lead to increase in per capita 
income (in both countries), decrease in poverty and growth in GDP.
28
 
The history of Indo-Nepal relations since 1948 presents another 
example of how domestic political compulsions play their part in 
determining the course of bilateral cooperation despite historical links and 
geographical proximity, close cultural and social relations and ethnic ties. 
Speaking on the unique nature of Indo-Nepal relations, the Prime Minister 
of the Himalayan state, Baburam Bhattarai had once said: ―Nepal and India 
share a very unique relationship. Nepal is sandwiched between two states of 
India and China; but we are virtually India-locked as we have borders on 
three sides. Most of our socio-economic interactions take place with India. 
Two thirds of our annual trade is with India, while only ten per cent with 
China. Given the historic tilt towards India, our bilateral relationship is 
unique. When you have more interaction, you have more problems and 
more friction. At times there are misgivings and misunderstandings on 
various issues-some are genuine, while others are borne (sic) out of 
skepticism.‖29 
These misgivings and misunderstandings stem from the perception in 
Nepal that India has sought to expand its political influence in the 




 Baburam Bhattarai, ―A vision for Nepal-India relations,‖ Hindu (Delhi), October 
19, 2011. 
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landlocked country through unequal and unjust bilateral treaties concluded 
in 1950s at the cost of Nepali sovereignty. The treaties relate to friendly and 
peaceful relations (Treaty of Peace and Friendship-TPF), bilateral trade 
treaty (Treaty of Trade-TT) and transit facilities granted by India to Nepal. 
India regards these treaties as bedrock of Indo-Nepal relationship, whereas 
the dynamics of Indo-Nepal relationship changes with every change of 
government in Nepal. These treaties are considered as troublesome for 
Indo-Nepal relationship. Every regime in Nepal-from kings to Maoists-have 
sought revision of these treaties as governments in Nepal have had 
difficulty in accommodating the genuine interests and concerns of India. 
These interests and concerns relate to politics and security as Nepal forms a 
buffer zone between India and China. Any Nepali bid to cultivate close 
relationship with China such as the purchase of Chinese arms during the 
reign of King Mahindra was viewed with concern by India leading to a 
strained relationship between the two countries.  
It is interesting to note that in addition to the robust bilateral trade —
mostly comprising Indian exports of fuel, food, manufactured goods and 
consumer items to Nepal, India and Nepal have also taken notable steps to 
enhance bilateral connectivity through recently signed Rail Services 
Agreement (RSA) and Air Services Agreement (ASA). But the mistrust 
arising out of political considerations has prevented any move for tapping 
the vast hydro potential of Nepal. Nepal is estimated to have hydro power 
potential of 43000 MW, which is technically feasible and economically 
viable. However, as a statement by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs 
(MEA) says,‖ major projects have not taken off due to considerations 
outside the realm of economics.‖30 Instead of attaining self-sufficiency in 
power, Nepal is a net importer of electricity from India. 
Apart from India‘s relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, 
Indo-Sri Lanka relations are also affected by domestic political 
compulsions. In this case the issue of Tamils inhabiting the northern part of 
Sri Lanka has played a most prominent role. On the basis of ethnic affinity, 
the treatment meted out to the Tamils in Sri Lanka has always been an 
emotional issue in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu where protests 
and demonstrations have been held against the alleged human rights 
violations against the Tamil community by the Sri Lankan government of 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, following the elimination of LTTE in army 
operation in May 2009. Under pressure from the state government and 
violent public protests in Tamil Nadu, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
decided not to go to Colombo to attend the Commonwealth Heads of 
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 A statement by Ministry of External Affairs of India, 
www.mea.gov,in/Portal/Foreign Relations/Nepal-February 2012.pdf 
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Government Meeting (CHOGM) in mid-November and, instead, sent 
Foreign Minister Salman Khursheed to represent India. On the other hand, 
Sri Lanka has on a number of occasions in the past about six decades 
accused India of resorting to interference in its internal affairs on the Tamil 
issue. Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka had for long known to have received 
help from sympathetic elements in Tamil Nadu and set up training and 
recruitment bases in the state, which helped sustain the Tamil insurgency in 
Sri Lanka. During the regime of Rajiv Gandhi, India opposed Sri Lankan 
government‘s bids to seek extra-regional assistance for overcoming the 
Tamil insurgency, and pressurized President J. Jayaverdene to accept Indian 
Peace Keeping Force (IKP) to quell the insurgency in 1987.  
It is interesting to note that India is the largest trading partner of Sri 
Lanka and the two countries have a flourishing Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA), which, signed in 1996 raised the volume of their bilateral trade from 
$500 million in 2000 to $5 billion in 2012. In June this year, the two 
countries decided to double this volume of trade to $10 billion in the next 
three years. However, observers are of the opinion that political 
controversies with India are driving Sri Lanka to promote its strategic 
relationship with extra-regional powers such as China. Sri Lanka defeated 
LTTE with Chinese arms and in return Colombo has allowed the Chinese to 
acquire substantial amount of economic, trade and investment interests in 
Sri Lanka. The Chinese have got $ 4 billion worth of infrastructure 
investment in the country. What worries India is that most of the Chinese 
investment goes into the building of strategic infrastructure in strategically 
important Sri Lanka, which includes port terminals, airports and highways. 
A Chinese company owns 85 per cent shares in a $500 million investment 
in a Container Terminal in Colombo. There were 42 Chinese companies 
among 83 participating in the trade exhibition ―Reflections of Sri Lanka‖, 
held on the sidelines of the November 2013 Commonwealth leader‘s 




Sri Lanka has enjoyed strategic significance by virtue of being situated right 
in the middle of the Indian Ocean since the dawn of the European era in this 
part of the world towards the end of 15
th
 century. Every major power has 
thus been keen to get a foothold in this island state for the furtherance and 
protection of its strategic interests in the whole region comprising the 
Indian Ocean area, East Africa, Horn of Africa and Persian Gulf. Before the 
Second World War, the British enjoyed complete dominance over the 
Indian Ocean through a chain of military bases from Suez to Malacca 
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Straits, turning it into a ‗British Lake.‘ As a rising economic power, China 
is keen to establish its influence in this area to gain access to the markets 
and sources of energy and raw materials in Africa and the Middle East. The 
Chinese endeavours for promoting economic and trade relations with the 
countries of South Asia are part of this strategy. Apart from China, the US, 
Germany, EU, Russia and Japan are also keen to establish commercial and 
economic ties with the countries of South Asia. The United States enjoys a 
relationship of strategic partnership with India since 2006. There is a 
strategic dialogue process between Pakistan and the United States under 
which the two countries are cooperating with each other in various areas 
such as counter terrorism. The convergence of major powers on South Asia 
to benefit from its burgeoning consumer market and other economic 
opportunities resulting from GDP growth, as is evident from a bee line of 
states seeking Observer Status at SAARC summits, provide strong 
incentives for South Asian countries to shift their focus for trade and 
economic relations to other regions. Indian Look East policy and Pakistan‘s 
all out efforts to further expand its already deep defence, economic and 
investment ties with China can be understood in this context.  
 
Conclusion   
The trends towards  growth in the volume of bilateral trade and agreements 
to promote bilateral as well as regional connectivity among the countries of 
South Asia in the last decade, reflect, on the one hand, a reduced ability of 
political consideration to block economic interaction among the South 
Asian countries; on the other, Pakistan‘s hesitation in implementing its 
decision on MFN status to India and no to India‘s request to use the land 
route across its (Pakistan‘s) territory for trade with Afghanistan and 
countries of West and Central Asia, shows that economic relations among 
the SAARC countries still face serious political constraints. The countries 
of South Asia recognize the merits of economic cooperation and enhanced 
trade for not only alleviating poverty and raise the level of socio-economic 
development but also as an important instrument for removing the trust 
deficit among them. To a degree these steps have proved to be productive as 
increase in bilateral trade and opening up of new routes for travel have been 
welcomed by an overwhelming majority of people in these countries. But 
the movement towards regional cooperation under SAARC still remains 
slow-paced. An incident on the border, however insignificant it may be, is 
enough to cause sentiments to flare up on both sides of the border into calls 
for strong punitive action or even war. Even an event, which falls strictly 
within the domain of internal affairs of a country, can develop into a serious 
issue straining bilateral relations. It only means that the mistrust among the 
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countries of the region is much deep rooted. The nations of South Asia need 
to make concerted efforts to build mutual trust so that the process of 
regional cooperation can move forward.  






Implications of Bilateral and Sub-regional Trade 
Agreements on Economic Cooperation: 
A Case Study of SAARC in South Asia  
 
Syed Akhter Hussain Shah and Syed Tariq Shah 
 
Abstract 
The paper analyses the impact of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements amongst SAARC countries on their agreements 
with the developed countries. Multilateral agreements for 
economic development contribute to socio-economic 
development of individual states and enhance regional 
cooperation. Bilateral agreements for economic development 
may contribute to regional cooperation in the long but in the 
short run negatively affect a country which is less 
competitive, less informed, has a weak marketing system. In 
the long run most states may increase their capacity, 
strengthen marketing networks, improve competitiveness and 
improve trade by linking with comparative advantage, which 
may raise overall production, reduce inefficiencies and 
increase total trade thereby enhancing income levels, 
interdependence and regional harmony amongst member 
states. 
 
Introduction   
 
ith the increasing acceptability of the concept of globalization, the 
trend of developing relations at inter-state, intra-regional and 
inter-region levels has gained ground. States now belong to 
different regional, economic or military blocs.. This engagement is made 
through formal, informal understanding, memorandums of understanding, 
pacts and agreements etc. Understanding is reached on common interests 
and smaller interests are compromised for the sake of greater interests in 
line with their priorities. Locational and situational advantage of a state 
helps to improve her bargaining power. Internal and external factors such as 
the strength of congovernment based on popular support, financial stability, 
foreign policy, diplomatic relations, harmony in domestic and foreign 
policies, and degree of engagement with neighbouring countries. External 
W 
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environment defined by presence of strong influential powers in the area of 
concern, the prevailing political and diplomatic culture and, global trends 
affect the foreign policy choices of a state. 
For economic development most of the states are making alliances, 
forming regional and sub-regional groups. These groups devise common 
policies through agreements. At the global level economic agendas are 
pursued through the World Trade Organization (WTO). Many of the 
countries make their local, sub-regional and regional economic groups 
through separate agreements.  Many states enter into bilateral agreements. 
Regional or bilateral trading agreements (BTAs) have now become the 
dominant mode of international commerce, and their importance continues 
to grow (Bhagwati 2008).
1
 
Ample literature is available on the topic, however, limited work 
has been done on comparison of agreements of developed with developing 
countries in respect of opportunity cost to the states in their trade 
relationships with developed countries over and above that with developing 
countries. Some time it may substitute and at other complement. In order to 
understand opportunity cost comparison of FTA with developing countries 
is necessary. Developing countries after entering into agreement with 
developed states often abandon opportunities of trade agreements with their 
developing partners. This will be discussed here in the context of SAARC 
countries.   
The paper is organized in the following manner: section one covers the 
main features of FTA with developed countries, section two and three 
contain an overview of SAARC, the comparitive advantage of SAARC 
countries, effects of FTA investment., Section four and five discuss Sub-
regional and Bilateral Trading Relations and agreements. Sections six and 
seven discuss the opportunity cost of Intra-SAARC trade and issues and 
management of trade relationships of SAARC countries. Section eight 
discusses management of trade potential followed by the Conclusion. 
 
Main Features of FTAs between Developing and Developed 
Countries 
Trade relationships amongst developed and developing countries are more 
complex and multifaceted. The trade agreements are more than just trade 
and trade related matters. Haque (2009) states that after failure in a 
multilateral setting, industrialized countries became interested in developing 
regional and bilateral relations to further their agenda. He points out two 
advantages for developed countries: one, it may help to divide and weaken 
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 For details see Bhagwati, J. (2008). Termites in the Trading System. A Council of 
Foreign Relations Book, Oxford University Press, New York. 
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developing countries as a group within the WTO negotiations; and, two, 
individual countries could pursue and promote commercial relations driven 
more obviously by their national interests. Besides an industrial country 
(typically, the bigger, more powerful partner) may reward or punish 
countries on a selective basis.  The developed countries by utilizing their 
better bargaining position add indirect and non-trade elements in the 
agreements.  Regarding overt and covert aspects of  trade relations between 
developing and developed countries Khor (2008) states that  developed 
countries including US, EU and Japan attempt to achieve what is left in 
WTO etc., specially, market access in goo s, services in general, specific 
services sectors like financial and telecommunications, intellectual property 
rights; rules on the ―Singapore issues‖ or ―non-trade issues‖ pertaining to 
investment, government procurement, competition policy, labour standards, 
environment and food. He further states that 
2
 most of bilateral FTAs with 
developed countries (for example, the US, EU and Japan) now include 
investment chapters, which can incorporate the elements and ―standards‖ 
preferred by the developed countries. 
 
Scope and Definition 
The scope and definition of investment is broadened.  ―In US FTAs, the 
definition of foreign investment covers foreign direct investment (FDI), 
portfolio investments, credit, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and 
practically all sectors except security and defence‖.   He quotes the example 
of US-Singapore FTA in which; ―investment means every asset owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor, that has the characteristics 
of an investment. Forms that an investment may take include: (a) an 
enterprise;  (b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an 
enterprise; (c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; (d) 
futures, options, and other derivatives;(e) turnkey, construction, 
management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar 
contracts; (f) intellectual property rights; (g) licences, authorisations, 
permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to applicable domestic law; 
and (h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and 
related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and 
pledges.‖3….Which ―means that all these forms of investments (and the 
investors) will be subject to the rules on pre-establishment rights, market 
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 For details may see, KhorMartin (2008), Bilateral And Regional Free Trade 
Agreements:  Some Critical Elements And Development Implications. Third 
World Network. 
3
  Ibid. 
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access and national treatment, as well as funds transfer, expropriation and 
investor-to-state dispute.‖  
 
Non-discrimination and National Treatment Principles 
National treatment and MFN status would be given to foreign investors and 
investments.  National treatment means that the foreign investor would be 
given rights to be treated no less favourably than local investors (thus, the 
foreign investor can be given treatment better than or equal to but not less 
than the treatment accorded to the local investor). Any measures or 
preferential treatment to local investors over foreign investors leading to 




Ban on Performance Requirements 
Under this provision, the host state of investor would be prohibited from 
imposing performance requirements on the foreign investor or investment.  
For example, regulation on limits and conditions on equity, obligations for 
technology transfer, measures for using local materials and for increasing 




Rights of Funds Transfer 
Under this system the states are obliged to allow investor‘s funds mobility 
freely into and out of signatory country. 
 
Protection of Investors‟ Rights against Expropriation 
There are also strict standards of protection for foreign investors' rights, 
especially in relation to "expropriation" of property.  Expropriation is 
widely defined in the US FTA model as both direct and ―indirect 
expropriation‖. An ―indirect expropriation‖ includes the loss of goodwill 
and future revenue/profits of a company or an investor as a result of a 
government measure or policy.  If there is such an expropriation, the host 
state is liable to compensate the investor for such losses.
6
 Instances of such 















Under this system investors may be enabled to bring cases against the host 
state in the designated international courts, including the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. ―Granting pre-establishment 
rights to foreign investors and companies would be a radical departure from 
existing policy for many developing countries. Foreign investors will have 
‗national treatment‘, i.e. the right to be treated as well as or better than local 
investors.  This prevents governments from having positive policies that 
favour local investors and firms‖.7 
 
Effects of the FTA Investment and their Management 
The possible effects of FTA pertaining to investment and their management 
have been described by Khor (2008) as the following: 
 
a) May contribute to financial fragility due to the movement of 
funds into and out of the country, and to some types of 
financially distorting activities; may impact on the balance of 
payments (for instance increased imports and outflow of 
investment income, which have to be balanced by export 
earnings and new capital inflows; if the balance is not attained 
systematically, then alternate options are limited). 
b) Instances have been observed that in a quarter, the financial 
outflows remained higher than the inflows. 
c) May affect the competitiveness and viability of local enterprises. 
d) May affect the balance between local and foreign ownership and 
participation in the economy; and possibly affect the balance of 
ownership and participation among local communities. 
 
On the other hand foreign investment can make positive 
contributions, such as: 
     
(a) Use of modern technology and technological spillovers to 
industry of host country and local firms. 
(b) Global marketing network may be established. 
(c) Contribution to capital funds and export earnings may be made.  
(d) Increased employment of local people and national human 
resource. 
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For implementation of agreements‘ obligations, the host country 
may have to undertake a number of reforms and introduce new 
procedures. 
Recognizing the significance of the role of government procurement 
in socio-economic development and national policy, Khor (2008) is of the 
view that FTA would erode the positive role. 
 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
Member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) have entered into agreements for cooperation in economic 
development, trade, social, and cultural fields.  
Regional cooperation is affected by a number of factors including 
partner states‘ trade, culture and perception of the masses, commitment of 
leadership, institutional support and harmony. The role of external countries 
may affect the relationship of two partner countries with respect to the 
nature of their agreements, whether complementary or substitute. The 
complementary agreements increase trade relationship between external, 
internal and partner states. If complementary agreements are signed then 
these would contribute to convergence in regional cooperation. If these 
agreements are of the nature of substitutes then that may lead to divergence 
in regional cooperation. 
Any threats, to the agreements‘ prospects may affect the degree of 
convergence on or divergence from regional cooperation. Lag factors, 
opaqueness and multi-stages in the final outcome may also affect the 
reaction and perception of the states. Economic agreements give rise to 
immediate expectations, The mindset change for entering into agreements is 
also a significant factor. Sustainability of these agreements is also 
dependent on any change in the mindset. Historical relationships, 
perceptions, socio-cultural relationships also affect the prospects of 
reaching an agreement. Social capital may be an important factor for 
convergence of efforts and agreements for economic cooperation among 
different states in a region. 
 
An Overview of SAARC Trade  
Regarding comparative performance of SAARC countries, Jain and Singh  
(2009) state that trade flows within the SAARC region are not much 
significant, which is perhaps on account of the disparities in the market size 
of SAARC economies unlike other regional groupings. They quoted the 
example of Bhutan and Nepal which cannot be the major export 
destinations for India or Pakistan. In their view one cannot expect intra-
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SAARC trade, particularly of big SAARC countries with small SAARC 
economies, to be anything but modest. Haque (2009) states that 
8
 despite 
some progress made in recent years, economic integration and trade 
relations within South Asia are still weaker. He is of the view that exports 
to Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka are modest, with small improvement 
over the past few years. Taking the SAARC countries together, the sub 
region‘s importance for Pakistan has increased considerably, with around 
10 per cent share in exports. Intra-SAARC countries trade  is around 5 per 
cent whereas  intra- ASEAN trade is about 25 per cent and  intra- NAFTA 
trade is 43 per cent; the highest is intra-EU trade at 66 per cent  (Hartwick 
2008). Intermittent political tensions between India and Pakistan are also a 
retarding factor in intra-regional trade development.  For example SAFTA 




Analysing SAARC countries‘ exports based on six digit commodity 
data aggregated to 99 broad industry groups, Jain and Singh (2009) found 
that all SAARC countries have more or less a similar export basket which 
partly explains the low intra-SAARC trade as member countries tend to 
specialize in similar items for exports. However, the export and import 
composition of SAARC countries also shows that India and Pakistan‘s 
exports are notably complementary to the imports of some South Asian 
economies, specially of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Besides, other 
economies, demonstrate efficiency in only a small number of export areas, 





Comparative Advantage of SAARC Countries in Trade 
SAARC countries have trade potential based on their comparative 
advantage, which may be analysed by taking into account different 
parametres and variables. Besides, the member states are also taking 
different measures to reform and restructure their economies at individual 
levels. As far as comparative advantage of SAARC countries is concerned, 
Jain and Singh (2009) state that in 1995, SAARC countries, as a whole, had 
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 Irfan ul Haque , ―The Rise of Bilateralism in Trade and its Implications for 
Pakistan,‖ The Lahore Journal of Economics 14: SE (September 2009): pp. 111-
133  
9
  Ibid. 
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 For more details look at Jain Rajeev and J. B. Singh(2009), Trade Pattern in 
SAARC Countries: Emerging Trends and Issues, Reserve Bank of India 
Occasional Papers vol. 30,no.3, Winter.  
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comparative advantage only in a few Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) broad industry groups. In 1995, India had 
comparative advantage in five trade sectors. However, India has developed 
comparative advantage in 10 sectors over the years. In contrast, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh have lost their comparative advantage in some sectors over 
the same period. Out of 12 broad (SITC) Groups as classified by UNCTAD 
(though not mutually exclusive), India has comparative advantage in the 
highest number of sectors while Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have 
only 4, 3 and 7 sectors, respectively. 
11
 The study found that Pakistan and 
Bangladesh had revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index of more than 
one in agricultural raw material and food items respectively in 1995 but 
both witnessed a decline in RCA below one in 2006. Nepal has developed 
comparative advantage in a number of sectors such as food items, ores and 
metals, nonferrous metals, chemical products and iron and steel as the 
respective RCA indices were more than one in 2006. Jain and Singh (2009) 
found that None of the countries have comparative advantage in capital 
intensive and high value added products. For instance, no SAARC country 
has RCA greater than one in machinery and transport equipment. In 
contrast, all SAARC countries, except Maldives, have strong comparative 
advantage in the industry group of textile fibres, yarn, fabrics and clothing. 
In the overall manufactured goods sector, Bangladesh and Pakistan have 
comparative advantage with RCA index of 1.29 and 1.14, respectively, 
followed by Nepal and Sri Lanka with RCA index of 1.01 each. They state 
that India is behind in comparative advantage in the manufactured goods 
sector. India has improved its comparative advantage substantially in ‗iron 
and steel‘, ‗chemical products‘, ‗non-ferrous metals‘, ‗ores and metal‘ and 
‗agriculture raw material‘. 
The analysis of competitiveness indicators carried out by Jain and 
Singh (2009) based on the index of relative trade advantages (RTA) 
representing the difference between the index of relative export advantages 
(RXA) and the index of relative import advantages (RMP) shows that out of 
12 broad industry groups, India enjoys relative trade advantage in 9 industry 
groups while 
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Table 1: Revealed Comparative Advantage of Major SAARC 
Countries : 2006 
 





Bangladesh enjoys only in textile items and manufactured goods (which are 
not entirely mutually exclusive). Pakistan has relative trade advantage in 
textile, food items, manufactured goods and other manufactured goods. The 
study found that SAARC countries seem to compete with each other in 
textile sector as most of them have relative trade advantage in this sector. 
 
Sub Regional Agreement 
Sub-regional agreements are made among the states to get closer to each 
other in a specific group. A sub regional agreement signed among some 
SAARC countries is BIMSTEC. 
 
Bay of Bengal Initiatives on Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) 
This sub regional group was initiated by Thailand in 1994 with the 
participation of Bangladesh- India-Thailand-Sri Lanka involving contiguous 
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countries of South and South East Asia surrounding the Bay of Bengal. 
Raihan Selim and M. A. Razzaque (2007) state that it was formally 
launched as BIST-EC (Bangladesh India Sri Lanka Thailand Economic 
Cooperation) in June 1997 in Bangkok with the adoption of the Bangkok 
declaration. In a special ministerial meeting held in Bangkok on 22 
December 1997 Myanmar was accorded full membership of the group and 
renamed as BIMST-EC (Bangladesh India Myanmar Sri Lanka Thailand 
Economic Cooperation). At the ministerial meeting held in February 2004, 
Bhutan and Nepal were welcomed as new members. Subsequently, the 
Grouping was renamed as ―Bay of Bengal Initiatives on Multi-Sectoral 
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)
12
.  
The Economic ministers adopted a negative list approach for free trade 
area in the Region and established a Group of Experts for drafting the 
Framework Agreement of the BIMSTEC FTA in Colombo. This 
Framework Agreement on BIMSTEC FTA was adopted at the First 
BIMSTEC Summit in February 2004 and came into force on June 30, 2004. 
It provided an economic forum to reduce tariff, improve trade, economic 
growth, technological exchange and deal with other economic aspects 
among member states. Unlike SAFTA, this Agreement covers trade in 
service and investment in addition to trade in goods. However, the volume 
of trade is still smaller than envisaged. 
 
Bilateral Trading Relations and Agreements  
SAARC countries have also entered into bilateral trade relations parallel to 
regional and global trading agreements with other individual states within 
and out of the region.  Pakistan has entered into trade relations with Sri 
Lanka, Afghanistan, India etc. Through these trade relations a number of 
goods and commodities are traded amongst these neighbouring states. 
However, the degree of existing trade arrangements is below its potential 
level, which can be improved through advanced arrangements.  Through 
improved trade relations of India-Pakistan both the countries can increase 
their total volume of trade, reduce the cost of trading and make available a 
variety of goods to consumers of both the countries at relatively low prices. 
Technological transfers, labour mobility, skill transfers, input supply and 
outputs trade can also be increased.  
The FTA between Pakistan and Afghanistan helps in trading a 
number of goods. Being a landlocked country Afghanistan also uses the 
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Trade Area (SAFTA), Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs) in South Asia:  
Implications for the Bangladesh Economy. Paper prepared for the UNDP 
Regional Centre Colombo, January. 
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Pakistani route for trade with other countries. The trade agreement 
generates employment in transport, trading and commerce sectors, increases 
choices of consumers‘ goods etc. This relationship may be used for 
capitalization of regional energy trade with other states of the region, 
thereby increasing global competitiveness of the regional countries. 
However, this trade relationship also creates market distortions when thro 
imported goods are smuggled back to Pakistan and dumped in its numerous 
Bara markets.  
 
Issues in Trade Relationships of SAARC Countries  
A number of trade and non-trade related issues are hampering the 
performance of intra SAARC trade keeping it below its potential level. Jain 
and Singh (2009) describe among reasons the vast disparity in the size of 
the economies, while the World Bank points to  protectionist trade regimes 
that  discriminate against trade among larger neighbours; the continued 
conflict between India and Pakistan; and transport and trade facilitation 
constraints. Chaturvedi (2007) pointed out that the intra-regional trade has 
remained far below the potential in the absence of sufficient trade 
facilitation measures. A cause of low performance of trade agreements is 
stated by Baysan, Panagariya and Pitigala (2006) relating to bilateral Free 
Trade Agreement (FTAs)  and the SAFTA exclusion of major sectors in 
which countries have comparative advantage and imposing tariff quotas on 
many other sectors. Similarly, strict ‗rules of origin‘ further handicap the 
potential expansion of intra-regional trade on preferential basis in products 
that had large potential of trade. The follow-up agreements on concessions, 
dispute settlement, negotiation of a Rules of Origin Agreement would be 





Opportunity Cost of Low Intra-SAARC Trade  
This low performance of intra SAARC trade has huge opportunity costs, 
which directly and indirectly affect individual states, the region and 
individuals living in these states. The SAARC Secretary General puts the 
cost of opportunity lost due to non-cooperation among the South Asian 
nations at US$ 8 billion a year.
14
 A World Bank Study by Wilson and 
Otsuki (2006) suggests that by raising the capacity halfway of countries of 
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188  Seminar Book 
 
 
South Asia to East Asia‘s average, the intra-SAARC trade would rise by an 
estimated US$ 2.6 billion, approximately 60 per cent of the total 
intraregional trade in South Asia. Upgradation of the Services sector 
infrastructure, efficiency in air and maritime ports would significantly 
improve intra-regional trade gains. South Asia also has a stake in the 
success of efforts to promote capacity building outside its borders. 
Similarly, if South Asia and the rest of the world raised their levels of trade 
facilitation halfway to the East Asian average, the gains to the region would 
be an estimated US$ 36 billion. Out of these gains, about 87 per cent of the 
total gains to South Asia would be generated from South Asia‘s own efforts 




Management of Intra-SAARC Countries Bilateral and 
Multilateral Trade Potentials 
Intra SAARC countries trade agreements may enable the member states to 
get various direct and indirect returns through economic cooperation, social 
capital accumulation, labour mobility, technological and skill sharing. 
Member states may cooperate at different levels through bilateral and 
multilateral agreements. A number of trade and non-trade issues need 
solution through mutual recognition and cooperation. 
The states have to target capacity building in trade facilitation, 
reducing barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), lowering tariff rates of 
protection, strengthening co-ordination, and elimination of other non-tariff 
barriers reducing productivity and private sector growth. Macroeconomic 
policy stability of the region is also an important factor for the region‘s 
trade with the rest of the world, Jain and Singh (2009). Settlement of 
pending disputes concerning SAARC countries at the WTO through 
SAFTA would also help in taking collective stand on WTO related issues. 
Jain and Singh (2009) suggested addressing of economic and political 
issues for making SAFTA more fruitful to the region. The study viewed that 
as SAARC economies grow and economic complementarities begin to 
develop, all the countries of South Asia, specially the larger ones, would 
make significant progress. 
Reduction in the cost of trading across borders in South Asia is 
necessary as it is one of the highest in the world due to higher level of 
protection within the region than with the rest of the world. Jain and Singh 
2009) supplemented findings of Baysan, Panagariya and Pitigala (2006) 
which suggested that the region should avoid substituting intra-regional 
trade liberalisation for extra-regional liberalization. They think that if 
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countries in the region bring down the customs duties to five per cent, the 
impact of trade diversion will be considerably reduced. Procedural 
formalities in the region are still relatively cumbersome. It takes on average 
more than 33 days to export from South Asia compared to 12 days from 
OECD countries; and more than 46 days to import into South Asia 
compared to 14 days for OECD. The study   informed of numerous 
opportunities in the region for intra-SAARC trade growth through 
appropriate agreement for capitalization of potential of roads, rail, air, and 
shipping enabling seamless movement. Besides, South Asian region 
countries being net energy importers, may meet the growing energy 
requirements through energy trade between these countries, which is 
currently limited to cross-border energy trade amongst Bhutan, India and 
Nepal. Dhungel (2008) suggests utilization of the potential for energy trade  
between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh for integration of regional 
economies. Similarly, by devising an effective mechanism for facilitation of 
exporters, increased and frequent supply of inputs at a  low price  and better 
quality  from one state to the other, would enhance competitiveness of these 
states, and thereby of SAARC  at global level.  
Inter-state labour mobility, skill transfers, small scale and large scale 
technology transfers may be increased and consequently, global 
competitiveness of the region and of individual states may be raised.  
These agreements may have other implications on the states also: they 
may bring these states closer to each other, help reduction in tension, 
provide a forum to discuss issues of mutual interests and suggest 
appeasement policies for settlement of conflicts and promote socio cultural 
gains through grass root level interaction and accelerate building up of a 
social capital accumulation base etc.   
 
Conclusion 
Multilateral agreements relating to economic development contribute to 
socio-economic development of individual states, thereby promoting 
regional cooperation. Bilateral Agreements relating to economic 
development may contribute to regional cooperation in the long run but 
harm the less developed economies in the short term. In long run most of 
the states may increase their capacity, strengthen marketing networks, 
improve competitiveness and improve trade by linking with comparative 
advantage, which may raise overall production, reduce inefficiencies and 
increase total trade thereby enhancing income level, interdependence and 
regional harmony amongst the member states. 
Multilateral and bilateral trade agreements with developed countries 
should not be treated as substitute to trade agreements amongst SAARC 
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countries, however efforts should be made to converge on developing  
complementarity by diversifying trading baskets  in respect of both inputs 
and outputs for enhancement of global competitiveness.  
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Implementation of SAFTA: Bottlenecks 
 
Barkat-e-Khuda and Selim Raihan  
 
Abstract 
To strengthen economic integration within South Asia, the South 
Asian leaders in 2004 agreed to the setting up of the South Asian 
Free Trade Area (SAFTA) with the primary objective of 
eliminating barriers to trade, and thereby facilitating cross-border 
movement of goods among the member countries. 
The volume of trade among the South Asian countries has 
remained quite low, indicating that the SAFTA has not been able 
to bring in the desired results. This is due to various barriers: (i) 
issue of long sensitive lists, (ii) lack of connectivity and transit 
crisis,(iii) institutional constraints, (iv) proliferation of bi-lateral 
free trade agreements, (v) trading blocs with countries outside of 
the region, (vi) non-tariff and para-tariff barriers, (vii) exclusive 
focus on ―trade-in-goods‖, (viii) identical comparative advantage, 
(ix) fear of revenue loss, and (x) lack of trust. 
In order to remove the bottlenecks in the implementation of 
SAFTA, it is necessary that the following strategies are vigorously 
pursued. These include: (i) reducing the number of items in the 
sensitive list; (ii) eliminating tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff 
barriers; (iii) expanding market access; (iv) improving physical 
infrastructure; (v) trade liberalization; (vi) promoting joint ventures 
and foreign direct investment; (vii) promoting intra-industry trade; 
(viii) promoting trade in intermediate goods; (ix)involving private 
sector representatives in the negotiations; and (x) accelerating 




ince the concept of regional trade agreements (RTAs) was perceived 
during the Uruguay Round, several countries have created regional 
trading blocs to expand trade and investment among themselves. The 
growth of RTAs and Bilateral Trade Agreements (BTAs) has been quite 
phenomenal and unprecedented. The large majority of the WTO Members 
are party to one or more RTAs. Thus, along with liberalization of trade on 
MFN basis, countries are moving towards a faster pace of liberalization 
S 
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within the regional and bilateral trading agreements. The RTAs are WTO-
compatible as long as they promote deeper (compared to MFN) 
liberalization (CPD 2006). 
RTAs facilitate a friendly trading environment among a limited 
number of countries located geographically close to each other. Regional 
trade blocs have been established all over the world at an increasing trend, 
especially during the last two decades, partly due to failures of multilateral 
negotiations, especially at various ministerial meetings of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The economic reasons behind RTAs are to allow their 
regional members to benefit from economic cooperation and comparative 
advantages, to achieve economies of scale, and to become less dependent 
on necessary imports from more distant countries. To achieve such an 
economic integration within South Asia, Bangladesh proposed a regional 
cooperative body of South Asian leaders in 1980, leading to the 
establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) in 1985, the adoption of the SAARC Preferential Trading 
Arrangement (SAPTA) in 1993, and the agreement on the South Asian Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA) in 2004 (Abdin 2009)
1
. SAFTA includes all countries 
of South Asia — Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
SAFTA is more ambitious than SAPTA, with the provisions of its 
Trade Liberalization Programme scheduled to be fully implemented by 
2016. SAFTA has six core elements: trade liberalization programme, 
sensitive lists, rules of origin, non-tariff & para-tariff barriers, revenue 
compensation mechanism, and technical assistance for LDCs. Also, the 
Agreement allows for safeguard measures, and allows partial or full 
withdrawal of preference.  The objectives of SAFTA are to: (i) eliminate 
barriers to trade, and facilitate cross-border movement of goods; (ii) 
promote  conditions  of  fair  competition  and ensure  equitable  benefits,  
taking  into  account their  respective  levels  and  patterns  of  economic 
development; (iii) create effective mechanisms for the implementation and 
application of the agreement and the resolution of disputes; and (iv) 
establish a  framework  for  further  regional cooperation  to  expand  and  
enhance  mutual benefits (Jalil 2011). 
As per the Trade Liberalization Plan (TLP) of SAFTA, Pakistan and 
India will bring down their tariff to the level of 0-5 per cent by 2012, and 
Sri Lanka by 2013.The four South Asian LDCs, namely, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal, will reduce their tariffs to 0-5 per cent by 
2015. SAFTA is to eventually graduate into a full-fledged South Asian 
Economic Union (CPD 2006). 
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Intra-regional Trade in South Asia 
 
Since the primary objective of SAFTA is to encourage trade among the 
member countries, it would be useful to briefly review change in trading 
among the member countries, following the setting up of SAFTA.  
Intra-regional trade between South Asian countries has been low for 
decades. Before 1951, its share of the region‘s total trade was in double 
digits. By 1967, however, as South Asia became progressively more closed 
to the world market and political rivalry between India and Pakistan 
intensified, intra-regional trade dropped to a meagre 2 per cent of the total. 
It increased through the 1990s and by 2002 it had increased to over 4 per 
cent (Baysan et.al. 2006). It peaked at 6 per cent in 2004, and then, declined 
to 4 per cent in 2010, though this decline in intensity is attributable more to 
South Asia‘s increased trade with the rest of the world than to intra-regional 
declines. The region‘s outward trade may look healthy; however, its internal 
activity, compared to other regions such as NAFTA, ASEAN and EU, is 
quite low. 
In South Asia, the distribution of intra‐regional trade is highly 
imbalanced.  India is the largest exporter in South Asia, accounting for 65 
per cent of the intra‐regional export, while Bangladesh is the largest 
importer in South Asia, accounting for 26 per cent of total intraregional 
import in 2008 (Raihan 2011). 
All other South Asian countries, except Bhutan and Nepal, have their 
major export destinations outside of South Asia. Regional export constitutes 
less than 5 per cent of total exports from Bangladesh. The corresponding 
figure for India is just over 5 per cent. India is the major export destination 
for Nepal and Bhutan, with Bhutan‘s and Nepal‘s exports to India 
comprising almost 100 per cent and 71 per cent respectively of its total 
exports. Among the South Asian countries, trade is unequally distributed. 
Bangladesh trades very little with Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. India is the 
dominant source of imports for Bhutan and Nepal, and India is also one of 
the major sources of imports for Bangladesh. However, trade with India is 
largely one‐sided, with the volumes of imports from India to Bangladesh 
and Nepal being considerably large, although the volumes of exports from 
these countries to India are quite low (Raihan 2011). 
An important aspect of the South Asian intra‐regional trade is 
substantial informal border trade, which, in itself, is a barrier to boosting 
formal trade among the member countries. Some studies on the informal 
border trade among the South Asian countries pointed out that the informal 
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and illegal trade between India and Bangladesh, between India and Nepal, 
and between India and Sri Lanka could be as high as the recorded trade 
(Pohit and Taneja 2003; Taneja et.al. 2004;Das and Pohit 2006; World 
Bank 2006).  
 
Growth in the Services Sector  
Over the past three decades, Bangladesh, India and Nepal have experienced 
a persistent rise in the growth of the services sector, while Bhutan, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka experienced a rather fluctuating trend in the growth of their 
services sector. Compared to the 1980s, the average growth rate in services 
sectors increased by 78 per cent in Nepal during the 2000s. The 
corresponding growth rates for Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka are 64 per 
cent, 41 per cent and 23 per cent respectively. However, growth rates 
declined for Bhutan and Pakistan during the same period by 13 and 23 per 
cent respectively (Raihan 2013). 
Bangladesh, India, Maldives and Sri Lanka experienced consistent 
rises in the growth rates of services exports and imports over the last three 
decades, while some fluctuating growth rates were recorded in Nepal and 
Pakistan The impressive growth of services exports helped India achieve 
healthy surpluses in the services trade during the 2000s compared to deficits 
during 1980s and 1990s. High growth in services exports during the 2000s 
also helped Maldives to widen trade surpluses. However, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka experienced deterioration in balance of trade 
and services during 2000s (Raihan 2013). 
In terms of the contribution of the services trade to the total trade, 
South Asian countries had mixed experiences. Bangladesh, Nepal and 
Pakistan recorded declines in the share of services exports in their total 
exports during the 2000s compared to the 1980s. For Bangladesh and 
Pakistan, this has been largely due to much better export performances of 
the manufacturing sectors. In Nepal, the growth rate in services exports 
declined during the 2000s. India and Maldives experienced remarkable 
growth in their share of services exports in total exports during the 2000s 
due to their impressive growth performance of services exports during that 
period. In the case of share of services imports in total imports, Bangladesh, 
Maldives and Nepal experienced declines, while India, Pakistan and Sri 
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 Raihan and Angkur (2012) argued that deeper regional integration in services 
trade would provide huge welfare gains for the South Asian countries, since 
almost all of them were net importers of services. 
 




Ever since the SAFTA was launched nine years ago, there has not been any 
marked change in trade flows among the member countries. South Asia still 
remains the least integrated among the global regions. Here, the various 
barriers affecting increasing trade among the member countries are being 
briefly discussed.  
Historically, the member countries pursued import substituting 
development strategy with tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports. Gradual 
trade liberalization has, however, led to reduction in tariffs and elimination 
of non-tariff barriers in some cases. Nevertheless, the remaining tariff and 
non-tariff barriers especially, the non-tariff barriers, continue to be major 
impediments to trade. As a result of various trade restrictions, trade has not 
increased to the desired level among its members, because some tariff rates 
within SAFTA are higher than in any other RTAs and because of many 




The issue of Long Sensitive Lists 
Under the SAFTA arrangement, every member country preserves its right 
to protect its industry by imposing restrictions to imports of goods from 
other countries by including specified goods in their sensitive lists or 
negative lists. For example, major goods of Bangladesh that fall into the 
sensitive lists of other SAARC countries are woven garments, knitwear, 
leather goods and foot wear, ceramic products, jute and jute goods, tea, 
handicrafts, bicycles, pharmaceutical products, meat, vegetables, and ships. 
The serious implications these negative lists have on intra-SAARC trade is 
especially true in the case of South Asia‘s textile industries. 
According to Article 7(3) (a) of SAFTA, the tariff liberalization 
programme would not apply to the tariff lines included in the sensitive lists; 
and therefore, the benefits from the regional trade agreement have been 
restricted, especially for the least developed countries (LDCs) of the region. 
It is estimated that over half of the total import trade in SAARC 
countries has been subject to the negative lists of the respective countries, 
thereby seriously inhibiting intra-regional trade. Out of Bangladesh‘s top 50 
export items, 31 items are in India‘s sensitive list for SAFTA LDCs (Jalil 
2011). In January 2012, the member countries submitted their revised 
sensitive lists. India appears to have cut down its sensitive list drastically 
for the LDCs, paving the way for greater potentials of market access for the 
LDCs‘ exports in her market. However, concerns still remain on a number 
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of non-tariff barriers, related to SPS and TBT, which can significantly 
restrict the realization of such potentials.  
 
Poor Connectivity and Transit Crisis 
Land connectivity makes transportation of goods easier, quicker and 
cheaper. However, after over two decades of SAARC‘s establishment, it 
has not been able to create land connectivity in the region, thereby not being 
able to make efficient business transaction among the member countries. 
The condition of land ports is not up to the desired level. In addition, ports 
are plagued by labour problems, poor management, and lack of equipment. 
Regrettably, the SAARC countries are still not giving sufficient 
transit to each other. For example, India is giving only two hours transit to 
Bangladesh and Nepal through Bangla Banda land port, which is quite 
inadequate to meet the transportation demands between Bangladesh and 
Nepal. If, however, this was raised to at least eight hours, Bangladesh‘s 
export to Nepal can be increased three-fold compared to its present level.   
Due to poor connectivity and transit crisis in South Asia, costs of 
trading increases
4
. For example, transaction costs at the India-Bangladesh 
border are quite high due largely to infrastructure bottlenecks, both at the 
borders as well as within the countries. The lack of benefits of cheaper 
transportation would not encourage trade between and among the member 
countries.  
Poor trade logistics in South Asia, including Bangladesh, affect the 
cost of export and import very significantly (De, Raihan and Kathuria 
2012). The quality and performance of logistics services differ considerably 
between India and Bangladesh and also across their trading partners, 
because of differences in the quality and cost of infrastructure services and 
also because of differences in policies, procedures, and institutions. All 




Institutional constraints impede the prospects of gain from SAFTA. Such 
institutional constraints include procedural red tape, inadequate 
enforcement of contracts, complicated and inefficient visa system, poor 
definition and enforcement of rules of engagement, asymmetry in standards, 
delays in Customs clearance, delays at ports and border crossings, pilferage 
during transit, corruption, and highly restrictive protocols on the movement 
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of cargo. According to the World Bank (2012), the domestic logistics chain, 
including collection of products from producers, road haulage to the 
warehouse, containerization, haulage to the port, and customs at port, 
remains quite underdeveloped.  
There is strong evidence that improving the efficiency of Customs 
and administrative procedures and simplification of trade related 
documentation can facilitate trade between and among the countries. 
However, despite the improvements, trade facilitation indicators in South 
Asia remain substantially poorer than those achieved in other regions of the 
world (Raihan 2011). 
 
Bi-lateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
The existence of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) raises questions 
whether the member countries really want to make SAFTA effective. 
Several member states (India and Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, and 
India and Nepal) are doing business with each other under their separate 
FTAs.  
Moreover, SAFTA is silent about how it will integrate the bilateral 
and multilateral trade arrangements, which currently exist between some 
SAARC countries and between SAARC countries with countries outside 
the region. There are concerns that if the pace of tariff reduction is not 
accelerated, SAFTA may become irrelevant in light of other competing 
agreements. Also, with respect to ROO, there are discrepancies while 
comparing the SAFTA treaty with the India-Sri Lanka bilateral FTA 
agreement and also with the BIMSTEC Agreement (Raihan 2008). 
 
Trading Blocs with Countries Outside of the Region 
Most SAARC countries are now members of more than one RTA, including 
those which exclude some of the SAARC countries, as in the case of 
Pakistan in BIMSTEC. As a result, the excluded members in such RTAs 
experience competition from the non-SAFTA countries such as Thailand 
and Myanmar. This could lead to loss of preference in trading with some 
member countries (Razzaque 2008). 
 
Non-tariff and Para-tariff Barriers 
Non‐Tariff Barriers (NTBs) mostly have to do with standards, testing and 
certification procedures, licensing, classification of goods, custom 
valuation, countervailing duties. Also, the lack of trade facilitation is acting 
as an NTB (Raihan 2012). 
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India is by far the biggest source of imports for Bangladesh. 
Nevertheless, despite a growing huge and sustained trade deficit and despite 
the fact that India has provided a duty free market access to all LDCs under 
her Duty Free Trade Preference (DFTP) policies, non-tariff and para-tariff 
barriers far outweigh the benefits of tariff concessions. 
There are various products (plastic and melamine products, chemical 
products, toiletries, copper wire, betel nuts, raw jute, jute products and 
fertilizer which have significant export potential in the Indian market under 
SAFTA. However, a number of such products, i.e., plastic products, 
toiletries and betel nuts are included in the Indian SAFTA sensitive list, 
thereby making it almost impossible to expand exports of these products in 
the Indian market. Also, Bangladeshi exporters face a number of non-tariff 
and para-tariff barriers in the Indian market; however, SAFTA is silent on 
the removal of para-tariffs and NTBs (Raihan 2008). 
While tariff concessions have been offered by India to Bangladesh 
under SAFTA, greater benefit can be achieved by addressing non-tariff and 
para-tariff barriers in both countries (De, Raihan and Kathuria 2012).For 
example, the Indian Food Adulteration (Prevention) Act 1954 requires that 
the shelf life of processed foods from Bangladesh should be not less than 60 
percent of the original shelf life at the time of import. While this objective 
is fine, the process of determining shelf life is often arbitrary and non-
transparent. Also, to export textile and textile products to India, exporters 
must obtain a pre-shipment inspection certificate from a textile testing 
laboratory accredited to the National Accreditation Agency of the country 
of origin. Non-availability of the certificate requires testing from the 
notified agencies in India for each and every consignment. In some cases, 
even certificates issued by EU-accredited laboratories have been rejected by 
Indian customs authorities and such consignments are subject to repeat tests 
in India. Bangladesh also imposes several NTBs and supplementary duties 
on Indian exports. For example, Bangladesh has imposed over 60 per cent 
supplementary duty on import of plastics from India. Also, Bangladesh still 
maintains 225 items in its sensitive list in terms of trade with India, 
covering machinery, pharmaceuticals, textiles, etc.  
 
Exclusive Focus on “Trade in Goods”  
The existing SAFTA Treaty is predominantly centred on ―trade in goods‖. 
Under such an approach, Bangladesh cannot enhance its growth 
opportunities much by merely promoting exports of goods to the regional 
market. Bangladesh's exports to the South Asian region are quite small, and 
even a quadrupling of its intra-regional exports will not lead to any 
significant expansion in its total exports (Raihan 2012). 
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A major limitation of SAFTA is that it leaves out trade in services, 
thereby depriving member countries from benefitting from the services 
sector in the region.  Recognizing the importance of the services sector, the 
South Asian Agreement on Trade in Services (SATIS) was signed at the 
16th SAARC Summit in Thimpu in April 2010 with the objectives of 
promoting and enhancing trade in services among the Contracting States in 
a mutually beneficial and equitable manner by establishing a framework for 
liberalizing and promoting trade in services within the region in accordance 
with Article V of GATS. However, the member countries are yet to 
schedule their specific liberalization commitments under SATIS. 
 
Identical Comparative Advantage 
The member countries enjoy comparative advantage in similar products and 
in a narrow range of products (Hossain 2002; Hussain 2009). These 
countries import capital-intensive products and technology from the 
developed countries, and export a narrow range of labour-intensive products 
to such countries. Incidentally, exports from the member countries receive 
favourable treatment in developed countries in the form of GSP facilities or 
quota allocations. Hence, it becomes more attractive for the member 
countries to trade with the developed countries. In fact, some of the major 
export items of these countries directly compete with each other in 
developed country markets. For example, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka all export RMG. Likewise, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka export tea. The 
issue of comparative advantage largely explains the small volume of intra-
regional trade in South Asia (Hossain and Rahman2002).  
 
Fear of Loss of Revenue 
Intra-regional trade liberalization involves potential loss of revenue, which can 
discourage governments to liberalize. Since importing countries lose tariff revenue, 
it is argued that exporting countries should compensate the importing countries for 
the loss of revenue. This logic for compensation is, however, contested because 
loss of revenue resulting from trade liberalization under WTO is also not being 
compensated for. In the case of SAFTA, there is preferential treatment of imports 
from member countries, while in the case of WTO imports are treated on MFN 
basis. The case for compensation is stronger if trade involves trade diversion, which 
involves revenue redistribution benefitting the exporting countries. However, fear 
of potential revenue loss should not deter a country from liberalization. Each 
country should be able to find alternative sources of revenue other than customs 
revenue to recover the lost revenue such as from VAT and supplementary duty 
(Hossain and Rahman2002).   
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Lack of Trust 
The governments and businessmen in the SAARC region suffer from lack 
of trust. The lack of trust is largely due to: (i) the long period of British 
colonization which has divided sub-continental people in many aspects; (ii) 
animosity between the two large member states, India and Pakistan; and 
(iii) the way India is behaving like a ―big brother‖ and projecting its 
superiority complex at the negotiation table. The lack of trust, especially 
among the political leaderships in the member countries is a major deterrent 
in the way of boosting trade among the SAARC countries.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The volume of trade among the SAARC countries is quite low, with the 
major trading partners of the individual South Asian countries located in the 
West. Also, due to limited complementarities in the region, there would not 
be considerable expansion of intra‐regional trade, even under the SAFTA. 
In addition, SAFTA may lead to substantial trade diversion than trade 
creation for some of the member countries. Furthermore, SAFTA may work 
as a stumbling block to multilateral trade liberalization (Raihan 2012). 
However, given the 2008 global financial crisis and the challenges being 
faced by the developed countries, which resulted in a downward trend in 
exports from the developed countries in the context of a strong trade flow of 
developing countries, it can be expected that the South-South trade may be 
one of the best ways to avoid a more serious trade slump. Countries in the 
South will continue to have higher trade with South-South region. In this 
regard, India and Pakistan from South Asia and China from East Asia have 
added responsibilities to drive this momentum. 
The following strategies should be vigorously pursued to remove the 
barriers in implementation of SAFTA, and thereby, help boost trade among 
the member countries. 
 
Reduce the Number of Items in the Sensitive List 
Some of the major exportable products of South Asian countries are 
formally excluded from trade among the member countries due to long 
negative lists. If the goal is to have a free trade area within South Asia, 
every country should shorten its negative list as soon as possible, especially 
regarding those products which are of export interest to the SAARC 
member countries for trade within South Asia (Jalil 2011). Also, the 
shortening of the negative lists would reduce the cross-border smuggling of 
goods and the resultant loss of revenue for the governments in the region.  
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The SAFTA working group proposed reduction of tariffs on a number 
of products under the initial lists of sensitive goods during the second phase 
of tariff reduction from January 1, 2012. Except for Bhutan, all other 
countries have reduced the number of products on their sensitive lists. A 
concern, however, is that there is no format in the SAFTA Treaty for 
phasing out of the negative list over the years (Raihan 2008). Therefore, 
there is an urgent need to address this concern. 
 
Eliminate Tariff, Para-tariff and Non-tariff Barriers 
If SAARC countries want an effective regional free trade area, all tariffs 
and trade barriers should be identified and appropriate actions taken to 
remove them before the end of 2015. 
High tariff rates among the SAARC countries, indeed, higher than in 
any other region, are one of the major reasons behind the low intra‐regional 
trade in the region. Thus, reduction in the tariff barriers among the member 
countries is likely to have important implications in terms of improved 
market access of these countries in their neighbouring countries (Raihan 
2011).  
Non-tariff barriers can easily reduce the potential gains from tariff 
liberalization. Unless these barriers are removed simultaneously with the 
reduction of tariffs, the full gains from various phases of tariff reduction 
will not be achieved; and as a result, the objective of preferential tariffs will 
not be fully realized.  
NTBs in India and in some other South Asian countries are holding 
back the export potentials from those countries, including Bangladesh. This 
calls for mutual recognition agreements among respective organizations of 
the member countries, including Bangladesh, and its trading partners in the 
region, particularly India. Also, there is a need for harmonization of TBT 
and SPS measures. In addition, non-tariff measures and para‐tariff measures 
not notified in WTO should be prohibited (Raihan 2011). Therefore, each 
SAARC Summit should set a target to address particular NTBs, which the 
member countries must report on in the subsequent Summit. 
 
Expand Market Access  
The ESAS countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan) could benefit 
considerably from facilitating new market accesses, if SAFTA would be 
more effective. If SAFTA is implemented properly, India would be bound 
to offer transit to the other member countries, resulting in considerable 
increase in Bangladeshi exports to Nepal and Bhutan. Also, the Pakistani 
and Afghan markets would be more easily accessible for Bangladeshi 
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products. Furthermore, by establishing a deep seaport in Bangladesh, the 
country would earn considerable amount of revenue by providing transit to 
the regions and countries which are land-locked to the eastern and northern 
parts of Bangladesh (Abdin 2009).  
There is a need for economic corridor among the ESAS countries in 
the region. Reduction in tariffs, together with elimination of sensitive lists 
and improved trade facilitation, will enhance the market access of these 
countries (Raihan 2011). 
The ESAS countries may not be able to gain much within the existing 
‗trade in goods‘ based agreement. The possibility of a large trade diversion 
for Bangladesh, under the full implementation of existing SAFTA 
Agreement, is high. Bangladesh will have to considerably raise her export 
share into the regional market to derive gains through positive terms of 
trade effect. Export diversification in this regard is quite important. Also, 
Bangladesh should try to expand its export outlets outside the region such 
as the BIMSTEC, D-8, and the IOR-ARC, of which Bangladesh is a 
member; and seek to improve its trading relations with the ASEAN (Raihan 
2008).   
The Treaty should go beyond the mere Agreement in ‗trade in goods‘; 
and include regional co-operation mechanism in the areas of investment, 
finance, services trade, trade facilitation and technology transfer. This will 
help create an enabling environment to promote intra-regional investment 
by setting up a SAARC Investment Area through an intra-SAARC 
investment agreement (Raihan 2008). Also, it will raise prospects of LDCs, 
including Bangladesh, for getting larger investment inflows from the more 
developed member countries in the region to improve their export supply 
capabilities and boost exports, both inside and outside of the region, to 
derive the desired benefits from SAFTA. In addition, the Agreement should 
assign adequate importance in promoting services trade in the region. 
 
Improve Physical Infrastructure 
Improved infrastructure and growth through improved connectivity would 
allow South Asia to share its benefits more widely. The state of physical 
infrastructure in South Asia needs to be improved. There are two 
dimensions of poor infrastructure which need to be duly addressed: i) 
unavailability of a certain service or utility (e.g. telephone, water, 
electricity, roads and highways, etc.), and ii) unreliability of the services 
provided. 
Road, railway, river and sea transport need to be improved to 
facilitate the flow of goods in the region. For successful free trade 
agreement with any member country, developing infrastructure and transit 
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facilities for the region as a whole makes more sense. Provision of transit 
facilities through different countries linking different trade points is quite 
important. Transit through India linking Nepal and Bangladesh, transit 
through India linking Nepal and Pakistan, and transit through Bangladesh 
linking Eastern India with other parts of India and allowing Nepal and 
Eastern India access to Bangladesh‘s ports can facilitate trade in the region. 
There are clear economic gains from transit; however, political sensitivities 
act as deterrent to allow it. The problem can be redressed, if the political 
leadership in the member countries are made fully aware of the extent of 
economic gain by providing such transit facilities, without compromising 
security interests of the respective countries.  
 
Trade Liberalization 
The gains from trade facilitation in South Asia are much higher than the 
gains from mere reduction in tariff. Therefore, to make SAFTA effective, 
trade liberalization is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. A very 
high priority should be given to developing trade infrastructure facilities 
(hardware) and trade facilitation (software), including the necessary reforms 
in custom clearance. In addition, intra‐regional investment flow has a strong 
role for deepening the regional integration. Further, inflow of foreign 
investment has a favorable impact on exports and imports as well (Raihan 
2012). 
 
Promote Joint Ventures and Foreign Direct Investment 
Even if Eastern and Southern African (ESA) countries get free access to the 
regional market and all non-tariff barriers are removed, it is doubtful how far such 
countries would be able to penetrate the regional market without some other 
complementary policies. Until adequate and appropriate production capacity is 
developed, the ESAS countries cannot make much headway in the regional export 
market. This necessitates the flow of FDI and establishment of joint ventures whose 
products will be targeted to the regional market.  
The South Asian countries have opened most areas of the economy 
for foreign investment with a small list of reserve areas in each country. To 
attract FDI, the countries also offer an attractive package of incentives in 
the form of tax holidays, lower interest rates, repatriation of profits and 
dividends, concessionary rate of taxes on expatriates, income duty 
exemptions on capital goods imports, etc. Also, the countries provide 
protection of foreign investments through various agreements. Despite such 
incentives, FDI is quite low in South Asia due to less than expected 
economic returns, infrastructural deficits, and political stability. Therefore, 
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the governments in the South Asian countries should attach high priority to 
address the impediments to low FDI in South Asian countries. 
 
Promote Intra-industry Trade  
When countries possess similar comparative advantage as do other 
countries, there is not much scope for expanding export to the member 
countries through inter-industry specialization. However, a member country 
can expect to make headway through production of commodities with 
competitive advantage. There are two types of competitive advantage which 
firms can gain, (lower average costs and product differentiation). With 
competitive advantage, a member country can engage in intra-industry trade 
with other member countries, which is quite low at present (Hossain and 
Rahman2002). 
 
Promote Trade in Intermediate Goods  
A substantial part of international trade involves trade in intermediate goods. Trade 
in intermediate goods is based on both comparative and absolute advantage. The 
South Asian countries can engage in vertical specialization through production 
sharing arrangements. For example, in the textiles sector, cotton can be produced in 
one country, yarn and fabrics in another country, and garments in yet another 
country. Viewed from this perspective, the trade flows (both exports and imports) 
will be looked at more positively; and South Asia can bargain with the outside 
world as one entity because they all have stakes in the particular activity (Hossain 
and Rahman2002).  
 
Involve Private Sector Representatives in the Negotiations 
At present, all types of trade negotiations are taking place at the 
governmental level, both in the case of the WTO and the SAFTA. Business 
communities, the actual actors, are, by and large, left out. To be able to 
identify the problems more clearly and to solve them efficiently, business 
communities and private sector representatives, including apex business 
bodies (e.g. the Federation of SAARC, SAFTA Customs Union, 
Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry), should be included in all 
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Accelerate Implementation of all SAFTA Agreements 
While the treaty has come into force on January 1, 2006, there are various 
elements which are supposed to be fully implemented only by December 
31, 2015. Therefore, it is important that all SAFTA agreements are 
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Economic Cooperation among SAARC 





The initiative to form a regional cooperation in South 
Asia was very much welcomed in Europe right from 
its beginnings in the early 1980s. It was actively 
supported by European governments and especially by 
the European Commission. Europeans as well as non-
Europeans saw the European Communities (Coal and 
Steel, Economic, Atomic Energy) as a role model to 
overcome national rivalries and hostilities. Not to 
forget: Germany and France had fought three wars 
between 1870 and 1945; there had been territorial 
disputes since the 9
th
 century. So we were tempted to 
see parallels in South Asian and European histories 
and hoped, if not expected, that economic cooperation 
would yield less political tension in the region as well 
as economic and social uplift in all member states. As 
success lies in the eyes of the beholder, both co-
operations, in Europe as well as in South Asia, are 
seen as great achievements, but also blamed for their 
shortcomings. The author had the opportunity to 
discuss regional cooperation in Kathmandu (SAARC), 
Singapore (ASEAN), Teheran (ECO) and Brussels 
(EU). As an economist he asks whether regional 
cooperation brings out economic development or 
economic development leads to regional cooperation. 
Economic cooperation is also more than free trade, and 
— not to forget — has considerable security aspects 
that certainly played a role in the case of the European 
Community/Union. The question therefore also is, 
whether regional economic co-operations thrive best if 
backed by a strategic alliance. 
 





his conference is on ―Towards an Asian Century‖.  So then, what 
does Asian Century mean? Continents, like so many other territories, 
got their names by outsiders: The Greek called what is today western 
and central Turkey Mikra Asia, Asia minor in Latin. What lay beyond was 
Makra Asia, Asia major. Nobody knew how big Asia was. Beyond Asia 
was India, basically all lands beyond the Sindhu (Indus). For Americans 
today Asia is East Asia, maybe including Southeast Asia. In the Gulf 
countries Asia refers to the lands east of Iran. When we talk of competition 
from Asia, we usually mean China and sometimes also India, the largest 
emerging economies. But they are not attaining a new role in world 
economics. It is China and India that have been the leading economic 
powers in the world over most of the last 2,000 years, as Angus MADDISON 
(2006), the economic historian found out. According to his findings, most 
of the last twenty centuries have been Asian centuries, indeed.  
It is the role that the economic cooperation among South Asian states, 
the SAARC countries, play in, or rather on the way towards a new Asian 
century will play, that is in the focus of our international conference, 
organized by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) in 
collaboration with Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF). 
This paper has been prepared as a contribution to the panel dedicated 
to the impediments to economic cooperation in South Asia. After the panel 
discussed the political constraints, bilateral and sub-regional agreements, 
and SAFTA‘s bottlenecks, it is to give a EU perspective. However, since 
the European Union is still working on their SAARC policy, the author will 
also look into the role of regional co-operations and their economic, 
political and security aspects. 
 
What Telephone Number Does South Asia Have? 
Henry Kissinger, the former US foreign policy advisor and secretary of 
state, famously asked: ‗What telephone number does Europe have?‘ What 
he meant was that there was nobody to speak for Europe. Still there is 
discussion what mandate Lady Ashton, the foreign spokesperson for the 
European Union, really has. (LARIVÉ 2011). Since her mandate obviously is 
very limited, the powerful leaders around the world still would talk to 
national political heavyweights rather than to European bureaucrats. 
A similar question can be asked for South Asia: Is there anyone who 
can speak for the South Asian countries? The General Secretary of the 
South Asian Association for Regional Development (SAARC) in 
T 
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Kathmandu obviously has very limited powers. Article VIII of the Charter 
of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation of 1985 simply 
states: ‗There shall be a secretariat of the Association‘. Supreme body is the 
heads of state or government (article III). A Council of Ministers consisting 
of the foreign minister of the member states (article IV) formulate the 
policies, review the progress, decide on new areas of cooperation, establish 
additional mechanisms and decide on ‗other matters of general interest‘. At 
the same time the foreign ministers form a Standing Committee (article V) 
to monitor and coordinate programmes, approve projects and programmes, 
determine inter-sectoral priorities, mobilize resources, and identify new 
areas of cooperation. They are assisted by Technical Committees (article 
VI). There is an Action Committee (article VII) ‗comprising member states 
concerned with implementation of projects involving more but two but not 
all member states‘. The major caveats are the General Provisions (article 
X): ‗1. Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity.‘ and: 
‗2. Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the 
deliberations.‘ (SAARC 2013). 
The author had the opportunity to meet and talk to former general 
secretaries and staff at SAARC headquarters and outside. He found 
enthusiastic diplomats and specialists, but much less of an organizational 
infrastructure than expected. Besides the General Secretary there were one 
director and another senior diplomat from each member country plus some 
administrative and support staff, housed in a mid-sized bungalow that also 
contained a small library. In that respect it resembled very much the 
Economic Cooperation for Development (ECO) headquarters in Teheran 
that the author had visited earlier. SAARC does not have any 
representations inside or outside the member states; but there is a dozen or 
so of SAARC institutes set up in fields of common interest, like agriculture 
and forestry, spread over all member countries and acting to some extent as 
information centres on SAARC. Their main activities are training and 
exchange of knowledge in the various fields, hampered by the fact that the 
costs of the participants have to be borne to quite an extent by their home 
countries. Travel is eased by ‗SAARC visas‘ that allow a small group of 
specialists unrestricted travel within SAARC countries. 
Compared to the European Union, SAARC is a very modest venture, 
if one only thinks of the EU budget of Euro 134 billion planned for 2014. 
That is almost as much as Pakistan‘s gross national income (GNI) of one 
year. 
So how much attention has SAARC found by the European Union? 
Since 2005, SAARC welcomes outside observers. At present there are nine: 
Australia, China, European Union, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Mauritius, Myanmar, and the US. The EU became an observer in 2006. The 
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relations are cordial, but not very active. The official website of the EU 
dedicated to SAARC relations is only a few lines long ending with the 
message of 2006 ‗EU obtains SAARC Observer Status‘ (EC 2013). 
The EU Regional Programming for Asia 2007-2013 mentions 
SAARC briefly: ‗The EC will concentrate its assistance to the SAARC 
countries on regional capacity-building with a particular focus on three 
areas,‘ namely SAFTA trade development, sectoral dialogue facility and 
civil aviation. ‗The envisaged EU-SAARC cooperation will strengthen 
institutional capacity and mechanisms for implementation of the SAFTA 
agreement and apply relevant EU experience to help demonstrate the 
potential benefits of progress under SAFTA (MDG 8, target 12).‘ (EC 
2007: 14). 
SAARC so far has not been a partner for trade negotiations that are 
conducted by the individual South Asian governments. A new EU ‗free‘ 
trade agreement with India, for example has been discussed extensively 
since 2007 and might be concluded in 2014. It has aroused suspicion and 
resistance in the EU and India as well, mainly among civil society, but also 
among groups with vested interests like the farm lobby on both sides.  
The Asian Development Bank runs a web-page on ‗Pakistan-
European Union Free Trade Agreement‘, but actually only refers to some 
press reports. (ADB 2013). In April 2013, the EU Ambassador designate 
reported that Pakistan would get the Generalized Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP) plus by the end of the year.
1
It would give Pakistan a better access to 
the markets of the EU, its largest trading partner with an annual trade 
volume of Euro 10 billion. (EC 2012). 
Bangladesh as a Least Developed Country (LDC) enjoys ‗the most 
favourable regime available under EU‘s Generalized Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP), namely the Everything But Arms (EBA) arrangement. EBA grants 
... duty free quota, free access to the EU for exports of all products, except 
arms and ammunition.‘ (ECDGT 2013). 
                                                          
1. For the European Union GSP nomenclature: ‗There are three main variants 
(arrangements) of the scheme: the standard GSP scheme, which offers generous 
tariff reductions to developing countries. Practically, this means partial or entire 
removal of tariffs on two thirds of all product categories. The "GSP+" enhanced 
preferences means full removal of tariffs on essentially the same product 
categories as those covered by the general arrangement. These are granted to 
countries which ratify and implement international conventions relating to 
human and labour rights, environment and good governance; "Everything but 
Arms" (EBA) scheme for least developed countries (LDCs), which grants duty-
free quota-free access to all products, except for arms and ammunitions.‘ (EU 
2013) 
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As can be seen, the all-important trade agreements are concluded 
bilaterally between the European Union and South Asian governments, but 
not with SAARC. In the light of these obvious limitations, SAARC so far 
has not been more than a platform for multilateral dialogue among the 
member countries. It is not, at least for the time being, a partner for trade 
negotiations between Europe and South Asia. However, there is hope in the 
member countries of SAARC and in Brussels that SAARC one day would 
have the mandate to negotiate trade and other agreements on behalf of the 
member countries. The next section, therefore, is dedicated to the 
economics of regional trade agreements, usually the first step towards 
regional economic cooperation. 
 
On the Economics of Regional Trade Agreements 
Regional trade agreements are a typical second best solution of international 
trade. The economics of trade, or the ‗gains from trade‘ as they are called in 
economic text books, are threefold:  
 
1. Lower production costs, 
2. A greater variety of products and 
3. Better quality of products. 
Lower production costs are the result of scale effects: The larger the 
quantity of (identical) goods produced, the lower the average production 
costs, as fixed costs can be spread over a larger number of products. This 
effect is commonly known as economies of scale. Such economies are not 
unlimited, because there are also diseconomies of scale, since the costs of 
information and control are usually low in small firms, but can be 
substantial in large ones. Reaction time is also shorter in small ones. Hence, 
the success of highly specialized, medium sized and family-owned 
undertakings in Germany, known as Mittelstand. Smaller countries opening 
their borders benefit more from economies of scale than larger ones. The 
success of the first Asian ‗tiger‘ economies would not have been possible if 
they had not been granted access to captive international markets, especially 
in the US. The rise of computer firms like Acer and Asus from Taiwan 
would have been much slower, if rising at all, without having access to the 
US market. 
Lowering of trade barriers creates larger markets, which allow a 
greater variety of products: For example, Germany exports cars to France, 
and France exports cars to Germany; they might be similar, but they are not 
identical and obviously people are ready to pay a premium for products of 
their liking and choice. Most of global trade is among the industrialized 
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countries and they exchange a lot of similar goods. Medium and larger 
economies benefit most from this effect. If we look again at the automobile 
industry, we find that medium sized markets provide economies of scale, 
but only for a limited range of products. This could be observed in the 
former ‗socialist‘ countries. Once their borders were opened, people 
decided for imported goods, because of their greater variety, even at higher 
costs. 
The limitation of production to a small range of products creates 
monopolies that are prone to inefficiencies, irrespective of whether the 
monopoly is enjoyed by a public or a private enterprise. In the case of a 
public enterprise we would talk of state failure, and in the case of a private 
enterprise of market failure. Typical inefficiencies of the first type are 
inflated production costs due to overstaffing and corruption, and of the 
second type due to artificial scarcity (smaller quantities) and monopolistic 
(higher) price settings. In both cases quality can be compromised. It is 
competition that usually not only results in lower prices, but also in better 
quality. Once alternatives are available, producers are forced to improve 
quality, if they do not want to lose their customers. 
In principle, thus, free trade and international competition should be a 
win-win game. Then, why has there been so much resistance to opening up 
the markets? A first argument would be the dynamic effects: Economies 
have developed under a highly complex system of trade restrictions and it 
would be impossible to change this set up overnight. A second and third 
argument would be politics and poor economics. As BHAGWATI and 
PANAGARIYA (2001) have found out, trade is most restricted between poor 
(economically less developed) neighbouring countries in South Asia and 
Africa. Politics forbids trade concessions that are seen as undue favours to a 
disliked neighbour, while the perception of the global economy as a zero-
sum game is hurting the own country, may be even more, than the 
neighbouring trading partner. The present set-up of tariff and non-tariff 
trade restrictions, unfortunately, cannot easily be undone. There simply is 
no reset button for trade regulation. Changing a system also creates winners 
and losers. A simple example from South Asia, i.e. that of the onion prices, 
will illustrate the problem, 
 
The Tale of the Onion Price and the Housewife 
From time to time consumers in India and Pakistan complain about a 
sudden rise in the price of onions and demand a ban on the export of this 
commodity. This happens, if export of onions is allowed and the world 
market price of onions suddenly rises. In a typical open ‗small‘ economy, 
that is in an economy with open borders and an inconsiderable (small) share 
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of the world market, prices are determined by the world market: If the 
world market price rises, so does the domestic price, since there would be 
no incentive to sell at a lower price at home, if a higher price can be 
realized abroad. For the housewife, who does the shopping and cooking, a 
rise in the price of onions means a reduction of her real income. It also 
restricts her ability to cook a tasteful meal, since onions are a less expensive 
and affordable way to give simple food some taste. If the price of an item 
rises, the normal reaction would be to substitute it, at least partly, with a 
cheaper item. In the case of onions, however, there is no such cheaper 
substitute, economists would say: inferior substitute and the housewife will 
be hit by the full force of the onion price increase. Hence, with her sound 
understanding of economics, she will ask for a ban on export of onions. If 
onions no longer could be exported, demand would be restricted to the 
domestic demand. Fewer onions altogether would be in demand on the 
domestic market and as a result, the onion price would fall to its original 
level. 
A student of economics, however, might be tempted to argue 
otherwise: He has learnt that international trade is a win-win game: Onions 
would only be exported, if the benefits of foreign exchange earnings from 
the export of onions would he higher than the (social) loss from the reduced 
availability of onions for cooking. Economists call this an increase in 
welfare: With the benefits from onion export larger than the costs (i.e. of 
not having them anymore) total income (GNI) and the income per head 
would increase. Unfortunately, the housewife is the one that does not 
benefit, at least not directly, from a larger national welfare, while the 
producers, traders and exporters of onions, and may be also the state (via an 
export tax), do. Theoretically, the state could plough back some of the gains 
to the housewife in the form of income subsidy or employment, but usually 
she would have nothing of it, especially not immediately. In other words: 
The state could compensate the consumer for the loss of the exported 
onions with part of the gains from trade. Such compensation would be 
necessary, because adjustment of the economy that works so well in 
economic textbooks, does work less well in reality, as adjustment and 
restructuring of the economy takes time. In the longer run, more onions 
would be grown, while their production costs would sink (because of the 
economies of scale). But that does not solve the problem of the housewife. 
Unfortunately, it is much easier to destroy an industry than to (re-
)build it. Therefore, the resistance in any country against trade 
liberalization. Surprisingly, in industrial countries it is especially strong in 
the agricultural sector; the United States, Japan and France are examples. 
The major exception is Britain that as a colonial power decided to let in 
cheap food in order to keep costs of living and industrial wages low and, 
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thus, enhance Britain‘s competitiveness. This played an important role 
when the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community, 
because it meant that the import of food items from the Commonwealth 
became liable to the intricate system of European import tariffs. It also 
explains why Britain was partly exempted from paying for the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Without going into detail, it is important to see, that 
free — or freer — trade is not so much a matter of principle and conviction, 
but of balancing the interests of the various stakeholders, especially if these 
are politically influential (like the farm lobby in the US Congress).  
Summing up: The housewife and the student are both right: She is 
losing real income and therefore asks for a ban on exports, while the student 
only sees the gains from trade. But gains from trade for the economy do not 
automatically mean gains for everybody. There are winners and losers in 
the process of liberalizing exports and imports, and usually the potential 
losers are better organized (because smaller in number with higher 
individual effects) than the potential winners (the rest of the populace with 
often marginal individual effects). In a democracy consumers are the 
electorate and any democratic government is well advised not to infuriate 
their housewives, and there are cases, where governments were toppled 
over the question of onion prices. (The Hindu 2010). In Pakistan, I observed 
a number of cases, where even the export of items like eggs had been 
banned from being ‗exported‘ (transported) from one district to another in 
order to keep prices down. Interestingly, the legal basis for similar actions 
still is section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 that certainly 
was not passed into law to limit trade between districts. (Express Tribune 
2011). 
The classical textbook case of the devastating effect of preferring free 
trade over consumers‘ interests would be the Great Irish Potato Famine of 
the 1840s, when a ban on export of food grains from Ireland would have 
helped to lower the price of food there and save many Irish lives. Free trade 
between Ireland and England, then, was upheld in order ‗not to disturb the 
markets‘. In the 1940s, it was just the opposite: The decision of the Indian 
surplus provinces to restrict the export of food grains to the deficit 
provinces added to the food problems of Bengal and led to the Great 
Famine of 1943.  
What does this mean for SAARC? SAARC is unusual in that the 
Association comprises economies of very different sizes: The largest, India, 
has four thousand times as many inhabitants than the smallest, i.e. the 
Maldives. The size of the economies of the smaller seven members put 
together would be only a fraction of that of India. Until Afghanistan joined 
the SAARC, no member shared a border with another member, except 
India. In any case, the size of the smaller trading partners determines the 
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volume of trade. We therefore have to be careful discussing indexes of 
openness (usually simply the sum of exports and imports in relation to 
GDP): Large countries appear to be surprisingly less open.
2
 The USA and 
Japan would be good examples. 
The South Asian countries, however, all rank at the bottom of the 
Open Markets Index (OMI)
3
 of 2011, with India at position 66 of 75, 
Pakistan at 70, Sri Lanka at 72 and Bangladesh at 75. (ICC 2011: 17). This 
compound index, put together by the international Chamber of Commerce, 
reflects openness well. It is evident, that South Asian countries have been 
protecting their markets to quite an extent, albeit in different ways. 
The gains of liberalizing the South Asian market are not easy to make 
out: India would have the least to fear, because her domestic market is big 
enough to realize considerable economies of scale for most products. An 
even larger market would, of course, allow even further cost reductions and, 
thus, would be very welcome, indeed. Pakistan as the second biggest 
economy would have to fear more, since some of the existing industries 
would have difficulties to withstand Indian competition. Small economies 
for very practical reasons tend to be open, and have less reason to fear the 
lifting of trade restrictions. 
In Europe, Luxemburg, the smallest of the original six members of 
the European Economic Community (EEC), is by far the richest one (per 
head), thanks to its leading role in financial services. The same holds true 
for South Asia, where the smaller countries are also the richer ones, with 
the Maldives, Bhutan and Sri Lanka reporting the highest GNI per capita. It 





Regional Collaboration - A Quick Overview 
World-wide there have been more than 200 regional cooperations, but most 
of them never became too active. They all have their own distinct historical 
background and other peculiarities. I shall briefly discuss some of the better 
known ones. Until the recent problems of the Euro zone, the European 
                                                          
2 
It is a statistical effect: Globally the sum of exports equals the sum of imports. The 
share of trade then is smaller in proportion to the GDP of big economies as 
compared to small  ones. 
3
 The Open Market Index has been constructed on the basis of 14 indicators in four 
different areas: openness to trade (4), trade policy (4), international capital flows 
(4), infrastructure for trade (2). Scores ranging from 1 to 6 were derived on the 
basis of statistics and expert opinion. For details sees. Open Markets Index 
2011.(ICC 2011). 
4
 The other two small countries, i.e. Cambodia and Laos do not enjoy that position, 
but they were held back by political reasons and joined ASEAN only late. 
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Union (EU) was regarded as an outright success. The Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) also earned much praise. Closer to home is the Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO): Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is a member 
of ECO as well as of SAARC. As long as the Soviet Union existed, there 
was also the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), a 
kind of common market for the Soviet Bloc. 
The EU, COMECON, ECO and ASEAN came up during and 
because, although not exclusively, of the Cold War. After World War II the 
United States came out as the only super power. In 1949, their hegemony 
was broken by the Soviet Union, when it successfully tested its first nuclear 
bomb. By that time, the Soviet Union had already established their reign in 
Eastern Europe, had tried to establish themselves in Iran and threatened to 
dominate Southeast Asia. In March 1947 the US President told US 
Congress: ‗It must be the policy of the United States to support free people 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures.‘ (Truman Doctrine 2003: 194). The Truman Doctrine, as it 
became known, is commonly taken as the beginning of the Cold War. It 
was also the beginning of the battle of the systems, i.e. the western, 
capitalist, democratic one in the West versus the eastern, centrally planned 
socialist/communist one in the East. After the War, Germany had been 
divided into four zones under military administration of the four powers 
(USA, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France). Fearing social unrest and 
political radicalization, the western powers decided to end economic 
discrimination in their three zones in Germany; in 1948 the German Mark 
was devalued and substituted by a new Deutsche Mark (DM), bound to the 
US-Dollar. In 1949 the Federal Republic was founded, albeit still under the 
control of the Western powers. In 1955, the Federal Republic became 
independent and in 1957 it signed the Treaty of Rome. The European 
Economic Community came to life in January 1958. The final aim was a 
customs union and the creation of a single, common market. 
 
Trade Regulation and the Burden of History 
 
A customs union in principle means unhindered trade among the member 
countries and a uniform system of trade protection at the outer borders. 
European governments had been interfering in their national markets on a 
large scale since the 19
th
 century (e.g. the British Corn Laws of 1815, 
repealed in 1846) and even more in reaction to World War I (1914-1918), 
the Great Depression (1930s) and World War II (1939-1945). Their various 
policies had to be ‗harmonized‘. This especially applied to their agricultural 
policies. Peasants in all the six original member countries of the EEC 
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enjoyed a wide variety of direct and indirect subsidies and other incentives 
in order to stimulate production and to support agricultural incomes. Not to 
forget that, all Europe suffered a shortage of food during and after the 
World Wars; food was rationed in some countries well into the 1950s. 
(Rationing 2013)
5
 A considerable segment of the population worked in 
agriculture and lived in rural areas; their income support had been part of 
the policies to ease their income problems during the Great Depression. 
Since many of them were part time farmers, support came in the form of 
price as well as income support. In order to create a level playing field for 
trade in agricultural commodities and agro-based processed goods, such 
incentives had to be brought to a uniform level. Because of the considerable 
voting power of the ‗green front‘, i.e. the rural/agricultural voters, 
especially in France, it was agreed to fix the common agricultural prices on 
the basis of the highest national, i.e. German, level of support for all 
European Community. For the next half century, agriculture absorbed more 
than half of all funds of the European Community, in the beginning even 
more. French farmers became the main beneficiaries of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, and German industry of the Common Market. This is 
just one example to show, how far reaching consequences can be, if a 
common market is to be created. It certainly is more than just having a 
uniform customs tariff. 
When the Berlin Wall came down, the prospect of a united Germany 
was not welcome everywhere. The European Community by that time had 
been extended in a series of enlargements; the most important was the 
North Enlargement of 1972 that included the United Kingdom. Great 
Britain had been invited earlier, but declined to become a member, and as 
we know, there are still reservations in the United Kingdom against an EU 
membership. In order to prevent Germany from becoming too powerful and 
independent, it was tied in by creating the European Union and the Euro as 
a common currency (although Britain, Denmark, Sweden and some new 
members stayed outside the European Monetary Union). Most Germans 
would have preferred to retain their strong Mark, but there was no serious 
resistance to the introduction of the Euro. The Euro, therefore has been 
primarily a political, not an economic project. 
 
The Military Past 
There is a discussion whether the European Community was a civilian 
outcrop of NATO, a military alliance. 
                                                          
5
 Cheese and meats came off rations in Britain only in 1954. (Rationing 2013) 
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 
1949 with headquarter in Washington, D.C. It was moved to Paris in 1952 
and to Brussels in 1967 after France had demanded the removal of NATO 
troops from the French soil in order to underline French sovereignty. The 
movement for a united Europe, however, was older than NATO. Indeed, 
there had been initiatives for a better French-German understanding already 
in the 1920s (Aristide Brian, Gustav Stresemann and others). However, 
given the fact that Germany came out of World War II as the pariah of 
Europe, it is hard to imagine that Germany would have been welcome as a 
full member of a European Community so soon after the war, without the 
East-West confrontation. Not to forget that the Communist parties in France 
and in Italy were quite strong and there were fears of a ‗domino effect‘ in 
Europe as well in the late 1940s and early 1950. 
There had been various attempts at setting up a European defence 
cooperation: The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was an agreement signed by 
Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, creating a 
collective defence alliance. (EB-BT 2013). It led to the formation of NATO 
and the Western European Union (WEU). The European Defence 
Community (EDC) was ‗an abortive attempt by western European powers, 
with United States‘ support, to counterbalance the overwhelming 
conventional military ascendancy of the Soviet Union in Europe by the 
formation of a supranational European army and, in the process, to subsume 
West German forces into a European force, avoiding the tendentious 
problem of West German rearmament. The idea was originally mooted at 
the Hague Conference of 1948.‘ (EB-EDC 2013). A treaty was concluded 
in Paris in 1952, but not sanctioned by the French parliament. ‗For the first 
time the divergent interests, especially in French politics, became evident, 
who want to see Germany tied in supranational structures and at the same 
time not want to have cut down their own sovereignty.‘6 In its place arose 
the Western European Unity Treaty, setting up the Western European 
Union (1955-2011) of ten countries (including France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom). It ‗operated as a forum for the coordination of matters of 
European security and defence.‘ (EB-WEU 2013). 
The concept of ‗containment‘ required a ring of regional alliances 
around the Eastern Bloc. NATO extended into Southwest Asia when 
Turkey joined NATO in 1952. In 1955 the Kingdom of Iraq, the Republic 
of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Pakistan, and the 
Kingdom of Iran entered into a military alliance that became known as the 
Baghdad Pact, renamed Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) after Iraq 
pulled out of the pact in 1959. As KECHICHIAN observed, CENTO ‗failed to 
                                                          
6
. Own translation from the German original (EVG 2013). 
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meet the real security needs of its members. In September 1965, for 
example, Pakistan invoked the treaty in connection with its war with India. 
Persia and Turkey gave verbal support, whereas Britain and the United 
States opted for neutrality ... Because of such failures, CENTO turned its 
attention more to economic development and technical cooperation issues.‘ 
(KECHICHIAN 2011). In 1964, the Regional Cooperation for Development 
(RCD) had been founded by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. There were 
ambitious plans (like a RCD highway), but not much to show. Once Iran 
had left CENTO and RCD after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, both 
organizations were dissolved in the same year. 
RCD re-emerged as Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), ‗an 
intergovernmental regional organization established in 1985 by Iran, 
Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of promoting economic, technical and 
cultural cooperation among the Member States.‘ (ECO 2013). After the 
break-up of the Soviet Union the newly independent former Soviet 
republics Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan along with Afghanistan sought the membership of ECO and 
were admitted into the organization in 1992. Contrary to RCD, ECO was 
not backed by any military alliance. What they have in common is their 
location in Central or West Asia and their religion, as they are all inhabited 
predominantly by Muslims. Politically and militarily they follow their own 
courses. When the author visited the modest headquarter in Teheran, it 
turned out that ECO provides a forum for regional talks, but there was no 
signature project that would not have been possible otherwise.  There had 
been a trial run of a train from Almaty via Tashkent and Tehran to Istanbul 
in 2002. Due to different gauges and train lengths through trains turned out 
to be impossible; however, there is a weekly container service that requires 
trans-shipments at the border(s). (TSR 2013). 
In South Asia, there always had been a gap in the ring of 
containment. Neither Afghanistan nor India or Myanmar were ready to join 
any of the western defence alliances. South Asia, or India as it was called 
then, had been united by the British and was partitioned when the colonial 
power went in 1947. Relations of the successor states, the Republic of India 
and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, have been strained ever since. In 1971 
the former eastern ‗wing‘ East Pakistan gained independence as 
Bangladesh. This explains why the South Asian countries at times thought 
of joining any of the other regional associations in southern Asia like RCD 
and ECO in the west and ASEAN in the east.  
Since progress in Indo-Pakistan relations was not to be expected, 
BIMSTEC was founded in 1997, basically a SAARC minus Pakistan and 
plus Myanmar and Thailand: ‗BIMSTEC originally stood for Bangladesh, 
India, Sri Lanka and Thailand Technical and Economic Cooperation. After 
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Myanmar joined the group later in 1997, and Bhutan and Nepal in 2004, the 
name was changed to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral 
Technical and Economic Cooperation.‘ (Bhaskar 2006). 
Other than South Asia that was ruled by just one colonial power, 
Southeast Asia comprised British, French and Dutch colonies and 
independent Siam (now: Thailand). When the Japanese conquered 
Southeast Asia, they were first welcome as liberators in most countries. It 
soon turned out that the new masters were not better than the old ones. The 
former colonial powers made all kinds of promises to the people of 
Southeast Asia in order to get their support to drive out the Japanese. When 
the colonial powers tried to take repossession of their lost colonies after the 
War, they were met by independent movements, some of them left leaning, 
with insurgencies especially in Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Malaya. The 
USA came to the aid of the French in Indochina and led a brutal undeclared 
war in Laos and Cambodia. After the ‗loss‘ of China in 1949 and the defeat 
of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, President Eisenhower had 
expressed his concerns that countries might fall following the ‗domino 
principle‘. (EISENHOWER 1954). By 1958, when Lederer and Burdick‘s 
‗The Ugly American‘ was published, it was clear, that the US had failed to 
read Southeast Asian minds. Over the next one-and-a-half decade the 
Vietnam war developed, with Thailand and Singapore becoming the rear 
bases for logistics and recreation. In the 1960s, Malaysia had become 
independent, only to cede Singapore in 1962 as an independent state. In 
1965 a military coup d‘etat brought down Sukarno in Indonesia, ending his 
nationalist claim on all Malay territories (i.e. Malaysia and Singapore) that 
would have made an earlier regional cooperation impossible.  
The Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was founded in 
September 1954 in Manila (hence: Manila Pact) after the Geneva Indochina 
Conference earlier that year, where the retreat of France from Indochina and 
the partition of Vietnam were agreed on. US Vice President Richard Nixon 
had advocated an Asian equivalent of NATO upon returning from his late-
1953 Asia trip. Different from NATO, SEATO had no joint commands with 
standing forces. Founding members were the USA, the United Kingdom, 
France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos could not become members because of the 
Geneva Accord, but came under the protection of SEATO. Burma was 
suffering from communist insurgencies, while the Kuomintang, remnants of 
the Chinese nationalist army, was fighting along the Chinese border. 
Burma, thus decided for a course of non-alignment and did not join 
SEATO. The Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North 
Borneo were under British rule; Indonesia pursued its policy of non-
alignment. In April 1955 representatives of 25 independent African and 
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Asian states met in Bandung, including, however, a number of states like 
Pakistan that already had aligned themselves, indeed. SEATO failed in 
becoming a Southeast Asian NATO (Sim 2011): The alliance had out-of-
region members like the USA, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand and 
Pakistan, and only two Southeast Asian members (Philippines and 
Thailand). Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei did not join after independence. 
Suggestions to include the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of 
(South) Korea were not taken up. (TAH 1969). SEATO members supported 
the USA in the Vietnam war, but the alliance hardly lived up to US 
expectations. After the USA pulled out of Vietnam in 1973, SEATO 
became superfluous and was dissolved in 1977. 
In 1967, i.e. in the crucial phase of the Vietnam War, the 
Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN was founded by 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei 
(1984), Vietnam (1995), Myanmar, Laos (both 1997) and Cambodia (1999) 
joined later. Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste have an observer status. 
The aims and purposes of ASEAN are laid down in the Bangkok 
Declaration of 1967: (BD 1969).  
 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region ... 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for 
justice and the rule of law ... 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters 
of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, 
scientific and administrative fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and 
research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and 
administrative spheres; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their 
agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including 
the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the 
improvement of their transportation and communications facilities 
and the raising of the living standards of their peoples; 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing 
international and regional organizations with similar aims and 
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation 
among themselves.‘ 
 
Although the original members clearly followed an anti-communist 
course, the agenda is mainly restricted to the economy. The Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976 created the opportunity for 
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outside countries to join ASEAN. China and India were the first ones 
(2003) to sign the treaty, followed by Japan and Pakistan (2004), 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (2007). The USA signed in 2009, France in 2006 
and the EU in 2012 after the treaty was amended to allow for the accession 
of non-states. (EU-TACS 2012). Trade among members is more in ASEAN 
than in SAARC, but by far not as intensive as in the EU. At a closer look 
one can see that much of intra-ASEAN trade is actually transit trade 
through Singapore, which has developed into Southeast Asia‘s transport 
hub. 
 
WTO and After 
 
The Uruguay Round, named because it had been started in Punta del Este in 
Uruguay, lasted for over a decade and ended with the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995. A similar organization, the 
International Trade Organization (ITO), had been planned already in the 
1940s as a third pillar of the new world economic order, besides the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The plan failed, 
because the United States was not ready to join it. What was established 
instead was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with two 
marked omissions, i.e. agriculture and textiles. The WTO was to include 
them, albeit with generous exceptions for ten years. The USA, which once 
had resisted the ITO, was instrumental in bringing about the WTO. The idea 
behind it was that the reduction, if not abolishing of trade restrictions, 
would be a win-win game for all participants, as already explained. The 
communist regimes of the Soviet Bloc were gone. The Asian tigers, old and 
new, had shown how beneficial trade could be as a growth engine. 
Resistance came especially from developing countries. What was the 
reason? The United States insisted to vote over WTO as a package, 
comprising not only merchandise goods, but also services (GATS), 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and investment (TRIM). The 
developing countries wanted an opening of the labour markets, an old 
demand that Nobel prize winner W. Arthur LEWIS (1954) already had raised 
in the early days of development economics. 
The agenda was controversial under the terms of liberalization and 
globalization. India was sitting — so to say — on both sides of the fence: It 
wanted to save its agricultural markets from international competition, did 
not want to open its financial sector or admit large scale foreign investment 
and strongly resisted most of the new intellectual property rights, especially 
the patenting of living organisms. On the other hand, the export boom in IT-
based services had started; India was on its way to become a world market 
leader in the production and export of pharmaceutical products, especially 
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for the treatment of children‘s and communicable diseases and generic 
drugs. 
India and Pakistan became founder members of the WTO. 
International trade almost exploded. India already had started opening her 
borders in 1991; Bangladesh became the biggest surprise and developed 
into the second biggest readymade textiles exporter, overtaking Pakistan in 
export earnings and home remittances. 
After the industrial countries managed to get more concessions out of 
the developing countries in the so called Singapore Round, the developing 
countries demanded some compensation. That has not come. The Doha 
Round started in 2001 with great expectations, but has been getting 
nowhere so far. 
What could be the reason? By the time WTO finally had been agreed 
on, the USA had lost interest in global arrangements, and started new 
rounds of regional and bilateral trade negotiations, creating a ‗spaghetti 
bowl‘ of overlapping agreements. The USA always had close relations with 
its northern neighbour Canada; the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) also included Mexico.  It is strictly a trade agreement.  What has 
become one of the greatest achievements of the EU, i.e. the freedom to 
move within the Union and to settle everywhere, is out of the question for 
NAFTA. It is not much better in the case of trade in services: Mexican 
truckers have only a very limited access to the US market. 
The Russian Federation had established a Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) that allows close collaboration of the former 
Soviet republics with the exception of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania). China started the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SHO) in 
1998 together with four of the former Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and Russia; Uzbekistan joined in 2001. India, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran have observer status; ASEAN is a dialogue 
partner. 
On the initiative of Australia, Japan and the United States the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) had been started in 1989. It is more 




The paper started with the question, whether regional economic cooperation 
would yield less tension as well as social uplift. Seeing the quick recovery 
after the War and the high quality of life in Western Europe (despite the 
recent setback in southern Europe), we have reason to claim that the 
creation of a common market has been instrumental in Europe‘s recovery 
and development.  
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The second question was, whether economic development leads to 
more regional cooperation. This question is less easy to answer. Rich and 
poor countries have benefited from opening their borders, but there can be 
winners and losers in each country, as the example of the onion price has 
shown. The recent problems in Europe are less one of economic 
cooperation in the EU, but one of sharing a currency in the (smaller) Euro 
area, as a common currency means that an individual country no longer can 
raise its international competitiveness by devaluing its currency. Rich 
countries fear, as the case of Mexican immigrants in the USA shows, that 
they would be flooded by foreigners who would take away their jobs, 
undercut their wages and unduly claim social benefits. 
The third question was, whether regional co-operations thrive best if 
backed by a strategic alliance. This obviously has been the case for the 
European Community/Union and for ASEAN.  RCD was much less 
successful, reflecting the fact that Baghdad Pact and CENTO were of little 
military use. In any case it would be difficult, if not impossible, to single 
out just one factor and to establish simple causalities. Most probably it is a 
problem of co-linearity, i.e. underlying common causes: In Europe it was 
the political will of the people and governments of the member states not to 
repeat the mistake of revenge and retribution committed after World War I, 
but to come together and embark on a policy of cooperation. This policy 
was greatly helped, if not forced upon Western Europe, by the fear of 
socialism and Soviet expansionism, but also by American money in the 
form of Marshall Plan assistance. The approach failed in Southwest Asia, 
where RCD countries neither had the common traumatic experience of the 
World War II, only partly had the fear of being run over by the Soviets, and 
US assistance did not reach Marshal Plan proportions. Furthermore, Europe 
had to be rebuilt, whereas developing economies had to be built up from the 
ground. The ASEAN experience has been different to the extent that all 
countries (more or less) had their experience of socialist aggression; the 
original members more or less benefited, however indirectly, from the 
Vietnam war: All countries received substantial US assistance, rest and 
recreation for US troops were the beginning of Thailand‘s tourism industry: 
Singapore became the regional hub. 
The conclusion for South Asia would be, that each and every regional 
cooperation has to cope with its own prospects and limitations, not only 
political, but also economical. Especially in South Asia, where governments 
have a tradition of state enterprises, market and price intervention and 
detailed restrictions of commerce, economic cooperation requires to look 
especially into the many non-tariff restrictions. Studying the process of 
integration of other regional cooperations, especially the EU, ASEAN and 
NAFTA, would be worthwhile. 
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The EU certainly could be helpful.
7
Already in the early 1980s when 
the idea of a South Asian Cooperation gained momentum, the author had 
discussed it at the Marga Institute in Colombo. It was only after the 
outbreak of the civil war in Sri Lanka that it was decided to set up SAARC 
headquarters in Kathmandu. Already then there was considerable interest in 
Europe in the concept of South Asian Cooperation on the lines of the 
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Implementing SAFTA and Role of 
Competitiveness 
 




t is indeed a great privilege for me to have been given the opportunity to 
participate in this conference. I must compliment Ambassador Amin, 
IPRI and the Hanns Seidel Foundation for organizing discussion on 
such an important and contemporary topic which has very far reaching 
consequences for Pakistan. The questions raised are critical for policy 
makers in Pakistan to chart a clear course for Pakistan. Failure to be part of 
the Asian century will condemn us to the dust bin of history.  
First of all we must understand that the 2011 report on Asian century 
projects average per capita in Asia to cross USD 42000 by 2050. But within 
the average there are winners and losers and not all Asian countries will 
achieve the average, in fact the report projects that Pakistan will cross US$ 
7900 and India will cross $42000 by 2050. This asymmetric performance 
by the two neighbours is based on existing trends and the current state of 
domestic management of the economy in each country. The projected result 
will be highly destabilizing for South Asia and India-Pakistan relationship. 
It is in the interest of the region that all countries of South Asia put their 
own respective house in order and to be winners in the Asian Century. How 
this can be done is also part of the recommendations of the report on 
realizing the ―New Asian Century‖.  It has at least nine takeaways for us: 
 
1. The ability of countries to realize the promise of the Asian 
Century will depend on success in three dimensions: national, 
regional, and global 
2. Countries must push for access and opportunity for all citizens, 
employment generation and provision of protection to the 
vulnerable. 
3. Growth will require harnessing of the full potential of technology, 
innovation and entrepreneurship. 
4. Cities will be the centres of higher education, innovation, and 
technological development. The quality and efficiency of urban 
I 
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areas would determine competitiveness and social and political 
stability. 
5. Financial sector will need to become more open to institutional 
innovation, and support inclusive finance. 
6. Radical energy efficiency and switching from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy will ensure future competitiveness. 
7. Building more compact and eco-friendly cities; relying on mass 
transit for urban dwellers and railways for long-distance 
transport. 
8. Eradicating corruption is critical for social and political stability 
and legitimacy. This will require effective governance, both at 
central and local levels with institutions that are transparent, 
accountable and predictable. 
9. A market-driven and pragmatic approach supported by an 
evolving institutional framework that facilitates free domestic and 
regional trade , investment flows and some labour mobility 
throughout Asia.  
 
The report clearly spells out that overall national success would 
depend on the adaptability, flexibility and capacity to respond to the 
changing global and domestic economic events; this will need far-sighted 
and enlightened leadership, willing and able to adopt a pragmatic rather 
than ideological approach to policy formulation and to keep focused on 
results. Building greater regional cooperation will be essential. Modernizing 
governance and retooling institutions, while enhancing transparency and 
accountability is a pre-requisite. In all the above factors Pakistan can 
definitely achieve success. It is blessed with unlimited potential of a young 
hard working population, dynamic entrepreneurs, unlimited renewable 
hydel power potential, natural resources to produce food and commodities, 
rapid urbanization, strategic geographic location, vibrant media and a free 
judiciary. 
While we are concentrating on the theme of the conference that 
addresses many issues that are highly pertinent for Pakistan and our 
regional cooperation, we must remember that apart from fostering regional 
cooperation, each country has to reform its own domestic economy to 
achieve success. Furthermore regional economic cooperation can only be 
fully exploited if each economy in SAARC ensures adoption of the 
housekeeping principles embodied in the ADB report and is able to 
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Over the last day and a half we have been discussing many possibilities 
 
 Will Asian century also encompass South Asia, central Asia and the 
Pacific islands? 
 Is SAARC the way forward for South Asia? 
 Can it be successful as EU and ASEAN? 
 How hurdles can be removed to make SAARC a success? 
 
The papers cover diverse and relevant topics such as Regional trade, 
Regional Investment, Regional energy Trade, Regional Transport and 
communication infrastructure, Regional energy corridors from West, 
Central Asia to south Asia, the New silk road initiative, China‘s cooperation 
with south Asia, SAARC as engine of economic cooperation. The topics 
also cover economic cooperation and political constraints, bilateral and sub-
regional arrangements vs SAARC, SAFTA bottlenecks, EU perspective on 
SAARC and what can be learnt from the EU experience, hurdles in 
implementing SAFTA and JVs, replacing conflict with peace, dispute 
resolution mechanisms between India and Pakistan. This will generate a 
treasure trove of research and guidelines for moving forward on south 
Asian cooperation. 
While we are focused on South Asian cooperation in general, there is 
no doubt that the future of this cooperation is particularly impacted by the 
overwhelming footprint of Pakistan-India relationship on the region. The 
India-Pakistan relationship particularly in the economic cooperation domain 
is like the sub-continental game of Snakes and Ladders. Every time we feel 
that we are making progress and take a few steps to overcome the hurdles, 
we go back to the starting point as some political event or incident 
overtakes the negotiations. It seems that the political leadership buckles 
under local expediency to sacrifice the gains made. The negotiations are a 
hostage to extremist elements on both sides but currently more so in India 
than in Pakistan. While in Pakistan there is general consensus among the 
political parties of the need to achieve a breakthrough on trade issues with 
India and the current political leadership in Pakistan can claim to be 
champions for trade and peace with India, it seems there are no such 
champions for promoting the relationship with Pakistan in India.  
The progress in this regard has to wait for the Indian elections to take 
place before meaningful dialogue can be restarted. Apart from the lack of 
political will to pursue the agenda at this point in time, there is still a strong 
underlying sentiment in each country that views regional trade promotion 
not as a win-win situation, but views it in a relative gain perspective. Thus 
each country feels satisfied if it runs a trade surplus in its bilateral trade but 
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feels cheated if it runs a big deficit in its trade balance. The bigger the 
deficit the weaker is the political position of the proponents of free trade. 
Thus progress in implementing SAFTA and liberalized trade falls 
victim to the fear factor prevalent in each country that freer trade will 
strengthen the opposing country and swamp their own domestic production. 
Thus each country devises ways to protect their domestic markets while 
pursuing freer trade. Thus whereas the implementation mechanisms of the 
SAFTA agreement are well drafted and powerful implementing committees 
are in place, enhancing trade to its full potential in SAFTA is severely 
limited due to a protective mindset that promotes restrictive sensitive lists, 
safeguard measures, anti-trade non-tariff barriers, domestic production 
subsidies etc. All these efforts affect even playing field in the SAARC 
region. These measures that are thriving because the leadership is not 
willing to risk political capital on taking a stand against forces opposed to 
opening up of free cross border trade. More and more this fear is also 
spreading amongst players in various segments of the economy that they 
may not be able to compete in a freer regional market place. 
So far in the discourse we have not examined the capacity of each 
country to compete with each other in an open market environment. As 
some speakers mentioned in their presentations Pakistan has free trade 
agreements with a number of countries including China. We have 
outstanding political and strategic relationship with China yet we have not 
been able to have a breakthrough in exports to China in spite of efforts by 
leadership of China to push greater imports from Pakistan. Thus we need to 
examine our own state of competitiveness to see that even if we get an even 
playing field with India, will we be able to compete from a position of 
strength. 
In the last few months I have been following Pakistan‘s performance 
in various global economic performance indices and the results have been 
quite disappointing. Last week we slipped in Ease of Doing Business 
rankings of the World Bank from 107 position to 113; earlier in the world 
economic forum competitiveness index we dropped to 134 rank amongst 
148 countries. Again, in the latest human development index our ranking is 
slipping and we are ranked at the bottom of the league. In the prosperity 
index we again have a dismal position. This underperformance in 
international standing shows a malaise which reflects grave governance and 
capacity issues facing the country. This state of affairs will be highly 
detrimental to the ability of Pakistan to participate in a fully liberalized free 
trade environment envisioned in SAFTA. 
The Global competitive Index (GCI) directly deals with perceptions 
of competitiveness of various countries in the global context. While in the 
2013-14 rankings Pakistan is ranked 133
rd
, India is ranked 60th and China  
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30th. The current trade deficits Pakistan has with these countries clearly 
reflect the respective competitiveness ratings. The GCI comprises 12 pillars 
of competitiveness and each pillar has many subcomponents for which 
relative rankings are published. The pillars are: 
 
 Pillar 1. Institutions 
 Pillar 2. Infrastructure 
 Pillar 3. Macroeconomic environment 
 Pillar 4. Health and primary education 
 Pillar 5. Higher education and training 
 Pillar 6. Goods market efficiency 
 Pillar 7. Labour market efficiency 
 Pillar 8. Financial market development 
 Pillar 9. Technological readiness 
 Pillar 10. Market size  
 Pillar 11. Business sophistication 
 Pillar 12. Innovation 
 
The first pillar deals with Institutions. This includes both government 
and private institutions. Pakistan ranks 123 and India is ranked 72. The 
pillar includes efficacy of government spending, corporate performance and 
law and order issues relating to crime and terrorism. 
The second pillar deals with infrastructure. This includes physical, 
energy, communication as well information and computer technology. 
Pakistan ranks 121 and India stands at 85. Inadequate infrastructure adds 
significantly to the cost of doing business. 
The third pillar relates to macroeconomic performance. Pakistan 
ranks 145 while India ranks 110th. The pillar encompasses budget balance 
and national savings rates. 
The fourth pillar relates to health and primary education. Pakistan 
ranks 128 while India ranks 102nd. Clearly human development is 
substandard in both countries. 
The fifth Pillar related to higher education and training. Pakistan 
ranks 129 while India is at 91. This pillar is critical for success in achieving  
successful business capability and wealth creation. 
The sixth Pillar relates to goods market efficiency. Pakistan ranks 103 
and India scores 85. The rankings indicate level of competition and 
vibrancy of domestic markets which is critical for domestic businesses to 
compete in regional markets.  
The seventh pillar relates to labour market efficiency. Pakistan ranks 
138th and India 99th. The index comprises labour relations, labour 
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productivity and female participation in the labour market. For example 
Pakistani women participation is 144 out of 148 countries. 
The eighth pillar relates to financial market development. Pakistan 
ranks 67th while India ranks 19th. Financial sector development is a key 
element in a nation‘s competitiveness. 
The ninth pillar is technological readiness. Pakistan ranks 118th and 
India 98th. The rankings suggests that both countries are dependant on 
imported technologies. 
The tenth pillar relates to size of domestic market. Pakistan is 30th 
while India ranks 3rd. 
The eleventh pillar is business sophistication. Pakistan ranks 85 while 
India is at 42. If the private sector is driver of regional trade then India is in 
a very strong position. 
The 12th pillar is innovation. Pakistan ranks 77th and India ranks 
41st. 
The GCI is a clear indicator of Pakistan‘s relative competitiveness 
disadvantage compared to India. It is surprising that in spite of Indian 
superiority in the competitiveness arena it is a leader in creating non-tariff 
barriers to keep out imports and protect its domestic producers. Maybe this 
is a blessing in disguise as while freer trade is delayed we can use the time 
to put our own house in order. Seven years ago our rankings were 
comparable to India‘s and we were negotiating with India with confidence 
that we will be able to compete. Now the situation is hugely different. It is 
in the interest of all countries of the region that we ensure compatibility in 
competitiveness among member countries. 
A clear joint venture that needs to be initiated in the SAARC region is 
to establish a competitiveness research Hub that evaluates the relative 
competitiveness of SAARC countries and how they will fare in a free trade 
environment. We should encourage member states to develop 
complementarities in their economies so that we can move forward in a 
relatively balanced manner. This is important because we need to alter 
perceptions of fear, dominance and one sided benefits. The establishment of 
a SAARC University could be a follow up activity.  
Secondly we need to promote travel and tourism within the SAARC 
region to build confidence amongst the people of the region for greater 
economic cooperation. If tourism can take off, trade, investment and 
economic cooperation can follow. A Joint Tourism Infrastructure could 
develop quickly if the Governments can create the right environment for 
facilitating travel for tourism purposes. 
In the meantime we need to establish a joint Infrastructure fund to 
facilitate connectivity in the region, At some point in the future we can 
establish joint investment company that facilitates cross border investments. 
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This could lead to establishment of a SAARC Bank to facilitate trade and 
investment. Finally, we have to be patient. Ultimately, SAARC cooperation 








Replacing Conflict with Peace in South Asia 
 
Ambassador (R) Nihal Rodrigo 
 
his Conference, organized by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 
provides an important opportunity to discuss productive regional 
trade, investment, energy-sharing, stable infrastructure and other 
aspects of economic connectivity within South Asia, and beyond as well, in 
the emerging ―Asian Century‖. Conclusions and recommendations of the 
Conference need to reach Governments of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for their serious consideration and 
reactions. 
Sri Lanka has replaced a violent conflict with productive peace in the 
island, ending decades during which its people have had to suffer the 
separatist mono-ethnic terrorism of the so-called ―Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam‖ (LTTE). The terrorist organization  has on its record, the 
assassination of  a Sri Lanka President,  an Indian Prime Minister, a Sri 
Lanka Foreign Minister ( himself a brilliant member of the Tamil 
community the security of which the LTTE claimed to be protecting ),  as 
well as tens of thousands of civilians including other politicians. Many 
issues do however remain to be settled in Sri Lanka at the human and 
developmental levels to sustain continued peace.  Human rights groups 
however continue to place undue emphasis on the ―final stages‖ of the 
conflict with the LTTE, but remain soft and even silent on Government 
attention paid  to  humanitarian  aspects such as providing civilians essential  
food and medical care  in areas then under LTTE control. 
Nevertheless, the  Joint Statement issued by the Secretary General of 
the United Nations and the Government of Sri Lanka, at the end of May 
2009 following his visit to the country and tours to the conflict areas, 
provided a relatively  balanced first hand assessment of the situation (1). 
The Statement indicated inter alia, that Sri Lanka had ―entered a new Post 
Conflict beginning‖ in which the Government and people would be dealing 
with ―the immediate and long term challenges relating to the issues of 
relief, rehabilitation, resettlement and reconciliation‖.  The economic 
aspects of rehabilitation have been heightened and India, as Sri Lanka‘s 
closest    neighbour, has also been engaged in contributing to the process. 
The present  Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Y.K. Sinha  has   
indicated that over 13,000 housing units in the former conflict areas would 
T 
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be completed with Indian assistance by the end of 2013 (2).  The UN 
Security Council also issued a consensual press statement through its 
Chairman which acknowledged ―the legitimate right of the Government of 
Sri Lanka‖ to combat terrorism. The statement demanded in the concluding 
stages of the conflict ( for which period, Sri Lanka is still being blamed by 
various groups and TV channels wanting viewers), that it was the LTTE 
that needed to ―lay down its arms and allow tens of thousands of civilians 
mostly innocent Tamils (as their human shields) in the conflict zone to 
leave‖. The LTTE forced tens of thousands of civilians, including women 
and children into the conflict zones to serve as its human shields (3).  
 
Domestic Issues Affecting South Asian Bilateral Cooperation in 
the Emerging Asian Century 
The Summit Conference of the Commonwealth took place in Sri Lanka 
from the 15th to 17th of November, adopting a consensual Declaration(4). 
Preparatory encounters involving the youth, civil society and the corporate 
sector contributed to its substance. Five of the countries among the eight 
members of SAARC (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka) 
are members of the Commonwealth.   India, Sri Lanka‘s closest neighbour, 
has been a major factor in assisting the process of economic re-development 
in the conflict-affected areas. However, the Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh regretted his inability to lead the Indian delegation to the 
Commonwealth Summit Conference. Indian External Affairs Minister, 
Salman Khurshid headed the delegation. The Prime Minister‘s non-
participation is due entirely to certain internal ethno-centric conflicts within 
India‘s own complex domestic political framework. These factors are being 
widely projected as having an influence on India‘s own democratic national 
elections which are scheduled to be held early next year. Election 
campaigning processes are continuing in India. The votes of Tamil Nadu 
state are being considered as essential for the Congress Party to return to 
power in the national elections.  
Sri Lanka‘s Northern Province, a majority Tamil area, in which 
conflict has now been replaced with peace has successfully concluded 
elections to its Provincial Council in September this year. The Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA) has succeeded in winning 30 of the Council‘s 38 
seats. On the other hand, the party which was supported by Sri Lanka‘s 
Central Government, the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDF), has 
however secured only a mere seven seats. The TNA is led by an eminent, 
highly respected former Supreme Court Judge, a member of the Tamil 
community, C.V. Wigneswaran who secured 68 per cent of the votes. It 
proved clearly that the process under which the elections were held had 
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been certainly fair, and free of any tinkering by the Government or its 
security forces.  An editorial in India‘s independent newspaper, The Hindu, 
on September 24th 2013  
correctly reported that ―Sri Lanka has crossed an important milestone 
towards national reconciliation with the holding of the elections…which 
gives the war-ravaged North its first-ever democratic political set up that 
will share governance with the centre. The huge turn out conveyed its own 
message about the elections for the voters. The dire predictions of some 
human rights groups that the Sri Lanka Army would use its overwhelming 
presence in the Province to influence the outcome of the elections proved 
incorrect‖.  An important conclusion in the editorial is that that the TNA, 
―steering clear of the extreme nationalist pronouncements by Tamil 
diaspora organizations,  has made a good start  by stating  that the victory 
does represent the wish of the people for adequate self-rule within a united 
and undivided Sri Lanka‖. Chief Minister Wigneswaran had rejected 
sectarian calls emanating from Tamil Nadu and the Tamil diaspora 
elsewhere that the Indian Prime Minister boycott the CHOGM Summit in 
Colombo as a form of protest. The Indian Prime Minister was invited by the 
Chief Minister to pay a visit to the Northern Province so that he could 
personally observe for himself that peace has, indeed, replaced conflict.  On 
earlier occasions, when Indian actions against Sri Lanka at the United 
Nations human rights forums in Geneva were continuing, in order to 
appease Tamil sectarian interests in India, including those by its diaspora, 
the process was apologetically and frankly described by India as 
unavoidable due to its own ―coalition compulsions‖ in electoral processes. 
Virtually all the SAARC countries are now committed to democratic 
forms of Government and election processes. None of the SAARC 
countries are monolithic in their ethnic, religious or social composition. 
This has its impact, internally on governance, on bilateral relations, on 
conflicts with neighbours, as well as  in respect of relations with other 
member states of SAARC. Indeed, when the last SAARC Summit took 
place in Addu Atoll in the Republic of Maldives in November 2011, a 
Maldivian media handout on the myriad social and other aspects of the 
South Asian region was projected as reaching ―across one hundred 
languages, across ten major religions, across one-fifth of the world 
population, across the lowest lying islands to the highest mountains‖. The 
last two references were respectively to Addu Atoll in the Southern 
Hemisphere and Mount Everest in Nepal in the Himalayas. 
Election processes, within the individual South Asian countries, are   
adversely affected by such myriad factors. Equally, they have a tendency to 
creep into bilateral relations and indeed adversely impact on South Asian 
regional cooperation as well. If and when they degenerate into disputes, 
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conflicts or violence, either within individual states, or between/among 
neighbouring SAARC states, economic cooperation would be hampered in 
the region. This is despite its major potential and its rising expectations to 
contribute to, and benefit by, the emerging Asian Century.  
In Maldives, results of a Presidential election that had been held, were 
twice declared to be invalid, on varied reasons, based on the grounds that 
none of the three candidates had secured over 50 per cent of the vote. 
Mohamed Nasheed, the former President, who assumed power in a 
democratic election in 2008 had been allegedly removed from power in 
circumstances that his supporters claimed amounted to a coup. The three 
presidential candidates, in the larger national interest did meet together in 
Male attempting to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the matter. 
Eventually, following much controversy, Abdullah Yameen was 
inaugurated as the 6th President of the Maldives 
Nepal is the host of the next, already over-due, SAARC Summit. It is 
being delayed due to internal difficulties. National elections in the country 
took place on November 19th. There had been some rising controversy 
about the deployment of the armed forces to ensure security considerations, 
inter alia due to the discovery of caches of some improvised bombs and 
some earlier violence committed against candidates that had been reported. 
By November 25th, tentative results announced indicated that the Nepali 
Congress Party had secured 105 of the total of 240 directly elected seats. 
The Communist Party of Nepal had won 91 seats with the United 
Communist Party (Maoist) trailing with 25 seats.   
The next elections in Bangladesh are being scheduled to take place in 
January 2014. There are rising concerns, likely to erupt into protests, by the 
main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party about the lack of an 
independent ―non-Party‖ caretaker administration to impartially supervise 
the polls. 
Within India, apart from the Tamilnadu-Sri Lanka factor, the deadly 
explosion that took place on 27th October this year in Patna at an election  
meeting being addressed by the opposition‘s Prime Ministerial candidate 
Narendra Modi also has had  an  impact on the forthcoming Indian  national 
elections. The World Socialist Website has asserted that ―Modi has made 
(his State) Gujarat a magnet for domestic and international investment‖ (6). 
He is reported to be therefore seeking to ―appeal to mass anger over rising 
prices and poverty, declaring that poverty is the primary problem of Hindus 
and Muslims alike‖ particularly as his image has  also been affected by 
reports of his being responsible for attacks against the Muslims. 
Apart from these contemporary aspects of political conflict within 
South Asian states which are affecting national as well as regional 
economic cooperation and growth, bilateral complexities between states 
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have also been addressed to some extent through diplomatic means. The 
SAARC Charter, when being drafted, came to include the stipulation that 
―bilateral and contentious issues‖ should not be included for discussion in 
the Association‘s formal agenda as they could cause conflicts and 
jeopardize consensual decisions and action. However, pragmatically, all 
SAARC Summits do, informally, provide space, time and opportunities for 
bilateral close encounters of the confidential kind which, of course need to   
take place outside   the formal meetings of Conferences. Such informal 
confidential bilateral engagements have in the past, helped considerably in 
easing tensions and providing space for   seeking pragmatic solutions to 
bilateral and contentious issues and for maintaining some regional 
economic impetus.  In 1999, a SAARC Ministerial Meeting taking place in 
the salubrious Sri Lankan hill resort, called Nuwara Eliya, was expected to 
take a decision on a definite time frame for the next Summit scheduled for 
Nepal. The forest resort provided opportunities for a confidential Walk in 
the Woods by the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan. This private 
encounter certainly helped clear some sensitive aspects, as well as facilitate 
decisions for the convening of one of SAARC‘s earliest corporate meetings. 
In 2000, the South Asian Business Leaders‘ Summit in Karnataka, India 
took place, attended by Ministers as well. It also contributed to help clear 
the road to the 11th SAARC Summit. The corporate sector‘s practical 
approaches towards furthering mutual economic benefits among SAARC 
countries have been a major asset which their governments appreciate. To 
some extent, it has also helped tone down traditional (even historical) 
bilateral political complications in favour of the larger context of regional   
economic cooperation which brings better results for their respective 
people. 
The genuine engagement of the people is a primary aspect of 
democracy which is essential to replace conflict with a peace that can 
endure. This needs to extend beyond the election processes, however 
regularly they may be held. In many economic processes, projects however 
beneficial they may be seen by governments, do need in the long term, the 
support of the affected people and their engagement.  Conflicts with the 
public are often involved, setting back peace and obstructing development 
projects which may be ill-conceived.  At the last SAARC Summit held in 
the Maldives in 2011, some Heads of State were alive to, and articulated on 
circumstances under which some development measures could be harmful 
to the public and even cause conflict. For example, Nepal‘s Prime Minister 
Bhaburam Bhattarai referred to ―the increasing gap between rich and poor 
that had given way to enormous stress on social harmony…peace and 
security‖ in the region.  His point was that socio-economic processes vitally 
needed to be ―genuinely people-centred and justice-based‖ and not lead to 
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conflict.  Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa,  noting that while conflict had 
indeed been replaced by peace  in his own country, did warn however,  that 
there was also  ―a mood of great urgency, even of impatience (as) a large 
part of our societies consist of young people, inspired by new ideas  and 
looking forward to a promising future. Patience is not infinite‖  
 As I had indicated at a South Asia-China Cooperation Conference in 
Kunming in June this year, democratic governance clearly needs to protect 
and preserve rural communities from the dangers of excessive greedy 
corporate exploitation that could lead to damage and destruction of 
dwindling forest reserves and pollution of water resources which sustain 
rural communities. These resources are, in effect, part of a nation‘s vital 
natural environment. Replacing Conflict with Peace alone, without 
providing inclusive development, would not endure. Mass demonstrations 
by the people have taken place throughout SAARC countries, including, for 
example, India where thousands have agitated for early, conclusive action 
against gender, social and caste discrimination. Professor Ratna Kapur  has 
described the cruel gang rape and killing of a female student on December 
12th last year as ―the crisis of Indian masculinity‖ which ―occurring with 
alarming regularity‖ compels the country ―to reflect upon who we are as a 
society‖ (7) 
 
The Indian Ocean Region  
Apart from the political, economic, social and security factors interwoven  
within the complex internal fabric of individual SAARC countries which 
cross borders causing impediments to positive, people-centric regional 
cooperation, the prospects of peace and security in South Asia are also 
obviously affected by global developments which figure in the Asian 
Century. 
These include, for example, perilous volatile developments and non-
traditional security threats affecting peace in the Indian Ocean Region 
(IOR).  Global developments and issues, including those in the Middle East 
Region, have muddled the prospects of peace considerably. The United 
States, the world‘s largest economy and military power, which had involved 
itself in the Middle East, is currently seeking to ―pivot‖ to a focus on the 
Indo-Pacific which it considers essential for its own perceived security 
concerns, economic connectivity and national interests. This affects the 
South Asian region as well as South East Asia and East Asia.  India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives are located in the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR). In terms of economic, human, security and other 
connectivity, the Indian Ocean is one of the most widely traversed ocean in 
the world.  The 13th Meeting of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for 
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Regional Cooperation (IORARC) which met in Australia‘s Indian Ocean 
city, Perth in early November this year, identified the following main 
characteristics of the Indian Ocean: It is the third largest of the world‘s 
oceans; the people living  in the IOR account for almost 40 per cent of the 
total world population; Indian Ocean ports (including Pakistan‘s Gwadar, 
Sri Lanka‘s Colombo and Hambantota, and Bangladesh‘s  Chittagong) 
handle over 30 per cent of global trade; around 60 percent of  sea-borne oil 
trans-shipments cross the Ocean; and 40 per cent of  the world‘s gas 
reserves are in the Indian Ocean region. It is a vital region that affects 
progress towards the Asian Century (8). In addition, the Indian Ocean also 
provides sinister under-world criminal connectivity for internationalized 
criminal cartels involved in people smuggling, drug trafficking, gun-
running, credit card frauds and other cyber-crimes.  Some elements within 
the rump residue of the LTTE which have been involved in these activities 
have also allied themselves with these globalised cartels, including even 
with Somali pirates who have posed major threats to fishermen from 
Maldives and Sri Lanka. Piracy, according to World Bank estimates, costs 
the global economy around $ 18 billion annually in increased trade costs. 
16. The Booz-Hamilton-Allen security think tank in the United States (from 
within which Ed Snowden emerged and later chose  to expose) anticipating 
China‘s rise,  postulated that, across the Indian Ocean, ―a string of pearls‖ 
(later more ominously even described as ―a necklace of thorns‖) had  been 
placed around India by China to cripple, if not strangle  it. The so-called 
necklace consists of Indian Ocean naval points and ports in SAARC 
countries, specified by Booz-Hamilton-Allen as being centred in Pakistan 
(Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Bangladesh (Chittagong) as well as 
Sitwe (Myanmar ) in South East Asia.  All these ports are certainly being 
developed with considerable economic and technical assistance from China. 
Such engagement, Booz-Hamilton-Allen implied, has been to primarily 
serve the selfish strategic security interests of China in the Indian Ocean 
region which the think-tank concluded was   endangering Indian as well as 
US interests in the Indo-Pacific region as the Asian Century was dawning. 
Shyam Saran, a former Special Envoy of the Indian Prime Minister has 
assessed some time ago that around 70 per cent of shipping to and from 
Indian ports is being handled by the port of Colombo. He has indicated also 
that a great deal of Indian break-bulk also needs to be handled through 
Colombo. Hambantota is being developed to take pressure off Colombo and 
provide commercial connectivity and not to strangle India.  
In fact, in 2008, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and China‘s 
(then) Prime Minister Wen Jia Bao,   signed a historic document entitled ―A 
Shared Vision for the 21st Century‖ (9). The two countries agreed to 
assume what was described as ―a significant historical responsibility‖ to 
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promote ―comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development in Asia 
and the world as a whole‖. The document also clearly rejected ―drawing 
lines on the basis of ideology and values or on geographical criteria as not 
conducive to peaceful and harmonious development‖. There is no cold war 
type of animosity between India and China though described as, 
respectively, the world‘s largest democracy and the world‘s largest 
Communist country. 
China has certainly played a major role in building naval linkages to 
provide it easier connectivity across the Indian Ocean which benefits South 
Asian and other countries as well. This is not a recent phenomenon. The 
Chinese navigator Zhen He had sailed in naval fleets across the Indian 
Ocean as early as the 15th Century. In fact his fleet of ships had even 
reached the eastern shores of the present United States before Christopher 
Columbus was said to have ―discovered‖ America (10). Zhen He‘s ships 
have landed in India, Sri Lanka and other Asian countries   for economic 
reasons.  A stone inscription of the period in Arabic and Chinese discovered 
near the Southern harbour of Galle has been dated, by archaeologists,  as 
having been erected in 1411. It praises Sri Lanka for its faith and belief in 
the pacifist philosophy of Buddhism (10A).  
 
Strategic Maritime Cooperation in South Asia and Beyond 
in the Asian Century 
Sri Lanka has launched a wide-ranging global consultative process  
described as the Galle Dialogue which has already held four annual sessions 
to build greater synergies and cooperation in the Indian Ocean and beyond. 
Sri Lanka‘s Secretary of Defence, Gotabaya Rajapaksa  has emphasized the 
need for regional cooperation to face the island‘s common challenges by 
harmonizing its naval resources and capabilities (10 B).  The 2012 Galle 
Dialogue was held under the theme ―Strategic Maritime Cooperation & 
Partnerships to Face the Future with Confidence‖. This year‘s session in 
November, engaged a wide range  of defence analysts  and naval experts 
from  all regions : Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, India,  Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan,  Qatar, South Korea, Russia, 
Seychelles, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, 
Turkey, UK, US, Viet Nam and  Zambia.  Defence Secretary Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa, stated that ―throughout history, the Indian Ocean has been a 
major conduit of international exploration, migration and commerce‖.  He   
indicated clearly that, in the current age, ―the overall security and stability 
of the entire Indian Ocean region is critical for the global economy (and 
that) fostering greater cooperation and partnership amongst the naval 
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powers active in the region is necessary to support the future prosperity of 
the Indian Ocean region‖. Most significantly, dismissing the Booz-
Hamilton-Allen theory, he asserted the strength of Sri Lanka‘s relations 
with both India and China and described China‘s support for building 
Hambantota as ―commercial in nature and not to be misconstrued as fitting 
the ‗string of pearls‘ paradigm‖. In fact,  Hambantota is one aspect  of Sri 
Lanka‘s ‖Five Hub Growth Strategy‖  which aims  to position and build the 
island as a global  Naval, Aviation, Commercial, Energy and Knowledge 
Centre. 
 
The Asian Development Bank on “Realizing the Asian 
Century” 
Apart from some variations in national responses, as a region,   all   
countries of South Asia, under SAARC, agree on the need to cooperate in 
economic and other activities to promote and facilitate the emergence of the 
Asian Century rather than being excessively inward-looking   and domestic-
oriented.  
In August last year, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) presented its 
Report ―Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century‖ at the Emerging Markets 
Forum in Tokyo (11). In introducing the report, the ADB President 
indicated clearly that the Asian Century could not be that of Asia alone but 
be the century ―of shared global prosperity‖. The Report covered national, 
regional and global aspects. It postulated that if Asian countries continued 
on ―its recent trajectory, by 2050 its  per capita income could rise six-fold in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) to reach Europe‘s levels (of) today‖. Caution 
was part of the Report‘s thrust when it indicated that Asia‘s rise is ―by no 
means pre-ordained‖. To summarise:  it stressed the following ―multiple 
risks and challenges‖ that needed to be dealt with: the   inequality within 
countries that could undermine social cohesion and stability; intense 
competition for finite natural resources as the newly affluent Asians aspire 
to higher living standards; income disparities across countries that could 
destabilize them; global warming and climate changes; poor governance; 
and weak institutional capacity being faced by virtually all countries.  
The ADB Report in summary states that building Asia‘s regionalism 
will require ―collective leadership that recognizes a balance of power‖ 
among ―Asia‘s major economic powers‖ identified as the Peoples Republic 
of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. 
China has territorial issues to contend with in its bilateral relations with 
India, Japan, Philippines and others in ASEAN which could complicate the 
Asian Century. Ren Xiao of Fudan University‘s Centre for the Study of 
Chinese Foreign Policy has stated that ―as China grows, its maritime power 
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also grows. China‘s neighbouring countries should be prepared and become 
accustomed to this.‖  
 
The Economic Surge of China and South Asia 
The economic surge of China, despite some debilitating aspects being 
addressed, is advancing as a major aspect of the Asian Century. Rigid 
Communist economic policies have long given way to pragmatic changes in 
China. Its outward reach in development policies has no ideological 
constraints on cooperating with the United States and other countries which 
China had once dismissed, in the past, as hostile to Communism. Some far-
sighted foreign policy aspects of China which are being more pragmatically 
advanced were clearly evident in the extensive engagements that have 
already been further advanced since China‘s President Xi Jinpin formally 
assumed leadership this year. All SAARC countries have economic policies 
which engage China in different ways. China is an Observer in SAARC as 
are also Australia, Iran, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mauritius, Myanmar, 
the United States of America and the European Union. Together with 
ASEAN countries, and indeed most of the SAARC observers, South Asia 
can bring benefits to its people in the Asian Century.  
It was as early as 1999, when I was serving as Secretary-General of 
SAARC, that Wang Yi ( currently  Foreign Minister of China) visited  the 
Secretariat in Kathmandu to have frank discussions on  prospects and 
means  for cooperation in diverse areas with SAARC as an association. This 
was in addition to the varied bilateral connectivity that China already had 
by then formed with each individual SAARC country. Much has developed 
on some of the activities in China-SAARC cooperation which were 
tentatively discussed at that time. China has been hosting many close 
encounters of the economic kind through Conferences and Seminars with 
individual South Asian countries as well as at regional level. Exchanges 
between think-tanks, corporate sectors, cultural and religious and even with 
individual political parties within countries are developing well, and do 
provide governments ideas and options on which to develop inter-state 
cooperation as well. 
I have participated in a number of such Seminars and Conferences 
which China has hosted to access and strengthen its multiple areas of 
cooperation with South Asian countries. In June this year, the China-South 
Asian Countries Think Tank Forum was held in Kunming. I indicated at the 
Forum that Yunan has lived up on its motto to function as a ―Gateway‖ to 
regional and international cooperation. It has linked up more than in mere 
nomenclature with the theme of the last SAARC Summit held in Addu 
Atoll in the Maldives : ―Building Bridges‖. The Forum was sponsored by a 
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number of Chinese Institutes dealing with political and economic themes. 
Three parallel sessions were held covering regional connectivity; regional 
economic cooperation and people to people connectivity. Eventually, a 
consensual document was finalized. Pakistan was represented inter alia by 
Fazal-u-Rahman of the Strategic Studies Institute; Khalid Rahman of the 
Institute of Policy Studies (12) 
Concurrently, the first China-South Asia Expo was also held in 
Kunming at which Sri Lanka‘s Prime Minister D.M. Jayaratne in his 
inaugural address, covered economic as well as people to people contacts. 
He referred to the stay of the Chinese Buddhist monk, Fa Xian, at the 
Abhayagiri Temple in Sri Lanka as early as the 5th century, and the 
enduring religious links between Sri Lanka and China notwithstanding the 
latter‘s early description of religion as ―the opium of the masses‖. During 
my period as Ambassador in Beijing, the Sri Lanka Embassy was able to 
assist China in holding the first World Buddhist Forum in Hangzhou which 
focused on the universal theme, ―A Harmonious World Begins in the 
Mind‖. Religious leaders from around Asia participated, promoting the 
philosophy of peace, tolerance and harmony by avoiding conflict. Its impact 
was strong. At the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
which followed the Forum, a significant amendment in fact was 
incorporated in the Republic‘s Constitution. It affirmed support for ―the 
peace-building activities linked to religious matters and encouraged 
religious adherents to making contributions to economic and social 
development in the life of the people‖. Ideological differences of course 
have been bridged between China and Sri Lanka from the earliest times. 
Even before the two countries established formal diplomatic relations and 
had conflicting political systems, agreements offering mutual benefit have 
been entered into between Communist China and what was then a strongly 
right-wing Ceylon. In 1952, the two countries signed the Rubber-Rice Pact 
in the interests of the two nations. Even then, internal ideological aspects in 
China did not adversely affect its foreign policy. 
 
China‟s Approach to the Asian Century 
With the trumpets of the Asian Century blowing now, a series of bilateral 
and multilateral engagements are being carefully developed in considerable 
harmony with the world‘s two largest economies, the United States of 
America and the Peoples‘ Republic of China.  The SAARC countries are 
also engaged and playing their own part in a relatively harmonious manner. 
A few discordant notes are of course also being heard, although the strident 
warped voice of Booz-Hamilton-Allen is hardly disturbing the growing 
harmony. 
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Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s Opening Address at the Annual 
Conference of the Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan Province in April this 
year is a useful score/ prelude to harmonize the Asian Century (13). The 
Boao Forum is the Chinese version of the Davos Conference in Europe and 
brings different countries with varying political systems together. The 
appropriate theme of the Boao Forum this year was ―Asia Seeking 
Development for All: Restructuring, Responsibility and Cooperation‖.  
President Xi, in a carefully balanced manner, acknowledged that the world 
is experiencing ―profound and complex changes‖, which are also 
increasingly ―interconnected and interdependent‖, yet ―far from being 
peaceful‖. Though over 50 per cent of global growth is from Asia, President 
Xi, a writer of poetry, perceived that the region had four main challenges to 
face:   (i) To ―break new ground for boosting common development‖ as 
―nothing remains constant… Shift the growth mode; adjust economic 
structures‖ making ―life better for the people‖. To ―reform the 
―international economic and financial systems, improve global governance 
mechanisms‖. Asia should ―ride on waves of the times make change in Asia 
―reinforcing and global development‖ to benefit all. (ii) To work together to 
uphold peace to provide security…boosting common security. ―Without 
peace, development is out of the question‖. Global peace and security are 
essential so as to ―turn our global village into a big stage, for common 
development, rather than an arena where gladiators fight each other‖. 
Differences should thus be resolved through dialogue, consultations and 
peaceful negotiations. (iii) Quoting a Chinese proverb, President Xi said ―a 
single flower does not make spring, but hundreds of blooming flowers do‖. 
So similarly, ―a country should accommodate legitimate interests of others 
in pursuing their own development‖ so that South-South cooperation and 
North-South dialogues could promote balanced development consolidating 
the foundation for stable growth of the global economy. (iv) ―We should 
respect the right of a country to independently choose its social system and 
development path, removing distrust and misgivings,  and  turning  the 
diversity of our world and differences among countries into  a dynamic… 
driving force  for development‖, by  ―drawing upon   practices of other 
continents‖, sharing development resources and promoting regional 
cooperation. Point (v) of the President summarized above holds 
considerable relevance to the concept of the Asian Century which is not 
exclusive, but one which involves mutual engagement and cooperation also 
with continents and countries outside Asia. Some focussed engagements of 
the President, Foreign Minister and other personalities of China across Asia, 
and indeed the world this year, are particularly relevant to SAARC.    
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China-Sri Lanka Relations                                                                                                                                 
Sri Lanka President, Mahinda Rajapaksa  was invited in May 2013 by 
President Xi Jinping, rather early after coming into power, to pay a State 
Visit to China, which is at the highest political and diplomatic level of 
contact at the international level (14). Following their close encounter, 
China-Sri Lanka relations have been uplifted to the status of a Strategic 
Cooperative Partnership. Among the areas of the Partnership are trade and 
investment facilitation, security issues particularly in respect of what China 
and Sri Lanka  term as ―the Three Evils‖ (i.e .terrorism, separatism and 
extremism). China‘s assistance and intelligence helped Sri Lanka in 
successfully contending with the distinct three evils of the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam and replacing conflict with peace. Cooperation will 
continue to advance on economic, tourist, cultural and religious exchanges, 
and also take in space technology.  A priority area was high level exchanges 
and maintenance of political links against corporate criminal activities and 
non-traditional security threats in the Indian Ocean area.  Accordingly, a 
Joint Committee on Coastal and Marine Cooperation will promote 
coordination in ocean observation, eco-system protection, marine and 
coastal zone management, combating piracy, and search and rescue 
operations.  
Now that peace has replaced conflict in Sri Lanka, China has also 
expressed full support for contributing further to Sri Lanka‘s present post-
conflict programmes of consolidating national unity, reconciliation and 
promoting economic development. The Chinese Government will be 
encouraging its financial agencies to assist Sri Lanka‘s ―social development 
efforts, including in the sectors of ports and aviation, power generation, 
roads and expressways and irrigation‖. These will provide Sri Lanka closer 
connectivity within the country as well across the South Asian region and 
beyond as the Asian Century develops. It was agreed on the basis of 
strengthening cooperation ―under the Asia-Pacific Countries Trade 
Agreement  to launch negotiating process on a China-Sri Lanka Free Trade 
Agreement‖. An Expert Group will carry out feasibility studies. In addition 
to all round government to government cooperation, both countries agreed 
to ―further intensify exchanges and pragmatic cooperation between 
Parliaments, political parties, armed forces and law-enforcement 
authorities‖. 
Sri Lanka appreciated China‘s contribution to SAARC through 
conferences supporting and encouraging greater interaction, including at the 
people-to-people levels. China agreed to promote Sri Lanka‘s application 
for Observer Status in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The two 
countries have agreed to continue coordination at the United Nations and 
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other multilateral fora particularly on human rights, climate change and 
fighting transnational crime. At the Business Forum of the Commonwealth 
Summit Conference held in Sri Lanka, although China is not a member of 
the Commonwealth, about 50 Chinese corporate and technical groups had 
been engaged actively in ―Reflections of Sri Lanka‖, an exposition on 
Trade, Tourism and Investment being held concurrently.  
Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited India and Pakistan also in 
May 2013, on which my colleagues from the two respective countries at the 
Conference would report.  President Xi Jinpin has already visited Indonesia 
and Malaysia.  Prime Minister Li Keqiang has visited ASEAN countries 
including Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam as well. China continues 
with high level visits to ASEAN and other countries, in the interest of 
contributing to the Asian Century, including countries such as the 
Philippines and Japan with which China has complex territorial disputes. 
 
China-US Relations in the Asian Century Impacting on 
South Asia 
President Xi visited the United States of America in June 2013, including, 
in particular, to clarify aspects of the Asian Century and China‘s 
perceptions of its expectations. Relations between the largest and 2nd 
largest economies continue despite complexities. The US Congressional 
Research Service indicated that   some in the United States are concerned 
that a  ―rising China‖ challenges the US economy and US global leadership. 
President Obama   however has been quoted as informing President Xi that 
it was ―very much in the interest of the United States for China to continue 
its peaceful rise, because if China is successful that helps to drive the world 
economy and it puts China in the position to work with the United States, as 
equal partners in dealing with many of the global challenges that no single 
nation can address by itself‖. On the other hand, there are certain aspects, 
for example those relating to conflicting maritime claims in the South China 
seas between China and respectively, Philippines, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam 
and Brunei — all of which affect the bilateral relations between China and 
the United States as well. 
No formal consensual Joint Press Statement was issued following the 
informal Sino-US close encounters at Rancho Mirage in California.  
However, the two Presidents met the press, jointly, to answer questions. 
The respective responses were recorded and thereafter released by the 
White House (15). Cyber security was an issue and China was the main 
concern for the US at that time. However, currently US cyber-listening and 
tapping of even confidential matters including those of allies such as 
Angela Merkel of Germany have been exposed. Xi said that ―the 
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application of new technology is a double-edged sword. We need to pay 
close attention to this issue and study ways to effectively resolve this issue 
in a pragmatic way.‖ Xi said that it would be an issue that both sides will 
continue to discuss in the context of the China-US Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue. Furthermore, in depth candid discussions on the domestic and 
foreign policies of China and the US would ―build a new model of major 
country relationships‖. US and China gave an impression that in an age of 
economic globalization they must find a ―common new path‖ avoiding 
confrontation and conflict as in the past. US-China exchanges in economy 
and trade, energy, environment, people to people interactions and cultural 
engagements would continue to deepen their shared interest. The two 
countries felt it was vital to build ―a new model of military relationships‖ 
between them. All this affects South Asia‘s economic development and 
security as well. 
In his concluding remarks, President Obama stated that ―President XI 
summarized very well the scope of our conversations and that it is  an 
example of concrete progress that can advance this model of US and China 
Relations.‖ President Obama indicated that much work needs to be done to 
take these broad understandings to the level of specifics which will require   
further discussions. He stated he is absolutely committed to making sure 
that China and the US would not miss the opportunity. China‘s newspaper 
the  People’s Daily quoted Tom Donilon, one of President Obama‘s 
national security advisors who had said that ― discussions were positive, 
constructive, wide-ranging… quite successful achieving all the goals that 
we set forth for this meeting…in a uniquely informal atmosphere‖ at 
Rancho Mirage. 
 
Indo-US Relations in the Asian Century and Impact on 
South Asia 
Three months later, President Obama also   held talks with Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington. It was more formal and 
structured than the Rancho Mirage US-China encounters. A Joint Statement 
of about 30 paragraphs was adopted on September 27th. (16). It was the 
third such Indo-US Summit in which the two leaders ―reflected proudly on 
the transformation of US-India relations during the last decade, affirming 
that the partnership between the two democratic nations is stronger than at 
any point in their 67-year relationship‖. Highlighting ―shared democratic 
values‖, the Joint Statement covered, inter alia, security cooperation, 
bilateral trade and investment, science and technology, energy, climate and 
environment, the global architecture on counter terrorism, cyber space, 
health security, Indian Ocean security and conservation of its natural 
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resources. The Joint Statement made clear that ―the US and India should 
look to each other as partners of first resort in addressing global changes.‖ 
The two leaders condemned all terrorist attacks.  
Significantly, in relation to the ―US rebalance to Asia‖ and India‘s 
own ―Look East policy‖, the two leaders ―expressed a desire to partner 
closely‖ with Asia-Pacific countries including ―greater coordination with 
Japan, China and ASEAN‖   through the ―evolving institutional architecture 
of the region‖. This links to a subsequent Joint Statement issued by the 
Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh  
in October 2013 (17) which also fits in with earlier discussions between the 
two when the former visited India. 
All this strengthens the theme of working towards the Asian Century 
and economic cooperation of China with SAARC countries. It belittles the 
not so sober   Booz-Hamilton-Allen theories about the Chinese placing a 
―string/necklace of pearls/ thorns‖ around India in collaboration with 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh‘s speech on October 25 at the Central Party Conference, in Beijing 
though primarily on India and China in the New Era also, implicitly, covers 
aspects relevant to the Asian Century and prospects of economic 
cooperation between China, the second largest economy in the world and 
South Asia (18). 
 
Conclusions 
Delivering the opening address at the inauguration of the Commonwealth 
Business Forum 2013, in Colombo on  November12, Sri Lanka President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa  described the Commonwealth as bringing together 
some of the world‘s ―richest and poorest citizens…of different religions, 
ethnicities, cultures, economic and political ideologies‖ (although the 
United States and China, as number one and two of  the world‘s largest 
economies were not members). He asserted, in general, that ―wealth 
creation is not merely creation of physical wealth and financial assets… but 
is the sustainable and continuous improvement of human and natural 
capital‖ and that therefore, ―it is vital that all nations, as one cohesive body, 
adopt a collaborative approach to find and develop ways and means in our 
own economies to link wealth creation together with social and human 
development at all times‖.  
Future issues in respect of shifts in global power balances are debated 
often quoting the case of China replacing Japan as ―Number Two‖.  An 
article in the Beijing Review provides some interesting perspectives, though 
not all of them can be totally conceded (19). Certainly, Asia‘s rising 
strength, despite its many social, economic and other issues will be a major 
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aspect. The South Asian region needs to keep in touch and relate closely 
with all power centres, developing economic, political, cultural and people-
to-people linkages that are free of ideological hangovers and constraints. 
Our own region needs to build greater solidarity, contending with bilateral 
and trust issues that hamper greater coordination. While ― bilateral and 
contentious‖ issues are banned for entry into the agenda of SAARC, 
informal ―South Asian‖ meetings to examine some of these, particularly 
those which contaminate greater coordination in the group hampering closer  
cooperation with the larger Asian community, need to be delicately, but  
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Sustainable and Result Oriented Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism between Pakistan and 
India 
 
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema 
 
o dispute resolution mechanism can effectively work without 
demonstrated political will to resolve the dispute by the involved 
parties. It becomes even more difficult if there is a pronounced 
asymmetry between powers of the parties and the stronger party is not 
willing to renounce the use of force. Admittedly, both parties prefer to 
initiate negotiations from a position of strength but visible difference in 
power could easily inject complications. The threat of imposition of will by 
the stronger party often impresses upon the weaker party to seek justice 
from a collective body like UN or a regional organization. 
While there exists no consensus among nations on what is the best 
method to resolve inter-state disputes, the United Nations, in its Charter, 
provided a guideline to resolve the disputes peacefully. The Chapter VI of 
the Charter clearly states to seek solution of the dispute by ‗negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitrations, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own 
choice‘.1 In addition the UN Security Council is authorized to impress upon 
the disputant parties to settle their disputes by employing the above 
mentioned approaches. All these approaches are meant to facilitate the 
disputants to resolve their dispute peacefully. This paper initially focuses on 
the existing UN approaches followed by regional efforts. Finally, it 
discusses the possibility of sustainable and result-oriented mechanism for 
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 See UN Charter‘s Chapter VI entitled as ‗Pacific Settlement of Disputes‘. Charter 
of the United Nationsand Statute of International Court of Justice, United 
Nations, New York, August 1971. 
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Among frequently applied approaches could be easily grouped into three 
categories; realistic, idealistic and legalistic approaches. The realistic 
approaches consist of negotiation, mediation and conciliation whereas the 
legalistic approaches revolve around arbitration and judicial settlements. 
The idealistic would be unconditional acceptance of the decision of the 
regional organization or the UN Security Council‘s (UNSC) decision or that 
of regional organization. Since neither the decisions of UNSC nor of the 
regional bodies are accepted and implemented without reservations, the 




Perhaps the best method is direct negotiation between the disputants. While 
negotiations are considered to be a voluntary approach but sometimes it is 
initiated because of encouragement or pressures from outside such as the 
international or regional organizations. Bilateral negotiation implies both 
parties would forcefully argue their case and try to convince the other about 
the righteousness of its own cause. It involves certain amount of give and 
take or a trade-off and often a compromise is worked out but it also 
frequently happens that the two involved parties are stuck on some point or 
issue and the entire process is either held hostage to the process of 
implementation or gradually and carefully sabotaged. Most leaders of world 
community prefer that the complicated issues or disputes are dealt with 
through bilateral negotiations. Such a course of action spares other forms 
being involved. However it needs to be mentioned here that almost all 
strong and powerful states prefer this approach especially when dealing 
with a weaker opponent. Negotiating from a stronger position is a preferred 
option for all involved. Another point that needs to be seriously considered 
is that if any of the party involved believes that continuation of conflict 
pays more, then in that case the negotiation process is either unlikely to start 
or irreparably damaged during the early phase. 
 
Third Party Involvement (Mediation and Conciliation) 
In case the two parties are unable to reach an acceptable solution to the 
issue or resolve the dispute bilaterally, a neutral party can be asked to 
mediate. This implies that parties have to agree to the involvement of a third 
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party. Invariably weaker party, unable to impress upon the stronger party, 
opts for third party involvement whereas the stronger party tends to resist 
and even avoids if it senses that the involvement of third party may not be 
helpful to secure its interest. For example, India is consistently opposed to 
the involvement of a third party in its conflict with Pakistan especially over 
the Kashmir dispute.  The main reason for Indian refusal is that the 
involvement of a third party is likely to compromise the advantageous 
position it enjoys and its power to dictate terms to Pakistan could be 
neutralized.
2
 It seems pertinent to stress here that when India did not enjoy 
advantageous position vis-i-vis the other involved party, it would readily 
agree to other methods. This is precisely what India did following the defeat 
in Sino-Indian war. In this war India lost a big chunk of its territory and in 
order to regain lost territories, Nehru ‗proposed to make use of adjudicative 
methods for settlement of their differences‘.3 
 
Third party could be an individual (i.e. representative of great power) or 
universal body like United Nations or World Bank or regional organization. 
Mediation by a third party ‗signifies a process by which a third party helps 
the parties in a dispute reach an agreement by reconciling the opposing 
claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen‘.4 
The main task of a mediator is to explore alternative means to secure peace 
and cooperation on the one hand and facilitate the involved parties to reach 
a compromise by exploring varied options on the other.
5
  Not only the 
mediator sets the rules of session but may also control the process of 
sessions. He/She may also approach the parties separately with a focus on 
how to work out a compromise and also safeguard the interests of the 
involved parties. ‗A successful mediation affords the parties an opportunity 
to generate a creative solution to their dispute in a manner that focuses on 
the future and not the past‘.6 
 
 
                                                          
2
 ‗Third Party Role in India-Pakistan Conflicts‘ by Ijaz Hussain in Conflict 
Resolution and Regional Cooperation in South Asia edited by Pervaiz Iqbal 
Cheema and Imtiaz H. Bokhari (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute 
and Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2004) pp. 152-157. 
3
  Ibid. 
4
  Ibid. 
5
 A Handbook for Conflict Resolution in South Asia by Sundeep Waslekar, Konark 
publishers Pvt Ltd, Delhi, 1996, pp/15-17. 
6
 See Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Constitutional Rights in Sub-Saharan 
Africa  by Bolaji Owasanoye in Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods, 
UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research) Document No.14, 
2001, pp. 15-25.  




Conciliation also involves third party and a conciliator is appointed. The 
conciliator discusses the dispute with the parties in detail and then prepares 
a compromise solution and tries to convince the parties separately.
7
 Not 
only the conciliator attempts to satisfy both parties but could also seek help 
from outside consultants in order to make the option more attractive for 
both parties. The main task of the conciliator is to secure consensus of  
the parties on the crafted solution whereas in mediation the parties are 
guided to devise an acceptable solution. Conciliation is a useful device for 
social problems like divorce or settling labour disputes etc. 
 
UN Special Representative 
Another form of mediation is that a special representative of UN is assigned 
the task to meet the disputants and facilitate them to reach a working or a 
compromise formula. It is an established practice that UN Security Council 
assigns this form of mediation to an eminent individual. For example India 
took the Kashmir dispute to the UN and as a consequence of its inability to 
secure the desired resolution of the dispute at the Security Council level, it 
agreed to the appointment of a special representative to make efforts to 
resolve the dispute. During the first ten years of the Kashmir dispute Sir 
Owen Dixon, Dr. Frank Graham and Gunner Jarring (officially appointed 
representatives of the UN Security Council) made earnest and concerted 





It is not too uncommon to use the good offices of an individual or an 
institution to help bridge the difference-gap between the disputants. 
Invariably this method is being employed by the international community to 
resolve varied kinds of disputes between states. Recently, the current 
Secretary General of UN Ban-ki-Moon has offered his services to resolve 
the ongoing Kashmir dispute provided both parties agree to his good 
offices. 
 
                                                          
7
  Ibid.,pp.16-17. 
8
 There are many good book are available that have extensively covered different 
aspects of the Kashmir dispute. However the two most balanced books, in my 
perception, are Alastair Lamb‘s Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-
1990(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1962) pp.158-181 and Josef Korbel‘s 
Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 165-197. 
 




Arbitration is not only voluntary but perhaps one of the oldest and most 
effective methods of resolving disputes.  Even during the era of the Greek 
city states this method was frequently practiced. Arbitration means 
submitting the dispute to an impartial penal of judges/persons whose 
decision or award would be final and binding on the parties. ‗The arbitrators 
are chosen by the parties to the dispute or by some neutral agency 
designated by them‘. 9 
 
Adjudication 
Adjudication implies legal proceedings to resolve the dispute. The decision 
is formally announced in a court of law. The court hears both sides and then 





Existing Approaches and South Asia 
Almost all of the above mentioned approaches have been employed in one 
form or the other with a view to resolving disputes in South Asia and more 
specifically between India and Pakistan. 
 
Negotiations 
Negotiations can be either bilateral or multilateral. However it needs to be 
stressed here that multilateral negotiations are often referred to as 
multilateral diplomatic efforts. Bilateral negotiations are often used to 
resolved the dispute or defuse the crisis. 
 
Bilateral Negotiations 
Bilateral negotiations start either on the initiative of either party to the 
dispute or are suggested and encouraged by an international organization. 
Bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan have a mixed record. 
While some issues have been resolved through bilateral negotiations, there 
were others which defied such efforts and the two countries failed to reach 
the desired agreements. Among the failed efforts perhaps the ongoing 
                                                          
9
 See The World Book Encyclopedia, vol. 1. Field Enterprises Educational 
Corporation, Chicago, 1969, p.552.  
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Kashmir dispute tops the list.  Not only the UN encouraged both parties to 
undertake bilateral negotiations periodically but following the 1962 Sino-
Indian war, bilateral negotiations started between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and 
Swarn Singh primarily because of pressures applied by UK and US. Many 
disputes have been resolved by bilateral negotiations in South Asia and 
more specifically between India and Pakistan. Among the disputes that 
were resolved through bilateral negotiations the following are more 
prominent; 
 
Liaquat-Nehru Pact (1950) 
The pact was designed to alleviate the fears of religious communities and to 
promote communal peace and harmony. It was signed on April 8, 1950 and 
promised to ensure ‗complete equality of citizenship, a full sense of security 
and equal opportunity‘ to minorities in both countries.10 
 
Simla Agreement (1972) 
 The Simla Agreement which was signed following the 1971 India-Pakistan 
war did not or perhaps could not address the issues for which it was called 
for. The major objectives that were advanced at the time were the 
establishment of durable peace in South Asia and normalization of relations 
between India and Pakistan, repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian 
internees and a final settlement of Kashmir dispute. It was signed in 1972 to 
address the above mentioned issues. The final clause of Simla Agreement 
clearly stated that the respective Heads of governments or their 
representatives would meet in future at a mutually agreed time and date to 
address those issues.
11
 However the Simla agreement has been projected as 
an important agreement that is the product of bilateral negotiations.  
 
Delhi Agreement (1974) 
In many ways it was a product of both bilateral and trilateral efforts. On 
April 1972, a three-way agreement was signed by India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. The agreement paved the way for repatriation of the prisoners of 
                                                          
10
 See Burke, S.M., Pakistan‘s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, (Karachi: 
Oxford University Press, 1973) pp57-58. 
11
 For a detailed analysis see Chari, P.R. and Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, The Simla 
Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise, (New Delhi: Mnohar, 2001) Published by 
the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo (Sri Lanka). Also see Abdul 
Sattar, Pakistan‘s Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A concise History (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) PP.pp.124-143. 
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war and Bangladesh agreed not to proceed with announced trials of 




Visa Agreement (2012) 
The Visa Agreement was signed in December 2012 not only to facilitate 
travel for the Indians and Pakistanis but also to promote people to people 
contact. According to this agreement the number of places to visit increased 
and special provisions were made for persons over 65, ‗nationals of one 
country married to nationals of other country‘ and ‗children below 12 years 
accompanying parents‘. ‗Exemption from police reporting for business visa 
granted to businessmen with an annual income above  Pak Rs.5 million or 
equivalent or annual turnover above Pak  Rs.30 million or equivalent‘. 13 
Group Tourist Visa was allowed for 30 days provided for groups having at 
least 10 members. 
 
Mediation 
Among the relatively more prominent cases in which the mediation efforts 
successfully resolved the crises and in some cases reduced tension include 
the Indus Water Treaty, Tashkent Declaration, Rann of Kutch Award and 
the four years of peace process (2004-2008). 
 
The Indus Water Treaty 
The Indus Water treaty (IWT) was signed in 1960 after efforts by the 
President of World Bank Mr. Eugene Black. The Indus Water Treaty 
resolved the water dispute between India and Pakistan. The treaty allocated 
the waters of three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India and the 
waters of three western rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan. The 
non-availability of waters of eastern rivers was to be replenished by a 
mechanism of link canal system. However, it needs to be mentioned here 
that India categorically committed to allow the flow of waters of western 
rivers for Pakistan‘s use except for certain limited uses in upstream areas in 
Kashmir for agricultural purposes, electric generation and certain other uses 
spelled out in annextures of the treaty.
14
 The Treaty allowed the 
                                                          
12
 See the Text of the tri-patriate agreement of Bangladesh-Pakistan-India. 
http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/?p=196 retrieved on 6
th
 Nov.2013.   
13
 For details see India, Pakistan activate new visa regime by Arun Rajnath, in  The 
News, Dec.15, 2012. 
14
 For a detailed analysis see Choudhury, G. W., Pakistan‘s Relations with India 
1947-1966, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), pp.155-169. 
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construction of run-of-the-river power plants but forbade ‗the construction 
of dams on western rivers in excess of prescribed limits‘.15 
 
The first major test to the Treaty came in 1976 when series of talks about 
Salal hydroelectric project started. Pakistan asked for detailed information 
about the project in 1974. When India provided the desired information 
Pakistan raised serious objections to its design and storage capacity. The 
project aimed at generating 690 mw in two stages by building a dam at a 
place in Riasi Tehsil of Udhampur (a district of occupied Kashmir) which 
was just 72km upstream of Marala Headwork in Sialkot district of Pakistani 
Punjab.
16
 The Salal settlement was signed in 1978. The efficacy of the 
treaty was further tested subsequently by projects like Wullar Lake, 
Baghlihar, and currently by Kishenganga projects etc. 
 
Rann of Kutch Award 
In the spring of 1965, the long standing dispute over the Rann of Kutch 
once again surfaced when Indian forces attacked the Pakistani held posts on 
April 4, 5 and 8 in the northern half of the disputed territories of the Rann 
which was repulsed with heavy losses to the Indians.
17
 These Indian attacks 
and consequent Pakistani actions resulted into what is often described as a 
‗little war‘ on 9th April 1965. 
The conflict over Rann of Kutch originated during the days of British 
rule in India. The conflict over the desolate land was primarily revolved 
around unsettled boundary which involved about 3500 km of disputed 
territory. The British government and more specifically, the Prime Minister, 
Herald Wilson, persuaded both parties to sign an agreement on 30
th
 June to 
resolve the dispute peacefully.
18
 Consequently a three member tribunal was 
formed with two members nominated by Pakistan and India respectively 
whereas the third was nominated by the UN Secretary General. ‗The 
tribunal announced its verdict on February 17, 1969 awarding about 350 
square miles in northern parts of the disputed Rann of Kutch to Pakistan 
and rest to India‘. 19 While the Rann of Kutch award was criticized by both 
India and Pakistan, a prominent Indian leader Jayaprakish Narayan asked 
                                                          
15
 Sattar, Op.Cit., pp.190-192. 
16
 See ‗Energy Challenges to Indus Water Treaty‘ by Shaeen Akhtar  in Regional 
Studies, Vol.xxviii ,no.4, Autumn 2010, pp.3-66. 
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 See Choudhury, op. cit., pp.2288-292. Also see Sattar, op. cit, pp.91-99. 
18
 See Burke, op.cit, pp.323-325. 
19
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his compatriots to look at the Kutch agreement ‗as an object lesson in peace 
making‘ and apply this method to all disputes including Kashmir.20 
 
Tashkent Declaration 
 Following the 1965 Pakistan-India war, the Soviet Prime Minister offered 
his good offices to arrange a settlement between India and Pakistan. 
President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister L.B. Shastri were both invited to 
Tashkent for peace talks on Jan.4, 1966 which enabled both sides to 






Not only the Tashkent Declaration provided for the exchange of 
prisoners of war and resumption of normal diplomatic activities but also the 
restoration of ‗economic and trade relations as well as communication‘.22 
One of the significant fallout of Tashkent settlement was that the Soviet 




SAARC Dispute Resolving Mechanism 
South Asia is viewed as a late comer in terms of establishing a regional 
organization. While almost all regions of the world had formed some kind 
of regional groupings or organizations, South Asia continued to lag behind 
primarily because of India-Pakistan hostile relationships. Among the known 
hurdles that delayed the advent of a regional organization in South Asia 
were structural and geographical setting of the region in which one state 
was not only huge in terms of area, population, resources, power and 
occupied central position geographically, but also suffered from lack of 
common threat perception, and complex inter-state disputes.
23
 
Theoretically SAARC was born in 1985 at the Dhaka Summit of 
seven regional countries; later it was expanded to include Afghanistan. The 
major objectives of the organization are to promote the welfare of South 
Asians in terms of improving the quality of life. For this purpose 
acceleration of economic growth, collective self-reliance, developing 
mutual trust and pursuing active collaboration with a view to strengthening 
                                                          
20
Ibid., Also see Burke, p.526. 
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 For a detailed analysis see ‗SAARC Needs Revamping‘ by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema 
in South Asian Survey, vol.3, Nos.1-2, 1996 pp.309-319. 
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cooperation among the member countries as well as with other regional and 
international organizations. 
While SAARC has been making noticeable but steady progress but it 
has not delivered as was anticipated. ‗Just as the UN Security Council did 
not live up to the expectations of a vast majority of the member states, 
SAARC also disappointed many in the region especially in terms of 
tangible outcomes that could substantively affect the life of ordinary 
citizens of the member countries‘.24 However, one needs to take cognizance 
of the fact that it came into existence with a baggage of disabilities and 
constraints. Confronted with regional pressures along with the existence of 
complex regional disputes, the association not only moved forward though 
slowly during the last 28 years, but has also been able to impress upon the 
member countries to realize the significance of cooperation.   
Compared to ASEAN, SAARC was unable to develop a conflict 
resolution mechanism. The ASEAN in its 26
th
 Ministerial meeting 
established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to foster not only 
‗constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of 
common interest and concern‘ but also ‗to make significant contributions  




 November 2005, the SAARC foreign ministers signed an 
agreement to establish SAARC Arbitration Council. Clause 3f clearly 
referred that the Arbitration Council would act as a coordinating agency in 
SAARC dispute resolution system. This is an ‗inter-governmental body 
mandated to provide a legal framework/forum within the region for fair and 
efficient settlement of commercial, industrial, trade, banking, investment 
and such other disputes as may be referred to it, between one member state 
to another through conciliation and arbitration‘.26 
As mentioned above, SAARC came into existence with a huge 
baggage which is impeding the desired pace of progress. Undoubtedly the 
existence and continuation of bilateral political disputes does not allow the 
organization to move forward at a desired pace. The ongoing India-Pakistan 
dispute over Kashmir takes a heavy toll of goodwill and well intentioned 
efforts. Since partition, the ongoing Kashmir dispute has not only 
dominated the relations between India and Pakistan but it has continuously 
generated a certain amount of anxiety among other members of SAARC. In 
addition there exist many irritants which have periodically emerged on the 
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 News, Nov 21, 2004 
25
 Regional Forum, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html retrieved on 
November 12, 2013. 
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 SAARC Arbitration Council http://sarco.org.pk/ retrieved on November 12, 
2013. 
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South Asian scene and contributed their share towards the incumbent 
arsenal of complex relationships. 
SAARC does not have a forum like ARF where the states of South 
Asia could discuss their political dispute with a desired level of honesty of 
purpose. However this does not mean that SAARC does not provide 
opportunity to member states to discuss issues and disputes of political 
nature. The annual Summit and periodic ministerial meetings frequently 
provide an opportunity to member states to at least exchange views on 
controversial issues. In addition it needs to be mentioned here that the 
member states have already begun to provide what is often referred to as 
‗retreat‘. While the Charter does not permit the member states to place a 
political dispute on the table in all formal sessions, one day is provided 
during the Summit for the leaders of the member countries to discuss their 




Sustainable Dispute Resolving Mechanism 
No regional dispute resolving mechanism is likely to work if there is no 
political will on the part of member states. In fact the future of all regional 
organizations is heavily dependent upon the goodwill of member countries. 
Larger and powerful partners are expected not only to facilitate the 
strengthening of the principle of collective advantages but also demonstrate 
the spirit of cooperation even if it entails some disadvantages. However, if 
the larger and powerful members of the regional organization try to use the 
organization with a view to promoting their own interest, the regional 
organization is unlikely to move forward towards the declared aim of 
collective advantage. For example, the Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO) was unable to attract genuine cooperative efforts from the Central 
Asian States as they realized that the original three members (Iran, Pakistan 
and Turkey) were trying to use the organization in order to promote their 
own interests rather than making serious efforts towards integration.
27
 All 
regional organizations have faced and in all probability would continue to 
face periodically emerging complex issues.  
To establish a sustainable dispute resolving mechanism, the following 
preconditions need to be seriously considered: 
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a) Existence of political will: Perhaps the most important pre-
condition is the existence of political will. Without the existence of 
political will to resolve the disputes/issues, all efforts to establish 
some kind of dispute resolving mechanism would be useless. It is 
expected that the involved parties would do their homework and 
come to the forum not only with a spirit of resolving disputes but 
also equipped with some alternative options. If the states involved 
are unable to demonstrate their desire and political will to resolve 
the dispute, mere public statements would not generate sufficient 
confidence or convince the adversary. Political will also implies 
that you are ready to make concessions and work for a compromise 
formula in order to settle the issue or resolve the dispute. One can 
learn from the working of ARF or OSCE (Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe) in order to resolve the dispute and pave 
the way for peace. 
b) Recognizing the need for some mechanism or forum to address 
problems of security and political cooperation in order to 
provide practical models for resolving the dispute. The ARF model 
appears to be relatively more suitable to the environment prevailing 
in South Asia. The existence of political will along with the dispute 
resolving mechanism could not only reduce the tensions between 
the disputants but could also influence parties to initiate a series of 
dialogue. These dialogues should be continuous and should not be 
allowed to be hijacked by either of the parties involved. Not only 
the consistency of regularly held dialogues is maintained but if the 
parties reach a dead end, the other members of the organization 
should be allowed to participate in the dialogue process with a view 
to helping and facilitating the process. Consistency of dialogue is 
extremely necessary and if the parties are unable to resolve the 
dispute/issue, they should announce the time and date of the next 
meeting/round of talks before dispersing. 
c) Need to recognize the usefulness of informal diplomacy: History 
is studded with innumerable instances/examples in which 
invaluable contributions were made by informal diplomacy. In 
recent times when the parties were unable to move forward such as 
during the negotiations of Brasstacks and Simla crises, it was the 
informal diplomacy that effectively dealt with the undesired 
impediments and facilitated the parties to move forward. If an 
organization does not allow the contentious issues/disputes to be 
discussed in formal meetings similar to what SAARC is practising, 
then it is imperative that some time is given to the participants to 
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discuss issues/disputes in informal setting. SAARC Summit devotes 
one day, what is often called the ‗Retreat‘, which is utilized for 
informal diplomacy. The participants are enabled to discuss 
difficult and complex issues in a totally relaxed and informal 
environment with view to finding a compromise formula which 
could satisfy both sides. 
d) Need to secure acceptance of alternative dispute resolution 
methods: The parties should not only be informed but also express 
their willingness that if the bilateral efforts fail to resolve the 
dispute then alternative dispute resolution methods may be 
employed. For instance mediation has been relatively more 
successful in most parts of the world. If the mediation process also 
fails to deliver, then the case could be referred to an arbitration 
tribunal. The main reason that contributed towards the successful 
resolution of disputes in ASEAN is the willingness of member 
states to move to other available dispute resolution methods such as 
mediation and arbitration.   
 
India-Pakistan and Dispute Resolution 
South Asia is an area where many UN approved methods of dispute 
resolution have been employed with varying degrees of success. However it 
needs to be stressed here that only those issues were resolved where both 
India and Pakistan demonstrated a desired level of political will. ‗The 
history of dispute settlement between India and Pakistan teaches us that a 
third party role, even if it is in the nature of a facilitator, is indispensable in 
order to move things forward‘.28 Complex disputes like the ongoing 
Kashmir dispute managed to defy all internal and external efforts mainly 
because one party never agreed to take to the arbitration tribunal if all 
efforts of negotiation, mediation and reconciliation failed. On the other 
hand, when both India and Pakistan agreed to submit the Rann of Kutch 
dispute to an arbitration tribunal after mediation of the British Prime 
Minister, Herald Wilson, and the case of Baglihar Dam which was 
submitted to a neutral umpire, both disputes were resolved.  
The main dispute between India and Pakistan is over Kashmir and it 
is a well-known fact that desired level of normalization between India and 
Pakistan will never come to South Asia unless it is resolved. While Kashmir 
dispute has been subjected to bilateral negotiations and mediation by UN 
official representative, it has not yet been resolved. Innumerable solutions 
have been put forwards by many scholars but the dispute continues to test 
                                                          
28
 Hussain, Op. Cit., p.157 
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Given the history of hostile relationships between Pakistan and India, 
it is not easy to suggest a sustainable and result orientated dispute resolution 
mechanism for these two countries. However, if they comply with the 
above mentioned four conditions -- political will, forum for discussion of 
political disputes, consistency and allowance for informal diplomacy, and 
expressed willingness to take the dispute to next stages- such as mediation 
or arbitration -- the chances to resolve even a complex dispute like the 
ongoing Kashmir dispute would rapidly multiply. In the event, mediation 
also fails to produce results, parties should be willing to submit the dispute 
to arbitration. 
                                                          
29
 The list of periodically suggested solutions for the Kashmir dispute is available 
and published. See PILDAT Briefing Paper No. 19, Proposals for Resolving the 
Kashmir Dispute, (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and 
Transparency, June 2005). Also see ‗Kashmir: Identifying elements of a 
Sustainable Solution‘ by Moeed Yusuf and Adil Najam in Sustainable and 
Development and Governance in the Age of Extremes edited by Sustainable 
Development Policy Institute, 2005, Pakistan. 






Dr. Kamal Monnoo hails from a business family that now has its fifth 
generation in industry and commerce. He sits on various private and public 
sector corporate Boards. Having done his schooling from Aitchison 
College, Lahore, he holds academic qualifications from the International 
School of Management, Yale University, Crummer School of Business & 
Management and Syracuse University, US. Dr. Monnoo‘s first book, A 
Study of WTO, was widely received, both at home and abroad. A committed 
traveller, endlessly curious about the international scene, he is also a 
member of the Board of Governors of IPRI. His second book Economic 
Management in Pakistan has recently been published in September 2013. 
 
Mr. Janak Lal Karmacharya has 45 years of experience of working in 
power sector in various capacities. He obtained his PhD in Technical 
Sciences from People's Friendship University, Moscow, Russia in 1978. 
And he obtained MSc in Civil Engineering from Ministry of Education, 
Moscow Hydrological Reclamation Institute, Russia in 1968.  
As hydro-techanical/ hydropower engineer he has been associated with the 
construction of hydropower projects for over 37 years. 
 
Ms. Arshi Saleem Hashmi is a PhD scholar and Assistant Professor, 
Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, National Defence University 
(NDU), Islamabad. She has expertise in Religious Conflicts, Religious 
Radicalism and Militancy, Political Violence, Conflict Resolution and 
Confidence Building Measures. 
 
Professor Savita Pande is Chairperson Centre for South Asian Studies, 
School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, (JNU), New 
Delhi, India. Her areas of expertise include Pakistan‘s domestic and foreign 
policy, regional security in South Asia and Indian Foreign Policy. Prior to 
coming to JNU, Professor Pande was Research Fellow at the Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses. Her published work include her books: 
Regional and Ethnic Minorities in Pakistan and Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy, 
etc.  
 
Mr. Muhammad Yousaf Saber is a member of the Afghan Parliament 
from Kuchi tribe and is the Secretary of Refugees, IDPs, Kuchi and Border 
Affair Commission of the Lower House. Mr. Saber holds a Bachelor degree 
in Management Sciences and English Literature.  
272   Seminar Book 
 
 
Dr. Liu Zongyi is Research Fellow at the Institute for World Economic 
Studies and Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institute for 
International Studies (SIIS). His research focuses on India‘s Economy and 
Foreign Policy, China‘s Foreign Policy, BRICS, and G-20. In recent years, 
Dr. Liu has published several papers in academic journals in Chinese and 
English language. He was a visiting scholar at the German Development 
Institute (DIE), OECD Heiligendamm Dialogue Process (HDP) Support 
Unit, and Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  
 
Dr. Pervez Tahir holds PhD and MPhil degrees from the University of 
Cambridge. He has been the Chief Economist of the Planning Commission, 
Joan Robinson Memorial Lecturer at the Faculty of Economics, University 
of Cambridge, Mahbubul Haq Professor of Economics at the GC 
University, Lahore and Professor and Head of the Department of 
Economics at the FCC University, Lahore. Dr. Tahir also served on the 
Statistical Advisory Panel of the UNDP‘s Human Development Report. 
Presently, he speaks, writes and researches as a freelance economist. 
 
Mr. Sheikh Muhammad Ali is Vice President of the Federation of 
Pakistan Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FPCCI), Chairman Board of 
Management, Gujranwala Business Centre, Gujranwala (A joint project of 
MoI&P, SMEDA and GCCI). He holds a MBA degree from Lahore School 
of Economics.  
 
Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan is currently working as Professor and Chairman, 
Department of International Relations and Political Science, Dean Faculty 
of Arts and Law, University of Sargodha (UOS), Pakistan. He is Founder 
Editor of UOS Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities. Previously, he 
was associated with Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) as Senior 
Research Fellow (2002-2010) and Editor-in-Chief, IPRI Journal. He was 
Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of 
Punjab where he founded the Journal of Political Studies. Dr. Khan‘s areas 
of interest include Government and Politics of Pakistan, South Asian 
countries, security issues in the Indian Ocean, Afghanistan and Central 
Asia. He is author of three books. 
 
Dr. Syed Akhter Hussain Shah is Additional Secretary, Labour and 
Manpower, KPK, Peshawar. Mr. Shah holds a PhD in Economics and has 
wide-ranging research, field and secretariat experience of around 25 years 
in socio-economic development, revenue and taxation, financial 
management, planning and development, public policy making, 
implementation and monitoring.  
Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries 273 
 
 
Prof. Barkat-e-Khuda holds a Masters in Economics (1970) from 
University of Dhaka; and PhD in Demography (1978) from The Australian 
National University, Canberra. His major areas of expertise include: 
Development Economics, Labour Economics, Microeconomics, Health 
Economics, Population and Development, Family Planning and 
Reproductive Health, and Health Systems Strengthening. Mr.Barkat-e-
Khuda has held senior management, research leadership and teaching 
positions for three decades. He has been Professor since 1984 and former 
Chairman of the Department of Economics, University of Dhaka. 
 
Dr. Wolfgang-Peter Zingel holds a PhD in Economics from Heidelberg 
University. He is a Pakistani expert and knows several languages including 
English, French, Hindi and Urdu.  
 
Dr. Salman Shah is former Federal Minister of Finance, Revenue, 
Economic Affairs and Statistics, and Adviser to the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan (2004-2008); Chairman, Board of Directors, Lahore Stock 
Exchange and  CEO and Founder of Bridge Asia Financial Services.  
A financial professional with over 25 years of extensive experience in 
government, academia and the private-sector, Dr. Salman Shah holds a PhD 
from the Kelley School of Business Administration, Indiana University, 
Bloomington, Indiana, USA.  
 
Ambassador (R) Nihal Rodrigo, a retired officer of Sri Lanka‘s Foreign 
Service was Honorary Adviser (Foreign Relations) to the Sri Lankan 
President. He has served as Ambassador to China when he was concurrently 
accredited to the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea. He has served as 
Secretary General/South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). He was associated with Sri Lankan Permanent Mission to the 
United Nations as ambassador. He was member of the UN Secretary-
General‘s Advisory Board on Disarmament. His earlier diplomatic postings 
were in Missions in Germany, India and Australia. He is working on a study 
of Sri Lanka‘s foreign relations and security concerns in the context of the 
emerging Asian Century. 
 
Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema holds M. Litt. in Strategic Studies from 
Aberdeen University (U.K.) and a PhD from Quaid-i-Azam University 
(Pakistan).  Dr.Cheema has been a teacher for 28 years both inside the 
country (Pakistan) as well as abroad. During his 19 years stay at Quaid-i-
Azam University; Dr. Cheema served as the Chairman of the International 
Relation's Department as well as Defence and Strategic Studies Department. 
Dr. Cheema served as President of Islamabad Policy Research Institute 
274   Seminar Book 
 
 
from 2000 to 2009. 
Dr. Cheema is a scholar of international repute. His work has been 
published in international academic journals. Dr. Cheema has authored and 
edited a number of books on international affairs and published a number of 
monographs.   
 






Abbas Maleki, 103, 104, 109 
Abdullah Yameen, 243 
Abhayagiri Temple, 250 
Abraham Lincoln, 58 
Addu Declaration, 2 
Afghanistan, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 18, 22, 
23, 31, 33, 55, 61, 62, 63, 69, 72, 
74, 76, 85, 86, 87, 91, 95, 96, 98, 
99, 101, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 
115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 
121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 
130, 131, 133, 135, 139, 142, 
149, 151, 158, 160, 161, 163, 
170, 175, 186, 193, 216, 218, 
221, 225, 227, 265 
Africa, 24, 136, 141, 164, 174, 
214, 247, 259 
African Union, 147 
Afzal Guru, 170 
Agartala, 87, 90 
Air Services Agreement, 173 
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
103 
Ali Shams Ardekani, 103 
Almaty-Bishkek Regional Road 
Rehabilitation, 32, 88 
America, 19, 42, 58, 93, 110, 
111, 119, 126, 247, 249, 250, 253 
Amin Faheem, 169 
Amir Khan Muttaqi, 111 
Amritsar, 84 
Amsterdam, 40 
Arab Peninsula, 15 
Arabian Sea, 104, 123, 164, 166 
Argentinian company Bridas, 111 
Asalouyeh, 104 
ASEAN Regional Forum, 11, 35, 
266 
ASEAN, 11, 16, 19, 20, 21, 35, 
81, 96, 99, 135, 140, 147, 183, 
194, 203, 209, 217, 218, 221, 
223, 225, 226, 232, 235, 248, 
249, 253, 255, 266, 269 
Asia Pacific, 35, 51 
Asia, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
23, 24, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 42, 
49, 51, 54, 56, 61, 62, 69, 70, 74, 
81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 
100, 101, 106, 108, 109, 110, 
112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 
118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 
125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 
132, 133, 134, 138, 139, 142, 
145, 147, 148, 151, 153, 162, 
163, 164, 166, 168, 175, 177, 
183, 186, 188, 191, 192, 193, 
194, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 
203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 
209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 217, 
218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 
226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 
232, 233, 234, 235, 240, 245, 
246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 
252, 253, 254, 255, 259, 261, 
262, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269 
Asian Development Bank, 1, 9, 
90, 110, 151, 161, 212, 227, 248 
Asian Energy Institute, 103 
Asian Highway Network, 87 
Asian Highway, 87, 88, 90 
Assam, 171 
276   Seminar Book 
 
 
Australia, 211, 222, 225, 246, 
247, 249 
Austrian, 54 
Awami League, 171 
 
B 
Baburam Bhattarai, 172 
Baghdad Pact, 166, 220, 226, 231 
Baglihar Dam, 269 
Bangkok Declaration of 1967, 
223 
Banglabandha, 90 
Bangladesh Power Development 
Board, 65 
Bangladesh, 1, 2, 7, 23, 33, 55, 
61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 72, 
73, 74, 76, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 
94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 130, 131, 133, 
134, 146, 148, 149, 150, 152, 
158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 
168, 170, 171, 173, 183, 184, 
185, 186, 189, 191, 193, 194, 
195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 202, 
203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 
212, 217, 221, 223, 225, 229, 
241, 243, 245, 246, 247, 255, 262 
Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation, 90, 221 
Bay of Bengal, 90, 167, 185, 221 
Beas, 263 
Behrampur, 72 
Beijing, 138, 250, 255 
Bengals, 33, 152 
Benin, 247 
Bhaburam Bhattarai, 244 
Bheramar, 72 
Bhutan, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 
70, 73, 74, 76, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 
95, 98, 130, 131, 133, 146, 158, 
161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 182, 
186, 189, 193, 194, 195, 202, 
217, 221 
Bilateral Trade Agreements, 192 
Biratnagar, 87 
Birgunj, 87, 91 
Boao Forum for Asia, 251 
Booz-Hamilton-Allen, 246, 248, 
250, 255 
Borneo, 167, 222 
Brasstacks, 268 
Britain, 165, 215, 219, 220 
British, 32, 41, 58, 99, 105, 112, 
152, 165, 174, 201, 218, 221, 
222, 264, 269 
Brunei, 217, 222, 223, 253 




Burma, 167, 222 
 
C 
C. Kunaka, 84 
Cambodia, 167, 217, 222, 223 
Canada, 225, 247 
Caspian region, 109 
CENTO, 166, 220, 226, 230 
Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation, 32, 88 
Central Asia, 1, 6, 88, 99, 101, 
118, 120, 125, 142, 164, 175 
Central Treaty Organisation, 220 
Central Turkey, 210 
Chenab, 263 
Chennai, 84, 87 
Chief Minister Wigneswaran, 242 
China National Petroleum 
Corporation, 139 
China Pakistan Economic 
Corridor, 142 
China, 1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 16, 18, 24, 
29, 35, 39, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 
Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries 277 
 
 
90, 91, 93, 104, 109, 110, 115, 
116, 121, 123, 127, 128, 129, 
130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 
136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 
142, 143, 144, 145, 164, 166, 
167, 172, 173, 174, 175, 201, 
210, 211, 222, 223, 225, 232, 
235, 236, 245, 246, 247, 248, 
249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 
255, 256 
China-Japan-South Korea Free 
Trade Agreement, 58 
China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor, 127 
China's National Energy 
Administration, 135 
China-South Asian Countries 
Think Tank Forum, 249 
China-Sri Lanka Free Trade 
Agreement, 252 
Chittagong, 84, 87, 90, 91, 134, 
246 
Christopher Columbus, 247 
Cochin, 87 
Cold War, 18, 102, 166, 218 
Colombo, 84, 87, 93, 99, 147, 
173, 174, 186, 191, 208, 227, 
240, 242, 246, 255, 262 
Common Agricultural Policy, 
216, 219 
Commonwealth, 85, 122, 173, 
174, 207, 216, 225, 241, 253, 255 
Composite Dialogue, 168 




Daar Es Salam, 110 
Dauletabad, 112, 117 
Delhi, 32, 84, 87, 90, 96, 99, 103, 
104, 105, 113, 116, 142, 165, 
167, 168, 169, 172, 206, 232, 
259, 262, 267 
Deng Xiaoping, 55 
Denmark, 219 
Deutsche Mark, 218 
Dhaka, 84, 90, 91, 166, 171, 206, 
207, 208, 265 
Dien Bien Phu, 222 
Distribution System Operators, 
75 
Doha Agreement, 37, 41 
Doha Talks, 50 
Doha, 37, 41, 50, 54, 225 
Dortmund, 40 
Douletabad, 114 
Dr. Frank Graham, 260 
Dubai, 44 
Duty Free Trade Preference, 199 
 
E 
East Asia, 15, 16, 19, 33, 51, 99, 
122, 188, 201, 210, 245 
East Asian, 1, 37, 42, 56, 93, 188, 
217, 223 
East China Sea, 55 
Economic Cooperation for 
Development, 211 
Eelam  Peoples Democratic 
Party, 241 
Elborgh-Woytek, 122 
Electricity Regulatory Authority, 
75 
Emerging Markets Forum in 
Tokyo, 248 
Engineering Development Board, 
46 
Estonia, 225 
Eugene Black, 263 
Euro Zone, 49 
Europe, 1, 9, 15, 37, 40, 42, 49, 
93, 109, 110, 115, 121, 122, 147, 
148, 152, 154, 164, 209, 210, 
278   Seminar Book 
 
 
213, 217, 218, 219, 220, 225, 
226, 227, 230, 231, 232, 248, 251 
European Economic Community, 
215, 217, 218 
European Union, 1, 9, 15, 16, 31, 
37, 42, 122, 152, 210, 211, 212, 
213, 217, 219, 220, 227, 228, 
229, 231, 249 
Export Inspection Council, 38, 43 
 
F 
Fa Xian, 250 
Far East, 24, 35, 51, 121 
Fazal-u-Rahman, 250 
Fazilka, 110 
Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, 205 
Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, 170, 
172 
Firdous Ashiq Awan, 172 
Five Hub Growth Strategy, 248 
Foreign Direct Investment, 47, 
128, 133 
former Soviet Republic, 15 
Formosa, 167 
France, 16, 152, 153, 209, 213, 
215, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 247 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 57 
Free Trade Agreement, 3, 12, 
174, 187, 208, 212, 227 
Free Trade Agreements, 13, 37, 
41, 179, 191, 198 
Free Trade Area, 98, 217 
Free Trade Areas, 35, 56 
Freidrich Hayek, 54 
Fudan University‘s Centre for the  




Ganda Singh border, 33 
Ganges River, 171 
Gas Infrastructure Development 
Cess, 106 
Gas Sales Purchase Agreement, 
106 
GATT., 98 
Gazprom, 109, 110 
General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, 157, 224 
General Patreus, 121 
Generalized Scheme of 
Preferences, 212 
Generalized System of 
Preferences, 137 
German Mark, 218 
Germany, 1, 2, 16, 24, 42, 103, 
152, 153, 175, 209, 213, 218, 
219, 220, 247, 253 
Global competitive Index, 236 
Globalization, 18, 84, 191 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa, 247 
Grand Trunk, 32 
Great Depression, 218 
Great Game, 165 
Great Irish Potato Famine, 216 
Great Recession, 41 
Greece, 247 
Grieco, 102 
Gross Domestic Product, 163 
Gunner Jarring, 260 




Hambantota, 246, 248 
Hangzhou, 250 
Hasina Wajid, 171 
Henry Kissinger, 210 
Herat, 110, 118, 120, 123 
Hillary Clinton, 120, 125 
Himalayas, 23, 135, 164, 242 
Hindukush, 164 
Horn of Africa, 174 
Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries 279 
 
 




India and Pakistan Standard and 
Quality Control Authority, 38, 43 
India, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 19, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 33, 34, 36, 
37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 
48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 60, 
61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 
72, 73, 74, 76, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 
91, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 
102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 
109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 
115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 
125, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 
133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 
142, 143, 148, 149, 150, 151, 
152, 153, 154, 158, 161, 163, 
164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 
170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 
182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 
189, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 
197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 
206, 207, 208, 210, 212, 214, 
216, 217, 220, 221, 223, 224, 
225, 227, 228, 230, 233, 235, 
236, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 
243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 
253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259, 
260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 
266, 269 
Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs, 173 
Indian Ocean Region, 245 
Indian Ocean Rim Association 
for Regional Cooperation, 246 
Indian Ocean, 7, 138, 140, 152, 
164, 166, 167, 174, 245, 246, 
247, 252, 254 
Indian Peace Keeping Force, 174 
Indonesia, 16, 39, 51, 52, 222, 
223, 247, 248, 253 
Indus Water Treaty, 11, 153, 263, 
264 
Indus, 11, 48, 104, 153, 210, 263, 
264 
Integrated Programme of Action, 
146 
Intellectual property rights, 179, 
224 
Intergovernmental Agreement on 
the Asian Highway Network, 87 
Inter-Governmental Framework 
Agreement, 113, 151 
International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, 181 
International Monetary Fund, 60, 
157, 224 
International Trade Organization, 
224 
Iran, 6, 7, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 
105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 
116, 120, 121, 123, 142, 151, 
210, 211, 218, 220, 221, 225, 
231, 247, 249, 267 
Iran, Libya Sanctions Act, 109 
Iran's Seventh Cross-Country Gas  
Pipeline, 104 
Iraq, 18, 220, 231 
Islamabad, 1, 2, 12, 14, 15, 17, 
18, 22, 27, 28, 87, 106, 111, 113, 
116, 147, 151, 165, 169, 170, 
207, 210, 227, 231, 240, 259 
Israel, 247 
Istanbul, 32, 99, 221 
 
J 
Jaigaon, 90, 91 
Jaish-e-Mohammad, 170 
Jamaat-i-Islami, 170 
Jamaatud Daawa, 170 
280   Seminar Book 
 
 
Jammu and Kashmir, 34 
Jamuna Bridge, 91 
Japan, 16, 29, 39, 52, 55, 56, 58, 
121, 127, 175, 179, 211, 215, 
217, 223, 225, 247, 248, 249, 
253, 255 
Java, 167 
Jawahar Lal Nehru, 166 
Jayaprakish Narayan, 264 
Jhelum, 263 
Jim Yong Kim, 51 
Joint Tourism Infrastructure, 238 
Joseph Stiglitz, 41, 59 
 
K 
K M Panikkar, 166, 167 
Kakarbhitta, 91 
Kakarvita, 90 
Kandahar, 110, 118, 120 





Kashmir, 18, 107, 153, 165, 166, 
168, 170, 258, 260, 261, 262, 
263, 264, 266, 269 
Kathmandu, 84, 87, 90, 134, 154, 
209, 211, 227, 228, 231, 249 
Katihar, 87 
Kazakhstan, 120, 121, 122, 221, 
225 
Khalid Rahman, 250 
Khalida Zia, 171 
khaura, 90 
Khuzdar, 104 
King Mahindra, 173 
Kolkata, 84, 87, 90, 91, 165 
Kunming, 91, 134, 245, 249, 250 
Kyrgyzstan, 122, 221, 225 
 
L 
Lahore, 60, 84, 90, 121, 154, 170, 
183, 191 
Lashkar e Taiba, 170 
Latvia, 225 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam, 10, 240 
Line of Control, 153, 169 
Lithuania, 225 
Look East policy, 175, 255 
 
M 
M. Roberts, 84 
Malaya, 167, 222 
Malaysia, 39, 51, 52, 217, 222, 
223, 247, 253 
Malaysian Peninsula, 164 
Maldha, 91 
Maldives, 2, 23, 61, 62, 63, 77, 
85, 86, 93, 130, 131, 133, 146, 
149, 158, 163, 164, 184, 193, 
195, 216, 217, 241, 242, 243, 
244, 245, 247, 249 
Mamata Bannerjee, 171 
Mandalay, 91 
Manila Pact, 222 
Manmohan Singh, 121, 137, 153, 
171, 173, 241, 246, 254, 255 
Marala Headwork, 264 
Maritime Silk Road, 142 







Memorandum of Understanding 
on the Regional Energy Market in 
South Asia, 75 
MFN, 22, 33, 44, 47, 48, 95, 98, 
149, 150, 168, 170, 172, 175, 
180, 192, 200, 206 
Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries 281 
 
 
Middle East, 18, 99, 105, 108, 
121, 164, 175, 245 
Mikra Asia, 210 
Ministry of Health and Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture, 46 
Mogla, 91 
Mongla, 90 
Monroe Doctrine, 166 
Montesquieu, 38, 54 
Most Favoured Nation, 168 
Motor Vehicle Agreement, 87 
Motor Vehicles Agreement, 32, 
99 
Multan, 104, 110 
multinational corporations, 56 
Mumbai, 84, 169 
Munich, 16 
Mutual Recognition Agreement, 
38, 43 
Muzaffarabad, 170 
Myanmar, 33, 90, 91, 99, 134, 
143, 186, 198, 211, 221, 223, 
246, 249, 255 
Nairobi, 110 
Narendra Modi, 243 




National Iranian Gas Company, 
103 
National Tariff Commission, 46 
Nawabshah, 108 
Negative List, 149, 169 
Nepal Electricity Authority, 64 
Nepal, 1, 2, 7, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 
68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 85, 86, 87, 
90, 91, 95, 98, 130, 131, 133, 
146, 149, 152, 158, 160, 161, 
162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 170, 
172, 173, 182, 184, 186, 189, 
193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 202, 
204, 208, 221, 242, 243, 244 
Nepali Congress Party, 243 
Netherlands, 220, 247 
New Silk Road, 6, 99, 117, 119, 
120, 121, 125, 126 
New Zealand, 222 
Nigeria, 24, 247 
Nile Delta, 164 
Non-Tariff Barriers, 7, 45, 46, 60, 
97, 150, 154 
North America, 147 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement, 225 
Northern Economic Corridor of 
the Greater Mekong Sub-region, 
32, 88 
Nuwara Eliya, 244 
 
O 
Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, 268 
Ottoman naval, 164 




Pacific Countries Trade 
Agreement, 252 
Pacific Islands, 1 
Pagla Water Treatment Plant, 134 
Pakistan, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
12, 13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 
29, 33, 34, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 
45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 55, 56, 57, 60, 
61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 
74, 76, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 
95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 
103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 
109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 
116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 125, 
126, 130, 131, 133, 134, 139, 
282   Seminar Book 
 
 
141, 142, 144, 145, 148, 149, 
150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 158, 
160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 
166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 
173, 175, 180, 182, 183, 184, 
185, 186, 187, 189, 191, 193, 
194, 195, 198, 200, 201, 204, 
206, 207, 211, 212, 214, 216, 
217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 
225, 227, 229, 231, 233, 234, 
235, 236, 237, 238, 241, 244, 
245, 246, 247, 250, 253, 255, 
257, 258, 259, 261, 262, 263, 
264, 265, 266, 267, 269 
Palestine, 18, 164 
Papua New Guinea, 223 
Paul Krugman, 39 
Persian Gulf, 164, 174 
Philippine, 167 
Philippines, 29, 39, 52, 55, 222, 
223, 248, 253 
Phuentsholing, 87, 90 
Pokhara Regional International 
Airport, 134 
Power Construction Corporation 
of China, 135 
Preferential Trade Agreements, 
37, 41 
President Ayub Khan, 265 
President Eisenhower, 222 
President J. Jayaverdene, 174 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, 
173, 252, 255 
President Obama, 116, 253, 254 
President Rajapaksa, 245 
President Xi Jinpin, 249, 253 
Prime Minister D.M. Jayaratne, 
250 
Prime Minister L.B. Shastri, 265 
Prime Minister Li Keqiang, 253, 
255 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, 
116, 153, 172 
Prime Minister, Herald Wilson, 
264, 269 
Professor Ratna Kapur, 245 
Punjab, 110, 134, 264 






Rail Services Agreement, 173 
Railway Agreement, 87 
Rajiv Gandhi, 174 
Rann of Kutch Award, 11, 263, 
264 
Ravi, 111, 117, 263 
Realism, 101 
Redressal of Grievances 
Agreement, 38, 43 
Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, 56 
Regional Cooperation for 
Development, 221 
Regional Electricity Market, 75 
Regional Power Pool, 75 
regional trade agreements, 192, 
213 
Regional Transport and Transit 
Agreement, 32, 99 
Ren Xiao, 248 
Republic of Korea, 51, 56, 211, 
248, 249 
Riasi Tehsil of Udhampur, 264 
Richard Cobden, 41, 58 
Robert Blake, 109 
Rohanpur, 87 
Russia, 110, 115, 116, 121, 140, 
165, 175, 225, 247 
 
S 
Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries 283 
 
 
SAARC Agreement on Trade in 
Services, 13, 148 
SAARC Bank, 10, 31, 239 
SAARC Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, 3, 13, 148 
SAARC Energy Center, 22 
SAARC Energy Centre, 72, 151 
SAARC Energy Working Group, 
75 
SAARC Highway Corridor, 90 
SAARC Regional Multimodal 
Transport Study, 23, 87 
SAARC Working Group, 5, 74 
SAFTA Committee of Experts, 3, 
13, 21 
SAFTA Ministerial Council, 3, 
13, 147, 156 
Salman Khursheed, 174 
SASEC Road Corridor, 90 
SEATO, 166, 222, 232 
Second World War, 16, 174 
Secretary General of UN Ban-ki-
Moon, 260 
Senegal, 247 
Sensitive List, 149, 150, 156, 201 
Seychelles, 247 
Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, 140, 225 
Shanghai., 58 
Sher Shah Road, 32, 99 
Shibgang, 91 
Shyam Saran, 246 
Sialkot, 264 
Siam, 167, 222 
Silk Road Economic Belt, 7, 127, 
141, 142, 145 
Simla Agreement, 262 
Singapore, 39, 44, 50, 52, 179, 
209, 217, 222, 223, 224, 225, 
226, 232, 247, 248 
Sir Owen Dixon, 260 
Sitwe, 246 
South Africa, 24 
South Asia, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 
15, 16, 24, 32, 33, 34, 81, 82, 83, 
84, 86, 91, 93, 98, 99, 101, 110, 
120, 132, 164, 166, 175, 188, 
189, 191, 193, 194, 201, 203, 
206, 209, 214, 221, 226, 231, 
233, 261, 265, 267 
South Asian Agreement on Trade 
in Services, 200 
South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation, 8, 37, 42, 
163, 182, 193, 211, 231, 240 
South Asian Economic Union, 
153, 193 
South Asian Free Trade 
Agreement, 2, 191, 207 
South Asian Free Trade Area, 
147, 186, 191, 192, 193 
South Asian Preferential Trade 
Area, 146 
South China Sea, 18, 55 
South Korea, 39, 52, 58, 247 
Southeast Asia, 15, 90, 94, 132, 
210, 217, 222, 224 
Southern harbour of Galle, 247 
Southern Silk Road, 142 
South-South trade, 201 
Special Purpose Vehicle, 113 
Sri Lanka Power System, 67 
Sri Lanka, 1, 7, 10, 55, 65, 67, 
68, 69, 71, 74, 76, 85, 87, 93, 99, 
130, 131, 133, 134, 139, 149, 
152, 153, 155, 158, 163, 164, 
167, 168, 170, 173, 174, 183, 
184, 185, 193, 194, 195, 198, 
200, 206, 208, 217, 221, 223, 
227, 240, 241, 243, 245, 246, 
247, 250, 252, 255, 262 
Standard International Trade 
Classification, 184 
State Electricity Authority, 75 
284   Seminar Book 
 
 
Stephen Krasner, 102 
Stephen Mann, 109 
Strategic Maritime Cooperation 
& Partnerships to Face the Future 








Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, 169 
 
T 
Tadbir Energy Development 
Group, 106 
Taiwan, 39, 52, 167, 213, 223, 
232 
Tajikistan, 99, 121, 221, 225 
Taliban, 110, 112, 115 
Tamil Nadu, 173, 241, 242 
Tamil National Alliance, 241 
TAPI, 6, 8, 101, 110, 112, 113, 
114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 125 
Tashkent Declaration, 11, 263, 
265 
Tashkent, 11, 221, 263, 265 
Technical Barriers to Trade, 44 
Teesta River, 171 
Tehran, 106, 107, 221 
Thailand, 39, 44, 52, 167, 185, 
198, 221, 222, 223, 226, 247, 253 
Thimphu, 84, 90 
Togo, 247 
Trade and Development Agency, 
114 
Trade Restrictiveness Index, 150 
Trans-Asian Railways, 32, 86 
Transmission System Operators, 
75 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, 56 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 
173 
Treaty of Rome, 218 
Treaty of Trade, 173 
Trinamool Congress, 171 
Tripura, 171 
Truman Doctrine, 218, 232 
Turkey, 164, 220, 221, 231, 247, 
267 
Turkmenistan, 6, 8, 72, 99, 101, 
108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 
115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 




UK, 35, 51, 154, 223, 247, 261 
UN Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and Pacific, 
87 
UN Security Council, 168, 241, 
257, 258, 260, 265 
United Kingdom, 215, 218, 219, 
220, 222, 231 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, 60, 93, 
154, 159 
United States, 7, 16, 37, 42, 108, 
110, 111, 114, 117, 119, 120, 
121, 142, 151, 166, 175, 215, 
218, 220, 221, 224, 225, 245, 
246, 247, 249, 250, 253, 255 
US India Civil Nuclear 
Agreement, 138 
US, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 24, 29, 
46, 51, 52, 53, 96, 105, 109, 110, 
111, 114, 116, 117, 119, 142, 
154, 166, 175, 179, 180, 187, 
210, 213, 216, 218, 222, 225, 
226, 233, 246, 247, 253, 254, 255 
Uzbekistan, 99, 120, 121, 122, 
221, 225 





Vasco da Gama, 164 
Vice President Richard Nixon, 
222 
Viet Nam, 247 
Vietnam, 222, 223, 226, 253 
Visa Agreement, 263 
 
W 
W. Arthur LEWIS, 224, 231 
Wagah-border, 33 
Waltz, 102 
West Africa, 24 
West Asia, 15, 33, 88, 98, 99, 
101, 118, 165 
West Asian, 1 
World Bank, 47, 51, 81, 150, 
187, 191, 195, 198, 206, 208, 
224, 246, 259, 263 
World Buddhist Forum, 250 
World Socialist Website, 243 
World Trade Organization, 60, 
154, 178, 193, 224 
World War I, 218, 226 
WTO, 30, 37, 38, 42, 43, 44, 46, 
49, 50, 54, 60, 95, 154, 156, 178, 
179, 188, 192, 193, 200, 202, 
205, 224, 225 
 
X 
X. Liu, 84 
Xi Jinping, 55, 140, 251, 252 
 
Y 
Y.K. Sinha, 240 
Yangon, 32, 99 
Yolotan-Osman gas field, 110 
 
Z 
Zambia, 247
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
